The Death of an Alliance, Part 48: Rumsfeld’s Rules
A big welcome to the new readers from Gateway Pundit, and as always, many thanks to Jim for his link and his support.
Update: Yonhap reports that “60 former defense ministers, chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army, Air Force and Navy chiefs” will step forward to oppose the command transfer. They want a word with Roh before he visits the White House next month. The Washington Post picks up the story, and gets it about right:
Roh’s populist rhetoric aside, what has really scared the gaggle of retired generals are indications that the Pentagon may be just as eager to see the switch.
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Next Thursday, we’ll find out whether the new anti-ballistic interceptors will ever be able to shoot down a Taepodong, should the need or excuse arise. Yesterday, Donald Rumsfeld stopped by the system’s nerve center at Ft. Greely, Alaska, I suppose to offer gentle, comforting words, hand out cocoa with marshmallows, and help everyone to relax and think about fluffy bunnies:
[O]n Thursday an interceptor based at a second launch site, at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., is scheduled to be tested against a target missile launched into the Pacific from Alaska’s Kodiak Island. That will be the first full-up test of the latest version of the interceptor and its “kill vehicle,” a device attached to the nose of the interceptor. Once it separates from the interceptor’s three-stage booster, the “kill vehicle” is designed to use its own propulsion system and optical sensors to lock onto its target and, by ramming into it at high speed, obliterate the warhead and any payload it might carry.
Thursday’s test also will be the first use of an early-warning radar at Beale Air Force Base, Calif., to provide the data required to put the interceptor on a proper path toward its target. The interceptor will be controlled from a command center near Colorado Springs, Colo. Fort Greely has a similar command center.[Lt. Gen. Henry] Obering said the main objective of Thursday’s test will be to see if the optical sensors on the “kill vehicle” aboard the interceptor work as designed. Whether it actually intercepts the target is secondary, he said. A further test, now scheduled for December, will try for an intercept, Obering said.
By now, you’ve probably figured out that this system wasn’t just designed to protect us from that maniacal “home rule” rogue, Carolyn Floyd. Good thing. This is a blog about Korea, after all.
At a news conference, Rumsfeld said that North Korea’s leaders showed, by their test-launch of multiple missiles on July 4, a determination to “continue to improve their capability and to threaten and attempt to blackmail other people.” He said they also are a threat to spread missile technology to terrorists.
“I think the real threat that North Korea poses in the immediate future is more one of proliferation than a danger to South Korea,” he said. Asked to elaborate on that point, Rumsfeld said U.S. intelligence about the intentions of North Korean leaders is not very good, but he said it is clear that the overall condition of the North Korean military has deteriorated. He mentioned that North Korean air force pilots are able to fly fewer than 50 hours a year — less than one-quarter the training done by U.S. pilots.
“I don’t see them, frankly, as an immediate military threat to South Korea,” he said.
If you parse those words carefully, you will hear Secretary Rumsfeld describing how North Korea poses a threat to the United States. He is unshouldering the heavy burden of defending every legacy protectorate on Earth, no matter how far its interests have diverged from our own. This is the new un-unconditional reality of the U.S.-South Korean security relationship, a relationship that has been irreversibly altered by the neutralism and appeasement of the anti-American administration of President Roh Moo-Hyun since his razor-thin election in 2002. The United States was willing, to a point, to defend South Korea against a regime the latter sustains. It is not willing to support a state that perpetuates direct threats to the United States itself. Rumsfeld wanted to be extra sure that the message was received clearly by its intended recipient, so he sent him a letter:
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has sent a letter to his South Korean counterpart Yoon Kwang-ung saying that the United States would like to return the wartime operational control of South Korea’s armed forces by as early as 2009, sources here said Sunday.
[….]
“Rumsfeld said in his letter to Yoon in mid-August that it is reasonable to hand over the operational control to South Korea in 2009 considering the timing of moving the USFK Seoul base to Pyeongtaek and the proposed dissolution of the command of U.S.-South Korea Combined Forces,” a Korean government source said on condition of anonymity. It is first time that the U.S. secretary has suggested 2009 as the target year for the transfer of the wartime operational control. However, South Korea has proposed the transfer occur in 2012, citing the need for more time to become defensively self-reliant.
The Reckoning
For a long time, I’ve been talking about the “death” of the alliance, and now that it’s pretty much coming to pass, I suppose it’s now incumbent on me to say that’s also a bit more complex than that (hey, you can only get so many words in a post title, and it’s catchy). This is a point that my colleague Richardson has already made (no, not the part about it being catchy). I agree with Richardson in general, if not in every detail, or in every political contingency. The alliance probably isn’t going away overnight, nor do I think it should. On the other hand, I don’t believe that the alliance as it was during the Cold War is long for this world, nor should it be. The ground component of the USFK will be dramatically smaller. Its mission will be reduced to protecting any air and naval forces that remain in Korea, which will be the key U.S. contribution to the defense of South Korea. South Korea will need that support for decades; its own own air and missile defenses are antiquated, and can’t be replaced without astronomical cost that will greatly outlive this current Korean administration [Update: more]. The Cold War is over, and Korea is effectively exercising an option that history has not previously presented it: to ask an occupying force to leave with a completely realistic expectation that its request will be cheerfully granted.
But I’ve already taken stock of the cost of that for Korea, and I believe that when Korea does, it will realize that it needs U.S. intelligence, air cover, and missile defenses. By providing those key components of South Korea’s defense, the United States will preserve most of its influence in Korea while reducing the unacceptable risk of having thousands of soldiers within North Korean artillery range.
The fact that it makes perfect sense isn’t the end of the story, however. In democratic societies, military postures are subservient to political trends and well as military threats. The majority of Korean society would have agreed with such a request just last year, but probably wouldn’t today. What this means for Korean society and politics is a national conversation about threats, and weighing costs and benefits. We should celebrate the fact that this conversation can finally be heard through the noise about pride, blame, and ancient slights. And of course, much of that noise came in the form of the basest, lowest, and least justifiable forms of hatred imaginable. Blogs like this one and its predecessors (credited but not not linked at this A-Times article) played a significant role in telling the American people about how their soldiers were the object of that bile, and that message eventually cost Korea friends in Washington. We can hope that one way or another, our soldiers will be on the receiving end of much less of this. Koreans and Americans alike should hope that this reckoning brings about responsible adult leadership and competent statecraft. No matter where good military and diplomatic sense may lie, they will be meaningless without the backing of solid political support.
The Debate
Why the U.S. urgency to hand over control? The Chosun Ilbo quotes a Korean official who suggests that this is America’s vindictive way of forcing the issue into the public debate at the Korean government’s expense:
A Korean source quoted a U.S. official as saying in recent bilateral discussions that Korea will not realistically be ready to exercise independent control of its forces even by 2012, but since that deadline appeared to be politically motivated, there was no reason for Washington to cling to military logic either.
This is actually plausible, in addition to being a good idea. If the alliance is a bigger issue than the immediate interests of the unpopular party that rules Korea for one more year, then that party ought to bear as much of the political burden for its own bad planning as possible. The time for Koreans to think about what form the alliance will ultimately take (if any) is while they’re thinking about who their next president will be. In this limited goal, we’ve been successful in focusing minds. There is near panic in the Korean defense establishment, which doesn’t believe that Korea can afford the shock of assuming the burden of these expenses and responsibilities so quickly. The opposition Grand National Party has called for halting plans to take back wartime control, although this seems more of a reaction than an alternative. Recently, thirteen former defense ministers joined in a rare public statement of opposition to the handover of wartime control. Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-Ung had dismissed those worries, but at the time, he was still trying to calm skeptics by assuring them that Korea would be ready for wartime command by 2012.
Timing isn’t the only unresolved issue. The Pentagon recently confirmed reports that the United States will reduce its total forces below the level of 25,000, to which they were to be reduced by 2008 (compared to 37,000 in 2004). It bears repeating that in 2004, about 25,000 of the American service members in Korea were Army, with the most of the rest being Air Force. If most force cuts continue to come from the Army component, it will have roughly 12,000 troops in Korea in 2008, about half of the 2004 level. Of those 12,000, relatively few will be infantry, armor, or artillery, and it seems unlikely that the Eighth Army, if it remains, will be worthy of its name. An unidentified Korean defense official later denied a rumor that all U.S. ground forces would soon leave Korea. At the same time, USFK was publicly threatening to remove U.S. air forces from Korea if the Korean government doesn’t find them a new training range. If the air forces leave, the ground forces will have no air cover and will also be withdrawn. The issue remains unresolved. Meanwhile, the Pentagon is quietly proceeding with plans to expand its facilities in Hawaii. The Pentagon denied the move is connected to Korea, but previous reports suggest otherwise.
The third unresolved issue is cost-sharing, one that has been highly controversial for years. Secretary Rumsfeld’s letter demanded that Korea raise its share from 40% to 50%, a demand that follows a failure by the two sides to agree after acrimonious talks.
The Future
What does this mean? It means that we today may not recognize the USFK that will exist five years from now. This transformation could end with a complete dissolution of the alliance, and almost certainly will if men who share the world view of Roh Moo Hyun ascend to power in 2007. This probably will not happen unless there’s an abortive military coup first, however.
What is more likely is that South Korea will continue a healthy trend that has now begun: a national debate about Korea’s relationship with America, the sort of reckoning I’ve been calling for since the early days of my blogging at OneFreeKorea. Because of Roh, though not for the reasons or emotions that drove his policies, and certainly not under the leadership of his supporters, there will be a new, better, healthier U.S.-Korean relationship, in which Korea will bear the cost of playing a more equal role. It will begin with the reduction of the present alliance from an anachronistic political liability to a calibrated, flexible supporting force that will be available to support South Korean interests, so long as they coincide with American interests.
What will the new relationship look like? I propose a few models in declining order of plausibility:
1. The Israel Model: U.S. forces leave Korea, but continue giving it substantial assistance aimed toward a robust, independent self defense. This would require much larger capital and human investments by the South Koreans and an expansion of the South Korean reserves.
2. The Thailand Model (circa 1970’s): U.S. ground forces leave, except for regular exercises and relatively small units. A robust air component remains. This was sufficient to deter Vietnam at its apex after the fall of Saigon, Luang Prabang, and Phnom Penh.
3. The Taiwan Model: U.S. forces leave, U.S. assistance is tightly restricted, and the nation’s government, placing its faith in trade with its foes and hopes of an American rescue, allows its defense to gradually decline to a point of vulnerability.
4. The Saudi Model. U.S. forces, including large numbers of ground forces, remain to protect an increasingly hostile population, whose government refuses to spend political capital to explain the reasons for the U.S. presence. That hostility finds increasingly violent expression until the U.S. government tires of the commitment and withdraws suddenly, forcing even normal trade and diplomatic relations to operate discreetly, outside the view of two populations who deeply despise one another.
5. The Finland Model. After U.S. forces leave, the nation gradually disarms and comes under the domination of strong neighboring dictatorships.
6. Kim Il Sung City: U.S. forces leave, the alliance is abrogated, and a “Coalitionist” government, influenced and infiltrated by the competeting tyrannical system, gradually cedes control to it.
7. Terminator V: U.S. forces leave Korea. Korea, with a declining human population, turns to a new race of super-intelligent warrior robots, programmed with nihilistic tendencies by a vengeful Dr. Hwang Woo-Suk. The robots, backed by their own robot air force, then conquer and subjugate both Koreas, except for a small band of ultra-nationalists on Tokdo. This band successfully defends Tokdo against the robot invasion, but starves to death a few weeks later because Tokdo is, after all, just a couple of godforsaken barren rocks.
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For so many years, the United States has been the all-purpose (a) benefactor, (b) defender, and (c) scapegoat that has protected an economically strong, yet politically immature nation from making sound security decisions against a background of the hard reality that surrounds it. With a new presidential election coming, the best thing the United States could do for its own long-term interests would be to help Korean voters perceive those realities and the interests they realistically share with the United States. If Korean voters are capable of perceiving those interests, they will elect responsible statesmen who will sit down with U.S. defense planners to draw up an updated plan for an alliance that fits modern realities. If not, what makes sense won’t matter, and political pressures for a total U.S. withdrawal and a complete abrogation of the alliance will reach tipping points in both the United States and Korea.
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After the ROK had its ‘coming out party’ in 1988 … with its Seoul Olympics, plans for the gradual paring down of USFK, with the ultimate goal being the ‘Thailand Model’ should have been initiated.
The incremental replacement of USFK’s on-peninsula capabilities by the ROK could have been well along the path to a successful (for all parties) conclusion by today.
Regrettably, this had not been done, and I believe the current situation has a certain amount of unseemly and unnecessary acrimony.
Joshua, great post, I think the next two months are going to tell a lot about the future of the alliance but the overall decision to pull all the forces out may very well come down to next year’s Presidential election.
I just can’t see another Uri type winning an election, but then again this is Korea were talking about and stranger things have happened so who knows?
Joshua, a very persuasive post on DOA. I get the feeling that Korean’s think its Roh who is pushing the wartime control issue. I now believe the USA will give it to them whether they want it or not, no matter who occupies the Blue House.
The July missile tests I think clarified in the American’s mind that the ROK doesn’t share American security concerns . Rummy is plainly saying America won’t support Allies that aren’t really allies. I think Roh understands the message clearly. Who does he go visit after meeting Bush in September? He trots off to debrief his new daddy Hu shortly afterwards.
I still think it is an enormous strategic error for the U.S. to leave or significantly drawdown USFK, particularly when the next ROK election likely will see positive changes for the U.S.
I don’t think the U.S. will force this on Korea regardless of the election outcome. A more conservative/less anti-American ROK admin could ask for and likely receive extensions. But of course Rumsfeld won’t be the SecDef then either.
On that note, and as Joshua notes, it’s good that Rumsfeld is calling Roh’s bluff on wartime as it moves the focus to Roh’s disastrous policies now rather than in 2012 – but it would be complete folly to follow through if the next administration requests a more realistic delay.
My problem with keeping a substantial ground force in Korea is that it effectively denies us the choice NOT to participate in a bloody Asian ground war should other contingencies and interests dictate that staying out is a wiser option. I can imagine a number of circumstances of that kind: (1) South Korea continues to serve Chinese and North Korean interests and undermine our own; (2) flighty and unstable South Korean leaders disregard U.S. requests and either weaken their defenses or rashly provoke Japan or China; (3) the population grows even more hostile, and there’s a real worry that sleeper agents and fifth columnists will change the force structure requirements dramatically; (4) China gets into it. By having the ground forces elsewhere (Guam, Hawaii, Ft. Lewis), and making them deployable with C-17’s and fast sealift ships, we have a choice in the matter. One choice might be to conduct an extended air campaign in areas of Korea occupied by hostile forces before we introduce ground troops. Another might be that Korean forces, backed by U.S. air cover, can handle it. Another might be that intervention isn’t worth the cost. It all depends on facts we can’t foresee, so why not simply give ourselves options? That, in turn, helps Korea to understand that our commitment to its defense is partly a function of the degree to which it behaves like a true ally.
The status quo illustrates why having ground troops in Korea actually reduces our influence there. First, having those troops is a political liability for Korean politicians who do believe that we share interests. Second, since the presence of all those American hostages along the DMZ commits us to Korea’s defense anyway, Korea is free to act without regard to U.S. interests.
I also want to address the arms race concern. I agree that it’s a legitimate concern — it’s already happenning — but I don’t think a U.S. drawdown in Korea will be a major contributor to that. The Rand study on ROK force modernization plans illustrates that South Korea is already mortgaged out on defense spending just to modernize equipment that was allowed to grow old and outdated since the Kim Dae Jung administration took power years ago. Korea is going to have to take another very hard look at its defense spending and structure in the next few years, after Roh leaves office. When it does, it will realize that even with a continuation of some form of alliance with the U.S., it won’t be able to afford a lot of white elephants. In fact, China started the arms race years ago. To a degree, Japan can keep up with that and significantly expand its forces. Korea will be lucky to keep its infantry forces at needed levels, modernize its air force, and buy itself some decent helicopters.
The US has an enormous strategic purpose to having military power in East Asia as Richardson says. The question is does withdrawing from Korea advance our interests or not? As its being described, the emerging relationship is a clear weakening of the Korean-American alliance. I don’t see any floor to future American reductions coming out of this agreement. China will definitely make hay with Korea and draw the 10th richest country in the world to its point of view. That is a clear big gain for China. How will Asia’s other rich countries view this American withdrawal? If we lose our position with Singapore, Taiwan, India or Australia due to doubts on American support, then the US will have suffered a damaging defeat, with not a shot fired.
On the other hand, I would definitely prefer a tight alliance between the US and ROK where both serve their national interests as well as benefiting each other. That clearly isn’t the case anymore between the ROK and USA. I have doubts that a new Korean government would be sufficiently tuned into American concerns about the NORKS. So maybe the US is recognizing reality. To make clear to Asia that the US isn’t going away, the US presses on with the building of Guam into a offensive base; tightens Japanese defense cooperation; offers to sell advanced jets to Taiwan; redeploys carriers and submarines into the Pacific; dangles advanced technology and defense co-operation to India. Maybe that is the best we can do given the situation.
Staying in Korea (and Japan) greatly reduces the risk of an East Asian conflict, while I seriously doubt moving troops out would prevent the U.S. from getting involved – we simply have too much at stake in the region, and likely would seek to prevent a regional war from spilling over into a global one.
In the unlikely event of an East Asian war that the U.S. would not participate in, USFK could evacuate much easier than forces could deploy in the opposite scenario.
As for reasons 1-4, 1 & 3 are, IMO, highly unlikely, while 2 is for China, leaving 4 as the issue. And USFK gives the U.S. leverage in such a situation, leverage we would not have if USFK was gone of reduced to even less significant levels. There is no substitute for keeping folks on the ground where the job focus is; hence I’m stuck in DC.
I have a different perspective on how our presence in ROK, the ‘status quo,’ affects our ability to influence Korea and the region. I see it as the single most stabilizing feature. With USFK gone, the ROK might be stupid enough to make defense preparations against Japan, and China would no doubt flex its muscle. A vacuum will be filled.
And I haven’t seen anything to dissuade me from believing that removing USFK will set off a vastly more dangerous arms race that what the region might be experiencing (China’s build up has not been matched by Korea or Japan, so I don’t consider it a race – once the other contestants enter it will be). I see South Korea as basically immature and vulnerable, apt to overreaction to Japan, and unable to do much concerning China. It’s got ‘nuclear proliferation’ written all over it.
Ever see a wheel with a large amount of those little lead weights on the side, and then have the joy of riding in that vehicle after those weights are removed but the wheel is still pretty unbalanced? USFK is that balancing weight while Korea is the wheel, and I’d hate to be in for the ride once they leave – it’s uncomfortable and dangerous, for the occupants and anyone in the vicinity.
Great post!
I don’t know if we should hope for a less anti-American government in Seoul…that doesn’t even sound right.
Our reduction/removal will force the SK’s to spend defense money where they should, on defense against an attack from their wayward cousins. Right now, our presence allows them to spend what little they do (considering they’re at WAR) on things like mini-aircraft carriers and the like to fight who??? Japan maybe??? I think that’s one of our allies…
The SKs are leaning towards China even with us in their backyard. I don’t think that trend will change as long as they have the common cause of hating Japan, and being good Koreans, they will never let that fall off their to-do list.
It’s time for SK to wear the big boy pants and start behaving like an adult in the international community. As long as we’re here, they will continue to behave like spoiled teenagers rebelling against parents they perceive to be stifling their independence.
One great result of the wartime control issue and Rummy’s letter, it has caused the SK media to shift to a role of actually informing the public.
They’ve spent so much time complaining about what the US has done TO SK that I was beginning to think that they were oblivious to what the US was doing FOR SK.
It wasn’t that they were oblivious, it was just that it was popular to hate the US…
too little too late
Another point to consider:
Joshua is likely right that having US forces stationed farther back increases flexibility for American political leaders in the event of crisis or conflict in the region.
HOWEVER, that US flexibility also increases the chance of miscalculation on the part of a potential regional aggressor.
To some extent, this is already happening with Taiwan (which the US is supposed to defend per Taiwan Relations Act). There are increasing concerns that the US would not intervene seriously should China invade Taiwan. There are influential political elements in the US (the business lobby, especially) that would sacrifice Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression in order to preserve commercial ties with China.
Having American forces on the ground is a tremendous psychological assurance (to allies and neutrals) of US intervention in the event of a crisis. It also is a surefire deterrence.
Without actual ground forces, that assurance of intervention evaporates. A potential aggressor may calculate (correctly or incorrectly) that the US political leadership or populace lacks the will to fight on another front.
Without the forces in-country, decisions to intervene (or not) depend more heavily on short-term political considerations, particularly domestic ones, rather than long-term geopolitical, strategic interests.
There are instances where flexibility can actually be harmful in the long-term.
As for Joshua’s very clear concern for anti-Americanism in Korea, I share it. But I am less pessimistic than he is.
First of all, such a sentiment cannot be eradicated. Wherever American soldiers go, there will be inevitable scuffles, drunken brawls, accidents and other troubles with indigenous population. That’s just the nature of things. And various local politicians who derive benefit for whipping up anti-American hysteria occasioned by such problems will take advantage of it everywhere, not just Korea.
Secondly, anti-Americanism in such a situation can be limited and managed to some extent by reducing footprint.
That leaves the deeper, society-wide anti-Americanism divorced from any consideration of having forces on the ground.
This is certainly on the rise in ROK — but not nearly as much as Joshua thinks in my view. I think the situation is reversible. What is in order is a time off, a trial separation, not a divorce.
Unfortunately, evacuating all (or most) ground elements is a step toward divorce that is largely irreversible.
Indeed, the last time the US NCA planned to withdraw a significant chunk of USFK, we almost had a nuclear ROK.
Right now, only some international obligations and bilateral agreements with the US stop ROK from having nuclear weapons and a significant ballistic missile capability.
Once ROK feels that it has been “abandoned” by the US, the chances of ROK abrogating BM-relevant treaties with the US will increase, particularly in view of increasing PRC BM capabilities and potential Japanese counter-action.
If Japan is shielded by a US-led BMD program, but ROK is not, the latter will try to buy deterrence by developing a significant BM capability combined with more potent payloads.
ROK already has all the research… ready to go.
I agree, to an extent, about some of what you’re saying about the strategic and military implications. I think that all the wise counsel of strategists is moot if politics vetoes it. I see our military situation as inseparable from its political context. In Iraq, we won’t be defeated militarily. If we are defeated, we will be defeated by political missteps there, the failings too many Iraqis to identify where their interests lie, and by defeatism, escapism, and an alarming amount of self-loathing by Americans.
The statistical record on Korea’s anti-Americanism suggests that it is deep and wide, despite occasional shifts and variations according to how questions are phrased and groups are sampled. Yes, it appears to have moderated recently, but the numbers are still alarming, and they have implications for the security of U.S. forces that we can’t simply go on ignoring, because it’s affecting our ability to carry out our mission, either through the Humphreys ruckus, the lack of a training range for the Air Force, the violence against our troops, or the fact that many (if not most) young men surveyed would rather fight against us than alongside us. If it comes to war, a recent Newsweek piece (which I could not find) questioned whether the South Korean Army would stay loyal. What about five years from now, when the next crop of kids who have been taught by the Korean Teachers’ Union enters service? What Korean politician or newspaper challenges the portrayal of the vast majority of our soldiers as pervs and thugs, or describes what they contribute to Korea’s prosperity and freedom, or so much as covers a story where an American saves a Korean’s life (not an infrequent event at the Start & Stripes)? Some of those papers and politicians are anti-anti-American, but virtually none dare to be openly pro-American. The far left is winning the national debate by default, and the most pro-American Koreans, driven to the sidelines by a stream of anti-American stories in the media, are keeping quiet as old age diminishes their numbers. If that trend simply goes on uninterrupted, the wise counsel of statesmen and strategists will be moot. We will have to leave, and at a much higher political, diplomatic, and military cost. We must either reverse that trend or find some other force structure that cuts our losses while preserving our interests and buying ourselves time.
Rumsfeld and Vershbow understand this. Yes, I suspect that the Pentagon is engaging in a degree of cynical political gamesmanship. It’s about time. At last, a few serious thinkers are coming out of hiding, speaking up, and participating in the national debate, (as opposed to spending millions on P.R. firms to convince Americans that Koreans aren’t really anti-American). They’re forcing Roh to pay the political cost of his party’s own anti-American manipulations by drawing a direct link to South Korea’s security, and more importantly, to its tax structure. If Korea seriously opts to drift into the Chinese camp or drop its guard to the NKPA, it will be for political reasons, not military ones. We have consistently failed to recognize and address the political problems we have in Korea. Recognizing those realities – for once – our government is executing a political strategy that has the advantage of easy adaptability into an exit strategy. And if we all agree that this could have negative implications for regional security, those implications only happen because a free society decides to make a bad gamble with its own fate and loses. I don’t see what we can do about that, beyond what we’re doing now.
I also disagree that the departure of our ground component will signal an abandonment of Korea. Having two major U.S. air bases in Korea, albeit beyond artillery range, is still a strong commitment to Korea’s defense. We don’t have ground troops in Britain or Israel, either, and we didn’t have troops in Kuwait in 1990. No one reasonably doubts our commitment to the defense of those nations. I agree that our support for Taiwan’s defense is much too constrained, but so is Taiwan’s support for its own defense. The normal state of strong alliances with between the United States and other prosperous nations does not include stationing large numbers of ground forces there. We are essential to Germany’s defense not because it is an exception that still hosts a large but dwindling number of U.S. troops. We are essential to Germany’s defense because it can’t deploy its military anywhere without the support of American airlift and sealift, and because it couldn’t defend itself without American shipments of fuel, ammo, and spare parts, because of American’s intel and spy satellites, and its Air Force. Like Germany, Korea will continue to rely on America for this kind of support and is unwilling to pay the additional cost of making its defense truly “independent,†something that would crush its economy and would be strategic and economic lunacy.
Finally, consider the political implications of a war not of our choosing, something we are currently set up for. If Korea War II starts with 1,000 dead Americans, can you imagine how the usual gang of defeatists and escapists in this country will exploit that? They’ll be assisted, sad to say, by allies in the broadcast media, who will cast it as a defeat from day one. The wire services that currently employ Hezbollah and ex-Mukhabbarat types as stringers, photographers, and reporters, will hire their war correspondents from every OhMyNews and Hankyoreh reporter not otherwise occupied reporting our troop movements directly to the enemy. As an in Iraq, those who write this history will be people who have never served and know next to nothing about the military, history, or how wars are fought. The anti-Americanism that none of them give a rat’s ass about today will suddenly rend their heartstrings.
Does anyone else think that this debate between ROK and America is also a debate with a silent debater? I think Japan has weighed in and is also pushing hard for the US to either withdraw or drastically reduce USFK.
There is the reality that if the Norks do have a useful nuclear weapon, then a standing army such as USFK is a very vulnerable target. What would America’s reaction be? We’d be under unbearable pressure at home to hit back in kind, with the result that huge radioactive clouds would drift east and blanket Japan killing thousands. I don’t think America could ever do that again.
Others would pressure the US to do nothing(Japan, Russia, China). Its a classic no win scenario.
The obvious solution is to withdraw/reduce USFK so that its not a target worth a nuclear weapon. But it goes further. Would Japan permit USFJ to pile on and rush to ROK’s defense? Not with a nuclear NORK. How best could America help the ROK, if we wanted to? From a distance. Away from ROK and Japan.
A nuclear North seems to call into question the whole reason for USFK. Its either a target or a hostage. Given a desire to maintain an American/ROK alliance, Rummy and company may simply be trying to re-invent it to exist with a nuclear north.