NYT: Iraq’s Sunnis Want U.S. to Stay
This certainly seems significant:
As sectarian violence soars, many Sunni Arab political and religious leaders once staunchly opposed to the American presence here are now saying they need American troops to protect them from the rampages of Shiite militias and Shiite-run government forces.
….The new stance is one of the most significant shifts in attitude since the war began. It could influence White House plans for a reduction of the 134,000 troops here and help the Americans expand dialogue with elements of the insurgency. But the budding accommodation is already stirring a reaction among the Shiites, who make up about 60 percent of the population but were brutally ruled for decades by the Sunnis.
….[W]hen an American convoy rolled in recently, a remarkable message rang out from the loudspeakers of the Abu Hanifa Mosque, where Saddam Hussein made his last public appearance before the fall of Baghdad in 2003.
“The American Army is coming with the Iraqi Army — do not shoot,” the voice said, echoing through streets still filled with supporters of Mr. Hussein. “They are here to help you.
In other words, the political and military power of insurgent and militia groups, both Shiite and Sunni, has declined to the point where they avoid confrontation with U.S. and Iraqi forces and pursue civilian targets, which has the effect of driving everyone toward the U.S. goal of restoring stability, if not toward an affectionate view of the Americans.
This is the latest sign that with al-Qaeda’s forces severely weakened, the native Sunni insurgent groups want some kind of a negotiated demobilization, for which they have already begun negotiating. That wouldn’t necessarily mean our troubles would be over; two major Shiite militias, the Mehdi Army and the Supreme Council of the Revolution in Iraq, are significant potential threats to stability, although it seems unlikely that either force has broad-based support across Iraq’s greater Shiite population. It’s difficult to imagine that a political movement based on reprisals against civilians and petty religious despotism will gain much public appeal, as al-Qaeda’s example illustrates. This proved the undoing of al-Qaeda, whose unpopularity proved its undoing when civilians provided the tips that led to the killing and capture of most of its leaders.
This gives us renewed hope that the vast majority of Iraqis will conclude that the political process is the path of least resistance to their attainable goals.
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