Wobble Watch: Interesting Comment from S. Korean Delegate to Talks

“As the BDA account case shows us well, if we mention bilateral issues between North Korea and the U.S., we will not see much progress in the denuclearization of North Korea. Matters such as the BDA issue should not be mentioned during the six-party talks, and should be discussed in a working group or at least should be a separate part of the six-party talks.

I read this as a good sign, given that the South Koreans had previously pressured the United States to negotiate away the asset freezes, and clearly prefer the idea of throwing every issue (except human rights) into the pudaechigae.  Chun Yeong-Woo would only say such a thing if he expects no progress on that issue.  And if he expects no progress on that issue, he must have a pretty good idea that the U.S. side won’t cave.

It’s always a safe bet to say that these talks will go no where, and on balance, that remains the safe bet, but with North Korea’s economic and food crises apparently getting worse fast, there’s more motivation for Kim Jong Il to sign one.  More importantly for Kim, there’s more reason to think he can get something for nothing.
I were Kim Jong Il, I would think along the following lines:  why not go to the talks and sign some kind of deal promising CVID?  Kim could even allow for a few initial inspections in exchange for some up-front concessions from the U.S. side, and insist that those benefits be delivered on the nail.  After all, a politically weakened Bush Administration is desperate for a deal allowing it to focus its dwindling supply of mojo on Iran and Iraq, so it would be strongly tempted to engage in some self-delusion to get that deal.  And of course, with the clock now ticking on the Administration’s exit from office, leading up to the next election, no one will be particularly anxious to call the North Koreans out for cheating or stalling inspections or dismantling of their weapons programs.  They might instead prefer to do what the Clinton Administration did — overlook North Korea’s bad faith and mischaracterize their see-no-evil diplomacy as successful.

Don’t reject that comparison out of hand, for as much as I’ve pilloried the Clinton Administration for allowing North Korea to go nuclear, we’re now witnessing the Bush Administration oversee Iran doing precisely the same thing — which is much scarier, in the grander scheme.

If Kim Jong Il can make it through the next year, he can probably buy himself two more years that will be lost to the presidential election and the subsequent transition.  But is he smart enough to play it that way?