Jane’s: N. Korean Regime Near Collapse
[Update: Digg it here]
[Update 2: A reader points out that Reuben F. Johnson is the source of both the Weekly Standard and Jane’s stories. I admit that I’m not familiar with Johnson’s work, but when a story comes with specifics, it’s more persuasive than when it comes without.]
Kim Jong-Il’s regime could collapse within six months, bringing chaos to North Korea, observers and intelligence sources in Asia have told Jane’s. [. . . .]
I know, I know: saying that North Korea’s regime could collapse in six months is a lot like saying someone else could step forward to accuse Bill Clinton of sexual harassment sometime between now and November. There’s a certain unpredictable inevitability to either contingency. This would have been an Anju Link, except that it’s Jane’s Country Risk News saying it, and they are offering some specifics to back this up. I report, you decide:
Any apocalyptic scenario has to be taken with a grain of salt; in 1997 the Central Intelligence Agency predicted the collapse of North Korea within five years. However, there are reasons for the heightened levels of concern; in particular, the recent actions of Kim Jong-Il and other North Korean officials are being interpreted as signs that the regime is nearing its end.
Tellingly, the ‘Dear Leader’ is in the process of moving financial resources to ensure that his assets are portable should he have to go into exile, according to some sources.
The centrally controlled economy has also now ceased to function and the food distribution system is near breaking point. With loyalty to the regime at an all-time low, another sign of trouble is the regime’s diminishing ability to prevent people from leaving the country. [Jane’s Country Risk News]
And there it ends, at the subscriber’s wall. (For you subscribers or SIPR-Net users, if you send me the rest of this, you can have one of my kidneys or my chisel mortiser. Take your pick, and bring plenty of plastic sheeting.)
You will recall that I wasn’t very persuaded by a similar prediction at the Weekly Standard last November, but Jane’s does cite some known facts that support its position. Our limited knowledge of events inside North Korea supports the existence of a sharp downward trend:
- Food Situation Worsens. North Korea’s food situation has gotten much worse, probably as bad as any time since the Great Famine, and this time, that situation may actually be affecting people Kim Jong Il depends on to stay in power.
- Disease Spreads. For several years now, we’ve been reading of major outbreaks of typhoid, paratyphoid, typhus, scarlet fever, measles, and most recently, drug-resistant tuberculosis. This may reflect the worsening food situation and dysfunctional health system, but it probably also reflects the fact that North Korea’s borders have sprung leaks. Today, we’re more likely to hear about things we wouldn’t have heard about five years ago.
- Chaos Spreads, Control Slips. The border is leaky: , and even the guards are dropping their guns and crossing it. Most amazing, if true, would be reports that even the concentration camps aren’t secure anymore.
- Palace Economy Damaged. The sanctions of 2005-2006 did lasting damage to the palace economy. The transfer of Kim Jong Il’s assets is interesting: it might mean what Jane’s thinks it means, or it might mean that Kim Jong Il reads this blog and wants to protect himself against another round of sanctions. It could also be a sign that slowly, banks are losing their fear of dealing with him. If we continue to relax sanctions, the palace economy will gradually recover and we’ll lose our leverage over the regime.
Increases or reductions in aid from the United States, South Korea, or China could dramatically change the regime’s survival prognosis. Then again, if I were of a conspiratorial frame of mind, stories like this might be a good way to use intel leaks to mollify disgruntled collapsists.
My take on this: the conditions for collapse have probably existed for a decade, and those conditions probably are intensifying. In past years, the probability of collapse might have been 10% per year. This year, it might be 25 or 30%. The fact that it hasn’t happened yet owes nothing to the contentment of the North Korean population; the people have voted. The problem is fear. There have been many isolated acts of rebellion, dissent, and even mutiny, but so far, no one in a position to make collapse happen has dared to try, and no one can do it alone. The decisive factor won’t be food or even information. It will be fear.
At the new year, I was feeling down on my prediction a year ago that the NK regime wouldn’t live to see 2009. Of course, I was going on gut instinct more than anything….well….on bits and pieces of information quickly pulled from the news. Much of it was along the lines you mentioned — knowing NK has been near collapse continuously since the early 1990s, pondering the conditioning of the different segments of the society that must have produced, and especially taking into account the economic banking sanctions the US was able to get China and others to go along with.
Most of all, what got my ears to prick up were the actions and words coming out Pyongyang on a variety of issues. To me, as I’ve said before, NK testing a nuclear device so soon after launching the ICBM was a very big event. To me, the most likely reason was pure desperation within the regime. Other things over the past year from the North have also seemed desperate for a regime that likes to project strength.
Any high level of desperation in Pyongyang most likely means they are afraid the end is near. And they would know better than any outside expert (unless they were delusional, but in that case, they would usually fail to see the coming collapse than be too eager to proclaim it).
I thought, however, when Bush flipflopped on the North, especially perhaps turning back on NK’s illegal money laundering avenues (though I don’t really know to what extent the sanctions have been reversed????), that my no 2009 prediction was dead in the water.
This from Jane’s makes me feel a lot better about it, and there was another item the last couple of months from experts far more knowledgeable than me that gave me hope, but I have completely forgotten where I read it….
Of course, time will tell………….
I imagine China would supply anything necessary — trains full of food and medicine, private jets full of cognac, a few thousand volunteer plainclothes PSB enforcers — to ensure that this does not happen until after the Olympics. So it might happen in 2008. But I can’t see it happening in the next six months. Indeed, if the Pyongyang is showing signs of imminent collapse, it is not inconceivable that the signals are intended to squeeze as much as possible out of the rich uncle who could not stand to be embarrassed — or upstaged — right now.
I know, I know: saying that North Korea’s regime could collapse in six months is a lot like saying someone else could step forward to accuse Bill Clinton of sexual harassment sometime between now and November. There’s a certain unpredictable inevitability to either contingency.
Is there? I honestly cannot recall any post-presidency accusations. Refresh my memory. Moreover, some of the women who claimed to have had sexual relations with Clinton, like Gennifer Flowers, did so voluntarily. That is not sexual harassment. A better analogy: saying that North Korea’s regime could collapse in six months is a lot like saying someone else could step forward to accuse the Bush administration of lying about Iraq.
testing, testing. Please rescue my comment from the spam trap.
As for China stepping in to save the day, a lot matters on timing and other factors. China was not seen to step in (or be invited in or however you want to phrase it) to save th 3 million during the great famine even though it looked like collapse was going to come. China helped as did others but not with the kind of knee-jerk, immediate, survival-at-all-costs we might be talking about.
I guess I mean that there are some points of departure from which even train loads from China cannot save the regime.
With all the various factors and ebbs and flows, North Korea walks a think tightrope. It has been doing so skillfully for years. But on a tightrope it does trod.
That is why if NK collapsed tomorrow, it wouldn’t be a surprise to those who watch it. Nor would it be if the collapse doesn’t come for another 10 years.
North Korea is a survivor. But it is also terminal. And it will collapse ultimately in any one of a possible chain of events.
As for the long term, however much China wants to keep the North alive, it has to factor in costs-to-benefits. NK means more to China than it did the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union ended up regretting the funding it wasted on the North for so long. China will not end up perpetually running an open-ended comittment to the North.
I reserve the right to be skeptical, but the evidence you have gathered here is quite telling.
Today in the Korea Times, reports are coming in that the North wants to reduce inter-Korean railway traffic, citing “lack of cargo”. More likely, they want less eyes viewing the chaos.
Also today the North is requesting a peace treaty be drawn up. I find that to be a quite interesting sign.
And the “Great leader” is heading to China to discuss “Economic Reform”. If Jane’s is accurate, then perhaps he’s looking for a place to hide.
So my question is this: Are we at a “tipping point” for the regime and if so, how many months will it be before a collapse? More importantly, how will South Korea react if the North collapses in an “overnight” fashion?
I’m just speculating but since there was some uproar regarding Chinese history texts claiming North Korea as part of Koguryeo (sp), wouldn’t there be some speculation that China also has contingency plans for the collapse of NK as well? I.E. Kim Jong Il flees to China and allows Chinese troops to occupy the North ala Tibet? Maybe far-fetched but I can’t say for sure.
“The decisive factor won’t be food or even information. It will be fear.”
The decisive factor will be when food becomes more important than fear. Remember that the Russian Revolution of February 1917 began as a riot by mothers in Petrograd who couldn’t find enough food for their children. The Tsar’s troops’ bloody crackdown only encouraged more people to join. By the end of the day, Karensky was in power and Lenin was on his way back from exile.
Certainly both will be factors, but my point here is that while the lack of food, repression, dull early-morning self-criticism sessions, midnight home searches, lack of electricity, Army looting, and any number of provocations may have had the people angry and discontented for a decade or more, the North Korean people didn’t rise up.
Why not? Well, surviving does tend to sap your energy for plotting revolution. And the regime is very accomplished at managing hunger in its most discontented regions (we’ll probably learn much more about that one day). So in fact, people are probably more likely to rise up when they’re fed adequately to have some physical and mental energy.
There have been plenty of scattered rebellions and acts of dissent. They were isolated, contained, and crushed because (a) news can’t travel easily in North Korea, and (b) people are too afraid to join efforts with which they may sympathize.
Is this Chris from the old FNK site? If so, I’m always glad to hear from you. If not, it’s still a good comment. Thanks.