Will John Negroponte Put Some Steel in Our Korea Policy?

If so, it would be good news. I’ve argued on this blog that the G.W. Bush policy isn’t really that different from the Bill Clinton policy on the fundamentals. Both shared the same set of  essential beliefs: that North Korea has a genuine interest in disarming, for the right price; that such a disarmament is achieveable, verifiable, and enforceable; implicitly, that North Korea’s nuclear proliferation can be contained; implicitly, that North Korea is more dangerous if its regime is destabilized than alive and cranking out nukes; that China and South Korea understood and shared our interest in protecting U.S. national security; that a viable  agreement doesn’t require a fundamental North Korean acceptance of a more transparent society, and that North Korea’s bona fides in desiring peace can be separated from its absolute contempt for human life (the object of peace is first, to preserve human life; take that away and you’ve lost a pretty big incentive).

I disagree with all of those beliefs, and their results speak for themselves. Neither China, South Korea, or North Korea really fears the consequence of U.S. national security remaining under the threat of North Korean proliferation. All prefer a continuation of the impasse, even as North Korea acquires more nukes, to doing what it would take to force North Korea to disarm peacefully.   Even after  a  nuke test and  two unanimous  U.N. Security Council Resolutions,  South Korea  and  China are  still giving the North the benefits of unrestricted aid and trade (if Republicans were doing this, it would be unilateralism).   I’d even venture that most of those in power in the Blue House and the Forbidden City today would quietly rejoice if a North Korean nuke took out an American city. This is known as a parting of interests.

I repeat my position here, lest new readers be confused:  I’m all for the six-party talks for their cosmetic value, as long as we’re realistic enough  to see that that’s all the value they have, and as long as we have another, more practical policy in place calculated to achieve our goals.  I’m convinced that  our problems in Korea will only worsen while North Korea is ruled by Kim Jong Il or its military.   Kim Jong  Il, especially if it’s true that he’s already  dying of liver failure, behaves like a man focused on Gotterdammerung.  He will eventually  attack his neighbors or proliferate nukes (again).  We  must cut the Gordian Knot first.  Sanctions are a start.  They will hurt the regime and won’t make things much worse for the ordinary people, but ultimately  may not do more than juggle the current power structure because they don’t plant the seed of a better alternative.  And since invading is not an option, we should instead seek to  remove the regime  through a dual strategy of cutting off its finances and making  common cause with the North Korean people  — to include broadcasting, training, leafleting, and  non-permissive  aid — to enable and inspire them to  resist their own government.

Enter Negroponte

The Bush crew was at least capable of recognizing that the North Koreans lie, and they reacted by … changing the shape of the table, offering smaller bribes, and eventually applying some financial pressure (the first effective thing they did, and even that took them five years).  If those changes seem superficial, it’s because they were.  Why the remarkable consistency? One reason is that Nicholas Burns, the number three man at State, is a Clinton holdover, and exercised great influence over U.S. Korea policy.   If my  sources are right,  his policy objective was  getting us to  Agreed Framework II. What a surprise.  And to that end, State dragged its feet on implementing the North Korean Human Rights Act, up to and including the semi-open defiance of binding federal statute.

The Washington Post reports that John Negroponte will henceforth run our Korea policy, and that’s probably good news.

A career diplomat who served as Bush’s ambassador at the United Nations and in Baghdad before becoming intelligence chief in April 2005, Negroponte will also have primary responsibility for policy toward China and Northeast Asia, especially the North Korean nuclear issue. Rice will focus on Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and other issues.

I dug up a few of Negroponte’s previous comments on North Korea here, and this left-wing hit piece suggests that Negroponte is a hard-headed fellow who has made the right enemies in the blame-America-first crowd. This interview is especially in-depth, and refutes the charge that Negroponte ducks the press (he opines, among other things,  that North Korea is acting rationally, from its perspective). His current subordinate, Joe DiTrani, is now the DNI’s Mission Manager for North Korea, and was once the U.S. “good cop” delegate to the six-party talks, while Chris Hill played bad cop.

Negroponte stepped down as Director of the National Intelligence Directorate after just a few months. That’s obviously unnatural, but the Post quotes a range of sources who all say that this move is not because Negroponte screwed up at his last job, but that it’s really about Bush filling an important vacancy in State, after Robert Zoellick (the #2, whom Negroponte is actually replacing) left last summer. Rice herself hasn’t proven to be an especially strong Secretary, either, as much as she has been an able administrator and consensus builder, but she remains too politically popular for Bush to replace now. This unusual division of labor hopefully means that someone decided that State needs a “bad cop” after all. With the North Koreans not even making a serious pretense of good faith negotiations, it’s about time.