Chris Hill Testifies at the International Relations Foreign Affairs Committee

Headlines now, details later:

• Hill was firm that North Korea had purchased items that had no other use but highly enriched uranium. He said that a failure to resolve the HEU issue would be a deal-breaker. Committee members of both parties also seemed to believe that North Korea must come clean on HEU.
• Hill left open the possibility that North Korea will still be denying the existence of its HEU program 60 days from now without breaking the deal. He believes North Korea will only have to “discuss” within 60 days.
• Hill carefully avoided specifics on what happens after 60 days, on inspection, and on verification.
• Hill had little to say about what consequences North Korea would incur if it was recalcitrant or mendacious after 60 days, other than not receiving more heavy fuel oil. He emphasized China’s good faith and role as
• At one point, Hill appeared to suggest that the United States might negotiate over the presence or force levels of US forces in South Korea, but then backtracked and said that U.S. conventional forces in South Korea were not a part of these “nuclear” negotiations.
• Hill emphasized that this deal is only a beginning.

Update: Details. Caveat — I took the best notes I could, but these are only near-verbatim quotations.

The Committee’s Reaction, Overall

• I thought someone had turned the clock back to 1994. Conservatives, including some Democrats, sounded pretty skeptical and picked at the agreement’s general absence of details and benchmarks, and on the uranium issue. Liberals, including some Republicans, were gushy.
• Lantos, a man I want to like but increasingly can’t, may have been the most saccharine (here’s his statement). He offered the Administration left-handed praise for finally abandoning “unilateralism” for listening to the “wise counsel” of its diplomats. This, from the man who has been calling for us to negotiate with North Korea bilaterally instead of multilaterally, something we’ve functionally been doing for months anyway. His enthusiasm for an agreement that really says and does so little seems rather unjustified; even Chris Hill conceded that by itself, it’s “wholly inadequate.”

On Uranium

• Hill emphasized in his opening statement that North Korea must give up “all nuclear weapons” and “all existing nuclear programs.” “All means all, and this means [North Korea’s] highly enriched uranium program as well.”
• Members from both parties sounded concerned-to-downright skeptical about the absence of any mention of uranium from the agreement.
• Hill conceded that North Korea still denies having a highly enriched uranium program.
• Hill sounded confident in these facts: “We know they made those purchases” of HEU components, including P1 and P2 centrifuges “from Pakistan,” and there is “no other purpose” for those programs except for making nuclear weapons [OFK note: uranium enriched to lower levels is sufficient for power generation]. He said pretty much these same words at least twice, suggesting that it was carefully scripted.
• He sounded less certain when responding to a question from Rep. Tom Tancredo, R, Colo.: “If we determine that there is a program, it’s got to go.” Hill said the United States needs “complete clarity” on the uranium question.
• Rep. Brad Sherman, D, Cal.: “It is very clear that we need answers on their procurement of [program components for] highly enriched uranium.” Sherman did his homework, knows that the North Koreans mine uranium, and said that we should put inspectors at those mines to determine exactly how much they had mined. That does sound plausible, if we can measure the volume of the mine tailings and have some idea of grade (I’ve worked in mining). Another interesting implication: what if the North Koreans used forced labor to mine their uranium?

On Inspection and Verification

• Hill admitted that at least for now, there are no plans for the IAEA to get access to any other site but the reactor at Yongbyon. Later, Rep. Brad Sherman, D, Cal., made the point that Yongbyon is “on its last legs” anyway. (OFK note: The greater concern is a larger plutonium reactor the North Koreans are building elswhere.)
• Lantos: The success of this agreement is “entirely dependent on the good intentions of the North Korean leadership.”
• Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R, Fla., the ranking Republican, also stressed the importance of verification and called for “complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament.”
• Responding to Ackerman: “We will not [put ourselves into a situation where] they pretend to disarm and we pretend to believe them.”
• No Democrat could resist the dig that this was just like the Agreed Framework. No Republican could help drawing the comparison as a criticism.
• Rep. Mike Pence, R, Ind.: The level denuclearization required for the normalization of relations should be “at least as high a hurdle” as what we required of the Libyans.
• Rep. David Scott, D, Ga.: Given how secretive the North Korean regime is, how can we trust them? Similar question from Rep. Brad Sherman, D, Cal., who mentioned North Korea’s extensive tunnels, a subject Rep. Sherman and I discussed one-on-one last September (he said he would ask the CIA for their assessment; I get the impression that he did). Hill obfuscated and ducked whenever inspection and verification came up. The was so little substance in his answer that I didn’t even write anything down. It really appears that the entire subject was deferred to the “working groups,” with China leading this one.

On U.S. Forces in Korea

• Firm denial that the United States has nuclear weapons in South Korea, something we affirmed on September 19, 2005.
• Now, I warn you to go to the transcript on this, but this is what I believe I heard, in response to a question from Rep. Scott, D, Georgia: “We have forces in South Korea, and at some point, that could be a matter of negotiation.” Then, Hill seemed to catch himself: “Our conventional forces in South Korea are not a matter for these nuclear negotiations.”

On Timing and Benchmarks for Progress

• North Korea will not have to present a full declaration of its nuclear programs in the first 60 days. It will only have to discuss that full declaration.
• Responding to Rep. Donald Manzullo, R, Ill.: Beyond the first 60 days, there is no timetable for disclosures.
• This agreement is “only a start;” there are many differences to overcome, which will be “difficult but not impossible.”
• “If this were the last step, people would be correct in criticizing this as wholly inadequate. [By itself,] this is wholly inadequate.”
• Royce read language from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718: “[T]he DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.”

On Counterfeiting and Money Laundering

• Hill’s opening statement listed all of the agencies that had a role in this agreement, and I noted that Treasury was not among them. “The Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue is being discussed on a separate track from the Six Party talks ….”
• Rep. Ed Royce, who had just taken his staff to Macau, held up a C-note he had acquired there and said that the North Korean supernotes were so good, we had no way of knowing whether the note was real. He asked Hill what assurances we had from the North Koreans that they had abandoned their “economic warfare” against us. Hill really had no answers or specifics, and no plans to inspect or verify anything. When Royce quoted an expert [I think he meant David Asher] who believes that North Korea is still counterfeiting today, Hill dismissed that opinion, suggesting that Asher has been out of government for two years anyway.
• Royce expressed concern about the Administration’s apparent decision to “de-emphasize” the pursuit of North Korea’s “illegal activities.”
• More from Royce: “I don’t think more pressure hurts.” “The line between North Korea’s illicit and licit [income] is virtually invisible.”
• Hill responded that “law enforcement will not be compromised,” and said that North Korea had admitted that financial pressure had been one of its motivations in making this compromise.
• Rep. Gary Ackerman, D, NY, got a few laughs a few moments later, as he made an audible note-to-self: “Don’t make change for Royce ….” Otherwise, however, Ackerman didn’t make many substantive contributions to the hearing.

On Human Rights, Humanitarian Aid, and Abductions

• Hill: “We do have other differences, such as human rights, that we need to deal with in the context of normalization talks.”
• The U.S.-DPRK bilateral relations working group will meet March 5th (if I heard correctly).
• There was distressingly little attention paid to this subject; the most hopeful sign is that the crucial staffers whose belief in this issue is sincere are still there. I wish I could name one who was a Democrat. Really, I do.
• Credit where it’s due: Lantos, whose statement was generally disappointing, did mention human rights as an issue that must be resolved, or else “we can never have a fully normal relationship” with North Korea.
• Royce and Rep. Chris Smith, R, NJ, were the only members who strongly emphasized the issue (the ranking Republican, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen mentioned it, and I know her staff to be very familiar with the issues).
• Royce (quoting Jay Lefkowitz) called North Korea “an Asian Darfur,” said we must “give no quarter on human rights,” and emphasized the need to increase broadcasting to North Korea.
• Ros-Lehtinen considers the abductions an impediment to North Korea’s removal from the terrorism list, which she added should not be “a bargaining chip.” This is just one element of the deal where Hill doesn’t appear to be in a strong position to promise the North Koreans much. For understandable reasons, North Korea does not grasp the limits of executive power.

On the Regime and Its Stability

• Responding to Rep. Diane Watson, D, Cal.: “I cannot say that public opinion seems to play much of a role among the leadership in Pyongyang.” There were audible titters at this. Rep. Watson again impressed me with the excellent and insightful questions she asked — about famine and the potential for popular discontent. Hill did not give satisfactory answers, though for understandable diplomatic reasons.
• Rep. Smith, from New Jersey emphasized that the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 requires us to provide aid in accordance with international standards. He expressed concern about the diversion of aid: “We want to help the people, not the army.” He insisted that we must hold North Korea to human rights benchmarks.
• Hill, responding: “Any agreement will be entirely consistent with our laws and obligations.” Suuuure.

On Heavy Fuel Oil and Reciprocity

• Hill stated that we will only keep the fuel flowing as long as North Korea takes specific steps toward denuclearization, but suggested no other consequence of North Korean nonperformance except … no more fuel oil. And upsetting the Chinese.
• Hill estimated that 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil would last a year. That’s the closest thing we have to a timeline for performance.

On China’s Role

• Hill invests extraordinary faith in the Chinese and slathered praise on them. He made it sound as if China’s wagging finger was the main guarantor of this agreement. He credits U.N. Resolution 1718, and China’s implementation of it, for North Korea coming back to the table and making the agreement. Yes, he thinks it was a U.N. Resolution that bombed Kim Jong Il back to the peace table.
• Rep. Brad Sherman, D, Cal. — “Brad Sherman from Sherman Oaks” as he introduces himself — accused China of sustaining North Korea in part because China is “tweaking us.” He asked Hill whether there had been any consideration of changing our China policy as a result, although the question wasn’t mean for Hill’s ears.

On Abductions

• For many of the families, Hill suspects “the resolution will not be a happy one.” True enough, but I thought it was cruel, almost dismissive, of him to say so.

On Proliferation

• The “Peace and Security” working group, chaired by the Russians, will be responsible for this issue, and for regional conflict resolution and arms control issues.
• Brad Sherman, chairs a subcommittee on proliferation. Sherman has a lock on being my favorite Democrat on the Committee, in good measure because the man has great comic timing and delivery, and uses his sense of humor to demonstrate valid points. Sherman said that if North Korea had a dozen bombs, hypothetically, it would need a thirteenth to test, and if it made a fourteenth or more, it would sell them on E-Bay. Sherman said that while you need to be a rocket scientists to build a rocket that can deliver a nuke, you don’t have to be one to smuggline a nuke into the United States, because “it would fit inside a bale of marijuana.” So what have we specifically done to address that? Bupkes. Hill offered no specifics.

Oddest Statement of the Day

• Eni Faleomavaega, D, Am. Samoa, who spoke admiringly of “the character of the Korean people” for testing a nuclear weapon because they are “not to be intimidated.”