Fighting Hard Power With Soft: Sanctions, Iran, and Burma
Burma’s generals, confident that they have reestablished the rule of terror, have just relaxed their curfews and bans on public assemblies. It’s exceedingly depressing to write about yet another ongoing atrocity that no one has the courage or vision to really fight, and Burma is another of those atrocities. If the Administration thinks that modest sanctions like these will end the slaughter, it’s fooling no one:
The president directed the government to freeze any U.S.-controlled assets held by 11 senior Burmese officials, and he widened the net with an executive order expanding sanctions to those who assist such officials or the Burmese government, starting with 12 individuals and entities. He also ordered tighter restrictions on the export of goods such as high-performance computers to Burma. [WaPo]
You can read summaries of our sanctions against Burma here and here. They’re fairly comprehensive already. We don’t import much of anything from Burma. Although we can export most items to Burma, financial services are a very important exception. The main impact of the new sanctions will be on junta members’ assets in the United States, and since it’s doubtful that they have much money here anyway, the likely impact is questionable. But there is Biparitsanship! Sure, that means nothing if you’re at the pointy end of a rifle in Rangoon, but it sounds great on the think-tank circuit, does it not?
The Bush Administration may have been encouraged by the results of its sanctions against North Korea, and the best evidence we have is that their effect was devastating. North Korea is probably an exception to the general rule, however; it has few valuable legal exports and a stunted network of trading partners, which makes it uniquely vulnerable to attack at select chokepoints. Burma abounds in timber, gems, oil, and gas, and every one of its neighbors buys those products from its generals. Sanctions against Burma will be difficult to negotiate and even more difficult to enforce. They may weaken the generals more than, say, stones or packages of ladies’ undergarments, but sanctions won’t drive the generals from power. Only the people of Burma can do that, and to do it, they will need guns, which nobody is even talking about sending them. Indeed, a credible threat to arm and train dissidents may be the only threat that can force dictators to negotiate a kinder, gentler tyranny in which dissent can still survive.
Iran’s ongoing inflexibility in its nuclear diplomacy with the United States and Europe, may have inspired Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to send this strong new signal about Iran’s money laundering. The mention of money laundering suggests that the Bush Administration may be thinking about applying PATRIOT 311 sanctions, the single most devastating weapon in our financial arsenal. You will recall a PATRIOT 311 designation declares an entity to be one of special concern for money laundering and bans U.S. financial institutions from holding corresponding accounts for any bank that holds assets for that entity. In simple terms, it forces every bank on earth to choose between that account holder and the American financial system, which effectively means the global financial system. The effect is to cut the offending entity off from global finance. It is the measure we used to nearly destroy Banco Delta Asia, which was once Kim Jong Il’s principal foreign bank.
Treasury previously applied Executive Order 13,382, which allows the freezing of assets suspected of use to proliferate WMD’s, to Iran’s Bank Sepah in January. With diplomacy failing, the administration must be thinking very hard about other options. It would like to be rid of the mullahs, may be forced to launch air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and knows that attacks would probably rally the population to the regime, at least for a while. It also knows that Iran’s economy is a basket case, and that economic warfare is more likely to advance its long-term goals. My guess is that any military options will be brief and limited, that the main thrust will be economic, and what we’re seeing are probing attacks aimed at finding the regime’s vulnerabilities. Like Burma, Iran has much to sell to the rest of the world, but its economy is far more developed than those of either North Korea or Burma. Its population is also far less isolated from outside information and far more likely to express its discontent in the streets.
Finally, Iran’s petroleum-based monoconomy makes it relatively vulnerable, but our dependency on it does the same to us. Without securing an agreement by other oil producers to expand production in advance, it’s questionable that the West would attack the one Iranian commodity to which it is an admitted addict.
See also:
* Trickle, trickle: the United States is preparing to accept a whopping 32 more North Korean refugees from Thailand.