BREAKING NEWS: NK May Be Preparing Nuke Test
Thanks to a reader for forwarding; via ABC News:
There is new evidence that North Korea may be preparing for an underground test of a nuclear bomb, U.S. officials told ABC News.
“It is the view of the intelligence community that a test is a real possibility,” said a senior State Department official.
A senior military official told ABC News that a U.S. intelligence agency has recently observed “suspicious vehicle movement” at a suspected North Korean test site.
The activity includes the unloading of large reels of cable outside P’unggye-yok, an underground facility in northeast North Korea. Cables can be used in nuclear testing to connect an underground test site to outside observation equipment. The intelligence was brought to the attention of the White House last week.
It’s a well-worn cliche, but this appears to be what’s known as “upping the ante.” You’ve got to wonder why, unless Richardson is right about “strategic disengagement.” After all, the missile tests they tried last time were mostly a technical flop, pissed off the Chinese, killed the Sunshine Policy, exposed the six-party talks (which nearly resulted in North Korea winning some major concessions) as a farce, and finally got the ball rolling on concerted international sanctions. It’s really hard to understand what they expect to gain this way, unless they’re just too cocooned to analyze their own predicament.
I, for one, am hoping they do it. We already believe North Korea has nukes. There’s no point in remaining in a state of escapist denial about it, and those who believe that North Korea’s intentions are really defensive deserve a dramatic refutation.
I wonder which way the wind will blow that day.
There ahead of my time-table. I figured it would take about a year of them guaging the winds before they lit one up, but it was the next North Korea-logical step.
Watching the reaction to the missile launch, I first predicted it would be 1-5 years for a nuke test. After the first week of the missile reaction, I chopped that down to 1-3 years. I’ll stick with that, but I’d put money down on 1-2 if someone wanted to make a bet.
The only real gamble, I think in Pyongyang’s eye, is how much it will have to pay in regards to China.
I believe Pyonyang believes a Roh-led SK is going to be with him no matter what —- no matter WHAT — and if the GNP wins the next election, it will either cut the North off or not depending on internal factors unrelated to the North’s actions: the GNP either fears collapse enough to keep the goodies flowing or it doesn’t. A nuke blast isn’t going to really cause them to flip flop – especially if they do it now a good year before the election.
But, what about China? The US can possibly lean on China enough to cause them to cut the North off. China and the US (and Japan) could cut a behind the scenes deal like South Korea should have been drumming up: one that gets the US and Japan (and EU perhaps) to agree to put up HUGE reconstruction money if China (and SK) force a North Korean collapse by cutting it off.
In short, if NK pisses China off too much, China might decide it gets a better return for its effort working against the North openly. (China moving to fence off the North – literally – could be taken as a sign of anticipating a collapse too).
But, North Korea is not the kind of nation that assesses weakness and easily picks the path of least resistance.
NK has been known from the start occasionally to bite the hand that fed it. Where perhaps most other nations would have reacted to China, its best and most important friend, slapping sanctions on its illegal banking funnels by moving to appease the Chinese, North Korea’s general MO is to kick them in the shins.
And that is what I would take away, in part, if North Korea does test a nuke within the next 6 to 12 months:
I would take it just as much a sign to the Chinese saying, “Look here, fuckers. Just because you’ve taken us for granted for 50 years doesn’t mean you do with us as you please. Slap sanctions on me!! Play along with the white devils!! Well, look at this….we’ve got some nuclear fireworks too, and we can shoot them off in any direction we please IF you push us to collapse. ANY DIRECTION we please.”
I think the message will be for everybody, but especially China and the US – friend and foe.
And it all works in North Korea logic:
As long as the US (and the allies that do have some influence on it (Japan and SK (and China))) believes war is not a viable option, NK will believe it can get away with just about everything and survive. It was very sorely tested in the 1990s after it lost “everything” it was getting from the Soviets and China. It starved nearly to death as a nation. But what? The regime survived. It started in the face of the worst fate, and walked away from it without collapsing.
So, to me, that meant any time they felt like they were not getting enough out of China and SK and whoever, they would decide to make big moves — of what it pecieves as strengths rather than weakness. It would fire up an ICBM and eventually test a nuke if it does not get what it wants.
And if the nuke test does come, and it does not lead the US and others to throttle the North either through direct military action or regime-killing sanctions —
—the next step for the North will be killing people.
The time to be scared will be – once the North tests a nuke, and the feror of chicken littles running around screaming “The sky is falling” has settled – and the North realizes the status quo is pretty much all they got for the effort – look for it to turn to murder as the next logical step.
Look for it to go the route of Hezbollah or the IRA or any such group. Look for it to return to the methods it used until the 1990s, but look for it on an increased scale. Look for it to take action that – forces the US to make 1 of 2 (really 3) choices: with NK saying in effect “either kill us or give us what we want” with the 3rd option being an unspoken one of “or accept a status quo in which your not caving into us leads to a routine of bloodshed.
In short —- once a nuke test has come and gone, if nothing fundamental changes, expect North Korea to push things into an Israel-type status quo – with frequent attacks in South Korea and Japan.
I give that a 2 to 5 year time frame to come true.
The whole jist of my post above about what comes next after a nuke test also explains the why the North will test a nuke: it really is best to look at the North as a gangster state.
Pyongyang is run by the Sopranos. To them, shooting up the ICBM was correct since the US applied some economic sanctions that touched a nerve.
Now that that failed to force the US into a sit down where it would cut a deal, the next logical step for them is to test a nuke.
And if that fails, the next logical step is going to the mattresses.
To them, to show weakness would do too much damage to their credibility – the credibility of fear they have used effectively in the past to wring concessions out of neighbors.
And also importantly, showing weakness sets the wrong message inside its own family as well. It might give some within the NK organization wrong headed ideas.
one thing for sure is that KJI is a wuss. he’ll do anything, but want to die.
KJI’s back is so far against the wall that he’s going to run.
the fall is literally hours away.
If a nuke test goes awry, it could be worse than Chernobyl. NK just goes from one disaster to another.
I bet they do test something. Whether or not it is successful is another question and what happens next is still another.
I predict eventually, Japan ramps up its security even more and South Korea goes nuclear as well (even if it is under the table).
A test certainly will only further isolate the North I would imagine. I do not see how it would realistically be another bargaining chip for them…
I really can’t make sense of why they’re doing this, other than for the domestic audience.
First we should be aware that the ABC story is perhaps a bit hyped. Reuters pointed out that:
So it could be a case of competing opinions, etc.
As far as why North Korea would do this, I don’t think it’s a mystery, as you point to the ‘strategic disengagement’ post. It makes perfect sense in that light, except that it’s just not needed, it’s too much. Another missile test would do just as well – but of course would run the risk of being another embarrassment.
Part of brinksmanship is not slipping over the brink, and a nuclear test might just do that. It all depends on the game China is playing.
And the domestic audience is always there, which is something for many regimes to consider, but especially for North Korea due to the cult aspect of the leaders hold on power. I think it all points to regime survival via continued disengagement.
(added) As far as ‘blackmail’ theory, or anything along those lines, the collective reaction to the missiles tests should have been enough to disabuse that notion, although I never believed it was for that in the first place. Obviously a nuke test would not bring concessions.
Also, at this point, it’s enough for them to merely drive some vehicles around known testing/research sites to get a rise from Western media and crank up threat and warning levels. Our adversaries have learned that the suggestion of a threat is enough in many cases.
Other likely factors in North Korea thinking: A nuke test proves beyond a shadow of doubt it has a workable bomb. No more strategic ambiguity.
Next, it can help American citizens decide defending South Korea isn’t worth it – at a time the US committment to SK seems clear to be weakening.
Next, it might have the long term effect of driving a wedge between Japan and the rest of East Asia.
If the missile tests brought only negativity, what might a nuke test bring? Concessions? No, NK knows better. Nuke tests will only deepen isolation. But they only need move a few trucks around to adjust our alert level.
And any new American administration won’t be able to deal with North Korea – UNLESS the DPRK agrees to ‘complete, verifiable, and irreversible’ disarmament, and fat chance of that – without looking like being blackmailed; political suicide.
North Korea knows all of this. No, NK is not after deals, they are maintaining disengagement.
KJI is going all in.
if this doesn’t work, then he’s gonna run into exile.
‘when you’ve got nothing, you’ve got nothing to lose.’
– bob dylan
I tend to agree with Richardson on many points regarding this one, with perhaps two exceptions:
1. I do not think extortion and disengagement motives are necessarily mutually exclusive.
2. I wholeheartedly disagree with:
There is a chorus among the foreign policy intelligentsia of the Left and even the fabled “Center” in the U.S. right now to deal directly one-on-one with North Korea.
In fact, Bill Richardson, a Democratic presidential dark horse and a potential (vp) running mate for Hillary Clinton, is on the record as supporting the “input” theory in dealing with the North.
And curiously enough, he is heading to North Korea again soon, I believe, on behalf of the Bush administration.
Beyond “strategic disengagement” is KJI’s desire to have a working nuclear deterrent against the US. Getting to that goal requires missile tests and a successful nuke test.
The way to dissuade KJI is to negotiate disarmament in exchange for security guarantees.
Great idea, Mi Hwa. Someone really should try that.
I agree with the two points James made.
A nuke test is both a way for NK to keep its isolation while putting pressure on the US that could very well suceed in getting the US to cut any deal possible.
I think I mentioned above that NK tries to play on what it sees as a weakness of democracy. It believes if it can get enough people screaming about the sky falling and the end of the world, Washington will cave just to make things like they are getting better or at least moving “away from the brink”.
And another key is that such pressure also helps, NK believes, by setting conditions where it has to do very little in such agreements. It can remain isolated. It can often simply make promises, and the fact that it has not done anything bad for a stretch of time is taken as a positive.
This is the only way NK knows to negociate. They do not believe they can survive if they put forward the kinds of reforms any real deals will entail. So, if they want to make any gains in deals, they must set conditions favorable to them — which means brinkmanship.
And if the tactics fail, what are they left with?
They are more isolated, which is fine with them.
And —- they have good reason to believe —- they will still be given the minimum needed to survive from China and South Korea (and a little from elsewhere).
And they have good reason to believe the US will not attack to kill the regime.
Yup (James takes out a beer and take a swig a la Hank Hill).
After the complete failure of the 1994 Agreed Frameworks (a Democrat deal, lock, stock and barrel), what would be the political repercussions of another Democrat conceived/backed North Korea deal that a) rewarded breaking the rules, and; b) ultimately fails (as any deal that doesn’t ‘complete, verifiable, and irreversible’ disarmament is destined to do)??? It’s easy for the Democrats to speak about deals from a position of little power and responsibility, but if they do gain some level of control, would the actually seek such a deal? Hopefully a moot question.
These quotes from the ‘strategic disengagement’ post sum up my position:
Can anyone suggest the math where a DPRK nuclear test = concessions from the U.S.? I’d love to see the reasoning.
I don’t have as much confidence as you in the correct short-term thinking of our political leaders. I think if enough “the sky is falling” happens in the press, political circles, and in our allies, pretty much any administration could cut a face saving deal just to get things quiet for a time.
I would also point to the minority but still somewhat influencial view among area experts and others who blame North Korea’s failure to live up to the 1994 agreement on the Republican controlled Congress and the US.
But, even more to the point, this doesn’t really matter.
North Korea does not have to seek brinkmanship only if it stands a good chance of achieving its primary goal.
More important than the chance of success is the cost of failure. I believe that is the lesson we learn from looking how NK has historically gone about things.
And here I’ll repeat myself. The reason we didn’t see ICBMs between 1998 and 2006 was not the lack of chance of forcing the US hand. The reason was NK needed China and SK too much, and it worried it could not afford to isolate them due to their support of the North and the North’s bad behavior.
The increased pressure by the US on badly needed funds in 2005 altered the equation. North Korea moved from a comfortable enough situation into one where it felt it needed to risk isolating its two benefactors for any chance at forcing America’s hand.
I also believe the North had grown more confident in how far China and SK would extend themselves even if it were acting up.
So, above all, I think NK believed it was cost effective to try to nudge the US along.
I think it will conclude the same with a nuclear test.
And after that, if China and SK stick with it significantly and the US fails to use its military, I think NK will move back to killing people like it did in the past.
And that is a key point. This is NK. They have a fairly clear track record. The see keeping the US and the rest of nations off balance as a goal in and of itself.
On the US political side, look at how frequently the Bush administration is said to have “no NK policy”.
There is a strong tendancy in State Department think which also infests area specialists that the reason “a solution” isn’t found is “we” are not trying hard enough. There is an idea that – yes – we can “all just get along”.
So when pressure is increased, they believe the reason a solution isn’t found is because we haven’t tried enough or we are not willing to make one or whatever.
This is one of my pet themes: how horribly difficult it is for these people to admit that — there is no solution.
It should be obvious that NK will not have a solution as long as it refuses to change – no matter what policy the US applies —- in part because nobody can stomach the alternative methods of forcing a solution barring reform initiated by the North (which would be military action or forcing a complete collapse).
A NK nuke test would give the impression that the Bush Admin.’s leadership has failed in regards to NK, as well as with Iraq and Iran.
… in stunning contrast to the glorious successes of the Clinton Administration, which got us a nuclear North Korea in the first place.
And remember, kids, America is jointly and severally liable for all of the world’s evil. And also for not stopping it. And for being too aggressive in stopping it.
I would also say if John Kerry had been elected, we would already had a deal with the North in place. I can’t say I have confidence either way if Gore had been elected, but I believe Kerry would have definately already had some deal signed – and we’d just be waiting for when someone would have the guts to announce it a failure – kind of like the KEDO project.
This is also an example of why pressure to make deals, any deals, works: people are short sighted.
Iraq is a “failure” or “sucess”. You got to have it now.
I guess it was the same in all those decades spent in South Korea, right? It was pretty much always already a “failure” given the South’s poverty and it’s authoritarian rulers. But, in the 1990s, it became (suddenly I guess) a success? Well, even there, it depends on who you ask. Some people of Mi-Hwa’s type would say the sucess was that of the South Korean people, not the US…
I guess it is a good thing our time tables were not so freaking out of wack when it came to fighting in WWII and then the reconstruction of Europe and elsewhere. It is a much better thing for the world that not just the US, but especially the US didn’t give in and succumb to “failure” as easily as so many want today when it came to not just the economic recovery of Europe (and Japan), but also the flowering of democracy over totalitarianism (including communism).
My point being: I’m not ready to call Iraq a “failure” and I won’t be for a long time. If the US leaves, and it remains as is or gets worse, then I’ll join hands with Mi-Hwa…well, no, not that, but I’ll call it a failure.
And at some point in the future, if things get worse, I’d accept it as a failure and say the US should leave.
But, I’d rather give the people involved more time to do something incredible and important – like set up a democracy in a nation that has long known tyranny, never known democracy, and has a split, tripartied ethnic makeup pulling at its seams.
I am not part of the mircrowave revolution.
If we applied today’s short-attention span/tolerance level to SO VERY MUCH of the past —
we would not only have not accomplished so much we would have helped create a much more screwed up world.
And lastly — success of failure in Iraq will depend more on the Iraqi people than the US government moves – just as it did in South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Italy, Germany, or even a France and so on….
As I pointed out before, the Clintonistas (or former Clintonistas) have been out in force criticizing the current administration for its North Korea policy (for all the wrong reasons, from my perspective).
The revisionism [seems to be my latest word of choice] push is on full tilt. They and their left-leaning allies in the media and think tanks are pushing the view that the 1994 AF deal “stabilized” the situation (and that Clinton knew of HEU, but didn’t care or took that risk into calculation) while Bush’s “misguided” policies led to the current “calamity” of increased North Korean nuclear capability.
The rather simplistic line they repeat now [gee, I thought the Left was the master of nuance] is “When Clinton was in power, North Korea only had 1-2 nukes; on Bush’s watch they now probably have 10-20. Now they are launching ICBMs and threatening a nuke test. What a failure on Bush’s part.”
Should the North test a device (and the preponderance of evidence does not suggest it… yet), then there will be a renewed chorus of “This is the sign of a great failure on Bush’s part, it’s a big crisis, this didn’t happen on Clinton’s watch, blah, blah, blah…”
And, frankly, this is not just for propaganda among some Left-leaning North Korea “experts.” It’s actually what they believe!
… Which means they will attempt to execute a similar policy should they be in power or have access to power players again.
The “consensus” that the 1994 AF was a failure — to which all three of us and probably most of our readers, being Korea watchers, subscribe — is really one that is shared only among the political Right and foreign policy hawks as far as non-Korea watchers go.
The other team wants “direct talks.” If and when they are in power again, they are going to give them to North Korea. Mark my words.
“then I’ll join hands with Mi-Hwa…”
It would be nice to have someone agree with me for a change.
The reason why the reconstruction of post-war Europe, Japan, and South Korea was successful is because the US didn’t have to fight a large insurgency. Iraq is a very different case.
The solution for the insurgency in Iraq is for American troops to leave.
The solution for the sectarian fighting in Iraq is to partition the country into three autonomous regions.
The solution for preventing a NK nuke test and missile tests is to lift the financial sanctions so that NK will come back to the 6-Party Talks.
Unfortunately, the Bush Admin. is “staying the course” to failure and more conflicts.
Well, I will agree you Mi-Hwa, but you won’t like it.
“The solution for preventing a NK nuke test and missile tests is to lift the financial sanctions so that NK will come back to the 6-Party Talks.”
I am sure that is correct.
And if we lift sanctions —- just to get NK to 6 Party Talks —- what will we have accomplished?
Jack shit.
Talk for the sake of talking is not a good thing, and when the price to just get talk is helping sustain a tyrantical regime until the “talks” break down again, is criminal (diplomatically speaking).
But, even worse, and here I am picking up on the end of James’ last comment, talks are not held just for the sake of talking. When the US side (and others – but not NK) go into talks, the pressure is to “get something done.” To find a “solution”. Because if a solution is found, the talks are considered “a failure” and then pressure is exerted in various ways.
People don’t walk away from “talks” saying, “We gave it the ole college try.”
Witness Rice’s visit to talks before the cease fire in Lebanon and what the press did with that.
Or, witness the fallout after Clinton’s big (noble) talks between Israel and Arafat failed to lead to an agreement.
I heard Bill Richardson a few weeks ago talking about 1-on-1 talks and he used the idea that “they are just talks”. That’s dishonest.
Next, on the post-war Europe front, I don’t think that is completely true. This will get into some apples and oranges, because the type of social turmoil was different and less concentrated, but France, Europe, and South Korea were not smooth societies in which reconstruction simply took place. South Korean society was in turmoil more than the others, but the struggle between both internal political/social division and external agitation as part of the Cold War struggle between capitalist democracy and communism caused major problems througout a war-torn Europe reeling not only from WWII but WWI as well.
My point — it is easy for us to look back simplistically at SK, France, Germany, and others and say the success of reconstruction on to the full flowering of wealth and peaceful democracy was preordained, but it sure as hell did not look that way at times – even up to the 1980s in South Korea and many of those European nations.
As for partitioning Iraq along with a US pull out, I thank heaven you are not a top policy maker….
But “insurency” is only a proximate cause. Why did insurgency not take place in Germany, Japan and South Korea (although in South Korea’s case, low intensity warfare continued actively throughout the 50s to 70s)?
The answer, at least in the case of Germany and Japan, was that the U.S. waged something close to total war and completely and utterly defeated and demoralized its erstwhile foes.
Insurgency is only possible when the defeated believe that there is some (even fleeting) chance of recovery. Given a choice between overwhelming American benevolence (the Marshall Plan and reconstruction of Japan) and overwhelming American vengeance, the leaders and populations of the erstwhile foes overwhelmingly chose the former… which leads to:
That is exactly the opposite of what the U.S. should do. Clearly you do not realize the catastrophic geopolitical, military, political consequences and trauma of The Fall of Saigon.
That worked out real well in British India c. 1947. A devastating inter-ethnic strife and slaughtering on massive scale, several wars and continuing conflict and guerilla/terrorist warfare over disputed territory (e.g. Kashmir).
Yeah, that worked out real well. And the Brits didn’t contend with a 9/11-like event before the Partition.
A better model, in my view, is the Malaya Emergency and how the Brits dealt with it.
Then we will have the peace of our times. Chamberlain must be your hero.
Sometimes, regrettably, conflicts are necessary to restore order or create a new order where the old order was ill.
And I suggest that the old order (of the Middle East) that gave us 9/11 was very, very ill from my point of view.
I saw where republican names of influence, either party or media, were starting to waver on Iraq. It would tend to happen with them, because before all of this, they were fond of speaking out against the idea of nation building and whatnot, but I was hoping for better resolve from them.
Ultimately, success or failure in Iraq is up to the Iraqis, but I believe it will be good for the US to stick it out in Iraq as long as it takes. If we are there ten years or 20 years from now, I personally will not mind as long as we have a good shot of helping to achieve the kind of success a South Korea has had. It will be worth it given the importance of that region.
We should only leave if level headed people without a political bent on the issue conclude it is hopeless, and I think it is far from that.
But, I wonder if we have enough people with who understand the word “fortitude” left in places of influence????
That’s sort of unclear (stress on “only†or “ifâ€???), and depends on how one defines the “primary goal.â€
I’ll have to disagree with that – the lack of missile activity had relatively little to do with not wanting to offend China or South Korea. From 1998 until October 2002 North Korea was on track with KEDO (if slowly) as well as making significant – although ultimately dishonest – progress with Japan on the abduction issue, the resolution of which is a prerequisite for obtaining colonial reparations from Japan (US$10 billion+). The Japanese were particularly sensitive about ICBM launches, which was a strong motivation for not testing.
That I can agree with.
And will add that China will put up with a remarkable amount of bad behavior from North Korea as it prefers the status quo over the potential headaches that accompany reunification.
I’m still not seeing any explanation of how an ICBM test would “nudge†the U.S. towards an action that would be viewed as positive by North Korea (i.e., a deal).
Right up to the launches the unambiguous message from the U.S./Japan was ‘don’t do it, it’s going to mean sanctions/UNSC action,’ and that’s what happened.
All it accomplished in practical terms was to maintain isolation.
The Perry/Carter (heh, and the Gingrich anomaly) calls for a pre-emptive strikes on the DPRK ICBM test site helped make the Democrats sound tough on security issues, but in reality they would never call for such careless actions if in a position of responsibility within the government.
The “Clintonistas,†as James calls them, clearly are clueless when it comes to dealing with North Korea. That they would talk to North Korea if in power is not really a point of debate, but I doubt they would accomplish even the type of deal North Korea would prefer. The concept of ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible’ would haunt them.
All the “revisionism†over the 1994 Agreed Framework (‘fabrication’ is closer) would come under scrutiny. Of particular interest would be that there was no provision to ensure North Korea actually kept the deal in regard to HEU, and that the Clinton administration learned of the illegal uranium enrichment program in 1998 or 1999, but chose to do nothing about it. Even worse, Clinton was considering a state trip to North Korea.
If the Dems get back in power and talks towards a 1994-like deal make headway, a lot of this would come out. Given how Americans feel about Dems and security issues, I think the GOP would drive home this issue until every time Americans heard “North Korea†they associate it with incompetent Democrats. Dealing with North Korea is a trainwreck waiting to happen for the Dems.
The main point is this; Clinton got the 1994 Agreed Framework, (a diplomatic ‘success’ in their terms), but the failure to include ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible’ caused the deal to fall apart. As long as Kim Jong-il is in power, they will never get, ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible’ in any deal, so if they conclude a deal it will have the same fatal flaw.
I think the American people will get the idea; the goal is not just a ‘deal,’ but a nuke free DPRK. As Kim Jong-il won’t agree to those terms, the other choices are a) wait until he’s dead; b) help the regime to fall; c) use your imagination.
Unpleasant but realistic options.
This is in response to James Na’s comment about the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and India.
When people and nations refuse to love others and forgive wrongs, deadly conflicts are going to arise.
This is obviously also true for Iraq, the two Koreas, Israel, America, and every other nation.
That’s why I support the Sunshine Policy as a guiding principle, although its implementation needs a lot of improvement.
The thing is that the lack of CVID would not haunt the Clintonistas and their allies one bit.
After all, 1994 AF has not. They see that as a success, and is selling it as a success today in the media — with some success, I might add.
One definition of insanity, to which I subscribe, is doing the same thing and expecting a different result.
“Sunshine” has been tried. What has been the result? Your theme of “it’s a good policy, it just needs ‘improvement'” reminds me of neo-Marxist apology for the failure of communism “It just wasn’t applied correctly in the Soviet Union.”
Richardson,
I think you are focusing too much on the actual chance of success in pushing the US to cave in the North have in assessing whether they were trying to push the US or not.
Both James and I give a good bit of weight to what I call “the sky is falling” type of pressure that is felt by the administration (any administration) whether it ultimately leads to changes or not.
But, the real question is how much weight does NK give the idea such pressure works?
We can’t know, but I believe NK puts a good bit of faith in it, and part of the reason is they really don’t understand the US (and the outside world) that much. Even if there was no significant chance an ICBM test would cause enough tension to lead to Bush going into 1-on-1 talks and whatnot, that does not mean NK didn’t think there was a real chance.
The suggestion that nations ought to “love” each other, as opposed to some of the more recto-hydraulic things that nations actually do to each other in a metaphorical sense, disqualifies the speaker from serious debate about nuclear deterrence and the balance of power.
I think you misunderstand one aspect of my position, which is that the U.S. ought to (continue to) push for a DPRK collapse, but that it’s perhaps not the most likely outcome; Kim Jong-il serving until he dies of natural causes is probably and unfortunately more likely.
As for “the sky is falling†mentality and pressure to make deals, the goal of any deal is ‘complete, verifiable, irreversible’ mantra – CVID. Any deal w/o that is worthless. That some would pursue such a deal is not doubted; that others would highlight the futility of such a process is the other side of that.
Any potential Democratic administration that abandons CVID for another deal that doesn’t work would be devastating to the already weak image Americans have of Democrats and strategic security issues. Given American opinions of the danger of North Korea, the Dems would be very careless to make such a deal.
Given the extreme lengths North Korea has gone to ensure the integrity of its hold on information dissemination (i.e., the cult aspect of the regimes legitimacy), none of the actions that would be required by CVID (e.g., hordes of inspectors), or even basic aid functions such as inspections to ensure that food aid is distributed fairly, are likely to be allowed by North Korea. Explained in detail in the Strategic Disengagement post.
That is the fundamental underpinning to the regimes motivations for its actions. With that understanding, interpreting Pyongyang’s actions become easier and make more sense.
I don’t think for a minute that North Korea really thought there was even a remote chance that ICBM tests would somehow results in any sort of talks. The same for their demands of dropping sanctions before they will return to Six-Party Talks; all of these actions are designed to ensure there are no talks and maintain status quo (isolation), and keep at a distance the outside information that would inevitably come with the engagement required to implement a realistic deal. North Korea also understand the U.S. diplomatic process enough to craft legalistically worded deals that send the diplomatic process into feedback loops. No, North Korea understand certain aspects of the U.S. with proficiency.
This conversation is going in circles. Reiteration has only so much value.
I agree with the reiteration portion, but here is a new one:
NK doesn’t need ICBM tests to prevent talks. It just needs to refuse to agree to join in. There must be other reasons for them – even though I agree keeping isolation is one of reasons. It is part of the idea NK is trying to set conditions for any future talks.