Robert Gates Gets It (Mostly) Right on Korea

Consider that: how often do bloggers, who live to bite ankles, find no fault with the pronouncements of those who make policy? I begin my observation of Gates as SecDef as a skeptic. And indeed, nothing that Gates could say about Korea could make me a fan if he prescribes Surrender Lite in Iraq or “learning to live with” an Iranian bomb. But listen carefully to his views on the Koreas, from his confirmation hearings. Begin in 1994, back when it might still have been possible to stop North Korea from going nuclear. What would Robert Gates have done then?

“There is a myth in the United States that if you offer foreign miscreants the hope of prosperity and membership in good standing in the family of nations, they will abandon whatever malign objectives they might have,” he wrote then.

Hallelujah. Gates went on to recommend destroying Yongbyon in an air strike. And as we know, that ceased to be a plausible alternative at some point, probably in 1998.

“I believe that clearly at this point, the best course[*] is the diplomatic one….”

* … that he’s authorized to discuss at a Senate confirmation hearing, that is. Really, what else could he say? The real question is whether Gates thinks diplomacy alone will be any more effective than it was in 1994. Based on what Gates said then, I’m inclined to say he understands the symbiosis between force and diplomacy, and quite possibly the fruitlessness of the latter without any credible threat to back it. And the nature of the threat?

“The potential for North Korean proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology and fissile material is a major concern and a threat that must be addressed.”

I think he gets that right, too, which is more than I can say for Bill Perry or Newt Gingrich. So, does Robert Gates perceive just how much our political position in Korea has shifted? Or that it suggests a change in the alliance’s architecture?

“We must continue to evolve our relationships with both the ROK and Japan to ensure their long-term political sustainability and to ensure that the DPRK never doubts our resolve to meet our treaty commitments,” he said.

Yonhap seems not to sense the veiled danger in those words, although Gates certainly isn’t saying what I wish he’d make clear soon enough: that on the ground, at least, Korea should be on its own, pronto. Gates also talked about the importance of resolving continuing differences on when to give the Koreans wartime opcon, but gave no clue as to whether we’ll continue to insist on 2009. Does Gates see some value for the alliance in avoiding the creation of a military vacuum, and the peril and chaos that could invite?

“The extended deterrence offered by U.S. nuclear forces to our allies must remain a viable component of our strategy, both to deter aggression in Northeast Asia and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons globally,” Gates said.

There isn’t anything Gates said here that I would have said differently if I were in his place. Now, maybe when I see another more complete report, video, or transcript my views will change. Maybe it’s all gobbledygook for congressional consumption, or ours. Maybe there’s some wishful thinking on my part. But on Korea policy, so far, so good.