Who Still Wants the Alliance?

Because of Agreed Framework 2.0, South Korea thinks it’s set for the duration of the Bush Administration — which it is — so it now feels free to demand our taxpayer dollars rather than ask for them politely. There are unpleasantries like Washington’s decision to sell off its ammunition stockpiles in Korea, but no matter; South Korea is certain war will never come (no, we still can’t leave).

South Korea also feels free to ignore our requests not to give Kim Jong Il so much free money, thus undermining the nuclear diplomacy Seoul has demanded for a decade and finally gotten. Witness this feeble request from our ambassador in Seoul, Alexander Vershbow:

“We do believe that progress on inter-Korean relations should be closely coordinated with progress in implementing the Feb. 13 disarmament agreements,” Vershbow said yesterday. “One rail is North-South engagement and the other is progress on denuclearization. The train needs to roll forward on both.

He said South Korea and the United States must “maintain a consistent and mutually reinforcing policy for North Korea so the six-party talks and North-South engagement send the same message. [Joongang Ilbo]

Unfortunately, the South Koreans don’t see these policy differences in absolute terms, but in relative (dialectic) terms. To them, our February surrender reaffirmed that Their Way prevailed and Our Way — a policy of regime change by pressure that in fact never really existed — has been abandoned. There’s no new consensus between allies, if that was our hope. The negotiation has just moved another step in their direction. “Consensus” is a concept that scarcely exists in Korea’s political culture. It’s generally crowded out by concepts like status, dominance, and getting your way through determined incrementalism.

South Korea may speak of the need for the United States to “negotiate” North Korea’s disarmament, but the governments of Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Dae Jung never made disarmament, nuclear or otherwise, a part of their dealings with Kim Jong Il. To the extent “negotiation” implies give-and-take, the term mischaracterizes the give-and-give that has characterized South Korea’s recent dealings with the North. To Seoul, denuclearization was treated as an American problem at best, and an American obstruction at worst. Now, it has concluded that we’ve been removed as an obstruction and anchored safely in place as an unquestioning benefactor. Thus, South Korea feels free to keep buying off North Korea with our money while ingoring our objections to this.

At a routine press briefing, Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung declined to comment on Vershbow’s remarks, but said South Korea will not give up on the North despite the setbacks in the nuclear crisis.

“We cannot give up the inter-Korean relations under any circumstances, and we must never stop trying to seek alternative solutions,” Lee said.

South Korea has this tribute money to spend because of the generosity of U.S. taxpayers and the American soldiers Koreans love to hate. Now, contrast the largesse South Korea lavishes on North Korea with its parsimony toward us:

South Korea’s defense chief said the top United States military commander here spoke “inappropriately” about how Washington and Seoul would split up the cost of moving the American bases.

During a Senate hearing in Washington Tuesday, General B.B. Bell, who commands the U.S. Forces Korea, said Seoul must increase its share of the cost of maintaining a U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula. Otherwise, Washington may have to reassess its base relocation plan here, Bell said.

In a news briefing yesterday, Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo of South Korea did not hide his irritation about Bell’s remark. “I understand that a commander must think about the welfare of his soldiers,” Kim said. “But, the relocation of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division and Yongsan garrison is proceeding under an agreement by the two countries, and it is inappropriate for the USFK commander to mention the possibility of a reassessment. [Joongang Ilbo]

This is not merely a contrast of two select anecdotes; South Korea’s aid to Kim Jong Il ($1 billion) exceeds what it pays to contribute to America’s defense of its territory ($ 780).

For this reason and others, the fundamentals of the U.S.-ROK alliance are bleak, and Americans should be happy about that. Is Kim Jong Il someone in whom we want to entrust the power to embroil us in another Asian land war? Is the U.S. presence in Korea — a uniquely volatile intersection of cheap liquor, eleven-bravos, taxi drivers, sloppy journalism, and “civic groups” — advancing America’s political goals? Can’t one of the world’s largest economies defend itself from an economic wreck with a dwindling, stunted population? Doesn’t America have other, higher priorities for its Army these days? It’s obvious where this leads, and one day, we make thank Roh Moo Hyun for making it all seem so obvious.

During the Bush Administration, the Pentagon reduced USFK from 37,000 troops to 29,000, with most of those reductions coming from the Army. This decline was largely driven by the loss of South Korea’s constituency of support among the American conservatives in just six short years. Conservatives watched the ascendancy of the Korean left, its inexhaustible apetite for appeasing North Korea, its general diplomatic incompetence, and its delusional fulminations of America-hate that reached the highest levels of its government. They watched the Korean right fall silent, barely admitting to its support for America or pointing out the benefits that the alliance brings (it stands for nothing and is paying the political price). Overall, South Koreans are as anti-American as many Muslim populations. American conservatives have come to resent this deeply, and on a more detached level, have come to realize that the two countries no longer share enough common goals, interests, or values to support a military commitment as large, expensive, and risky as USFK.

The force reductions would have been more sudden, but for the survival of so much of the center-left foreign policy establishment after the Clinton-Bush transition, and even after Bush’s reelection in 2004. After six years of internecine struggle between the establishment and conservatives over the course of George W. Bush’s Korea policy, the establishment finally prevailed in 2007. This came at a high cost for South Korea, however; conservatives now attach South Korea itself to the bitterness of their alienation. American Liberals have long wanted a reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. Liberals and “progressives” here haven’t been in a more isolationist, anti-military mood since Vietnam. And most “moderates” are “moderate” because they really don’t know and don’t care. Who is left? A stagnant vestige of diplomats, businessmen, and retired officers with no real base of political support. These “realists” have invested their last reserve of credibility in an arms control agreement grounded on Kim Jong Il’s honesty, China’s good faith, and South Korea’s loyalty.

That’s why it’s hard to see Korea continuing to benefit from such generous terms after 2009, no matter who wins the next elections. Conservatives won’t repeat the mistake of leaving men like Chris Hill, Nicholas Burns, George Tenet, and Jack Pritchard with the run of their camp to sabotage them again. Plenty of liberals may be sympathetic to South Korea’s instinct to appease, but they won’t expend political capital to keep more of our troops posted in Korea. Their voters want them to cut military budgets, and that will force Pentagon planners to take another hard look at USFK.

South Korea’s best hope might be Hillary Clinton, who comes prepackaged with Wendy Sherman, Bill Richardson (who is running for Secretary of State), and various proteges of Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright. Still, readers may remember Mrs. Clinton’s accusation that South Korea suffers from “historical amnesia.” And does anyone think Hillary Clinton will be as tolerant of being crossed by conniving politicians in Seoul as George W. Bush turned out to be?