Agreed Framework 2.0: The Shelf Life of Happy Talk

There are probably several good reasons I’ve never really enjoyed a musical except while looking at the lovely France Nuyen, who does not sing.

If legacy was its object, Agreed Framework 2.0 won’t be a positive contribution to one. President Bush must know this, or he would have mentioned it in his State of the Union speech. Events turned against the agreement during the last quarter of 2007: specifically Syria, uranium, North Korea’s false declaration, and its failure to give a complete one. One rumor circulated, briefly, that the Administration might relent and accept an incomplete declaration after all. More recent reports say otherwise:

The United States, alarmed by mounting evidence that North Korea gave nuclear assistance to Syria, has rejected pressure from some of its partners in six-nation talks to compromise on an overdue declaration of Pyongyang’s nuclear activities, U.S. officials said yesterday. [….]

The Syrian connection has become a major problem for the United States since an Israeli air strike in Syria in September. The target was widely reported to be a nuclear facility under construction with help from North Korea. Current and former U.S. officials said yesterday that intelligence points to a plutonium-related facility.

Yesterday, Mr. Hill said the North’s declaration must account for the Syrian connection. “We discussed all of the elements that we believe need to be included, including the Syrian matter and uranium enrichment,” he said of his talks with Mr. Kim.

U.S. and Israeli officials have refused to talk about the September strike, but diplomats and analysts said even the administration’s strongest advocates of engagement with Pyongyang are worried by what they have learned from intelligence sources. [Washington Times, Nicholas Kralev]

Which advocates? I’ll just say that this surprised me:

The United States has presented to South Korea a video of a Syrian nuclear reactor believed to have been built with North Korea’s help, a Seoul daily reported Friday.

Top U.S. nuclear negotiator Christopher Hill showed the video to Kim Byung Kook, senior secretary for foreign and security affairs for President-elect Lee Myung Bak on Wednesday, the Munhwa Ilbo said, quoting an unidentified South Korean government official. [Kyodo News]

You will also recall my post about a recent event where NPR’s Robert Siegel, the WaPo’s Glenn Kessler, and the NYT’s Mark Mazzetti discussed the implications of Syria. Despite the suspiciously extraordinary secrecy surrounding the events of last September, the emerging consensus is that it was something nuclear: possibly a reactor, or according to other sources, nuclear material.

Which leaves us where we’ve been since the beginning of the year — firmly stalled. That condition can’t last forever. I believe that within the next 30 days, we will start to see the first signs of the Bush Administration recognizing the realities that (a) the current policy will not disarm North Korea, (b) North Korea is stalling, (c) a rare consensus of the aforementioned is forming in Washington, and (d) because Bush’s policy looks ineffective, Bush’s legacy will not benefit from helping North Korea stall. I also predict that this recognition will amount to little in practice.

The other factor is blame, and the avoidance thereof. The leftward fringes, of course, will always find reasons to excuse each North Korean transgression and support every North Korean demand, now matter how contrived. Others take refuge in superficial matters or meaningless promises. But serious thinkers understand by now that North Korea isn’t willing to disclose the extent of its nuclear programs and has probably crossed The Red Line with Syria. It seems difficult to blame Bush for not having made his best effort toward the kind of diplomacy his critics have spent the last seven years demanding.

The question now is what Bush can still do in the time he has left. Certainly military action is off the table, but it hasn’t been on the table since 1993 anyway. Bush lacks the time and the political capital for any major legislative, political, diplomatic, or logistical effort. He could try yet more concessions, such as watering down requirements for a North Korean declaration or removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Politically, however, those options seem to be foreclosed, Chinese pressure notwithstanding:

Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, said there has been “a mood shift in Washington” since the air attack in Syria. “The administration has taken a firmer line with North Korea,” he said.

At times over the past year, Mr. Klingner said, Mr. Hill has given the impression that he was “lowering the bar” on the requirements from the North, particularly on verification of Pyongyang’s claims in the declaration. But since the Israeli strike, which was followed by criticism of the administration’s policy by some Republicans, there has been no room for trusting the North Koreans blindly, Mr. Klingner said. [Washington Times, Nicholas Kralev]

After a fractious internal debate within the Administration, the option of watering down the declaration has been eliminated. Most Republicans in Congress would probably oppose removing North Korea from the terror list, and it’s hard to imagine Democrats expending much effort to support one of Bush’s foreign policy initiatives this year.

Which brings me to economic pressure, such as Plan B. This would require only a series of executive branch actions the President could order unilaterally. The question is whether the Administration’s foreign policy team possesses the legal savvy, creativity, or determination to do it. Still, America’s foremost experts on the North Korean economy will tell anyone who asks that pressure works.

Can President Bush get away with muddling along for 11 more months? Probably, because everyone’s already forgotten him. Everyone — Kim Jong Il most of all — is already thinking about McCain and Obama. My guess is that the Bush Administration’s language will probably have to change soon. It will have to start acknowledging North Korea’s bad faith and implicitly, the failure of last year’s policy shift. It will probably be prevented from offering substantial new concessions. It may even have to make some pretense that it has an alternative plan. But if the Administration has been gridlocked and out of ideas for the last seven years, it’s difficult to imagine it adopting a more effective appoach now.

Update:

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged North Korea on Friday to come clean on its suspected highly enriched uranium program when it gives a full account of its nuclear intentions under a six-party deal.

”We need a complete declaration from the North Koreans about both their proliferation activities, their current plutonium program, which they are in the process of disabling, but also the HEU program,” she said. ”They need to make clear what has happened there.” [Kyodo News]

More Chris Hill transcripts below the fold.

Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill
Remarks to Press After Receiving the Order of Diplomatic Service Merit Gwanghwa Medal
Presented by ROK Foreign Minister Song Min-soon, February 20, 2008
At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul, South Korea

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, what assurances have you obtained from your meeting with Mr. Kim to form a complete declaration, and when do you think the next six-nation talks will be [inaudible]?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, first of all, let me just say it was a great honor just a few minutes ago to receive this decoration from the Korean Government for diplomatic service. I was really very touched, very honored, to receive this, which I really felt I received on behalf of the whole American diplomatic team that’s been working very closely with the ROK and working with the ROK on a variety of mutual diplomatic issues, including the problem of the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions. So I accepted this award with the understanding that there’s much work to be done,and that it, in a real sense, provides some extra incentive and vigor to try to get through and finish this job.

Secondly, let me say, it’s — as it always is — a great opportunity to come here to Seoul and to consult with my colleague and friend Chun Young-woo on the subject of the Six-Party process and where we might go next. We had a good discussion about where we are in this, and I was able to brief him on my meetings with Kim Gye-gwan.

Now in my meetings yesterday, my meeting with Kim Kye-gwan — it was a fairly lengthy meeting — we discussed the current difficulties of getting through the second phase. Now Mr. Kim Kye-gwan was very careful not to describe this as any kind of stalemate. He wanted to make clear that he and his government are prepared to try to make progress and get through this. I told him that we were also prepared to try to make progress on this, and I reiterated that we stand ready to fulfill our commitments, provided the DPRK is prepared to fulfill its commitments.

We talked about some of the issues, especially pertaining to the declaration, the complete and correction declaration that not only is expected by us, but is also expected from the October agreement. We talked about some ideas of how we might proceed with that. We did not discuss any particular language. We did not negotiate, for example, what the declaration might look like. But I emphasized to him the fact that, from our vantage point, we need a complete and correct declaration — because that is the basis for going forward. And I think he fully understood our position. We promised to be in touch in the days and weeks ahead.

And I think, as everyone knows, Secretary Rice will be out here in the region. I will report to her on my visit to the region this week, which was in many respects an advance trip for her visit, and then we’ll take it from there.

So we have a lot of work to do to be sure, but I would not like to describe the Six-Party process as in any kind of stalemate at this time. It’s just on a rough road, a rough patch that we’ve had to deal with in the past and have found ways to get through.

QUESTION: Has the DPRK set any new contingencies for the declaration?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, they haven’t. No.

QUESTION: What did Kim Kye-gwan tell you about the declaration? I mean, recently I think we’ve heard all —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: They continue to take what they call a principled position that they have not engaged in any uranium enrichment activity nor have they been. Well, I should say he wanted to make very clear that they are not at present having any nuclear cooperation with any other country, and they will not in the future have any nuclear cooperation with any other country.

QUESTION: Based on your discussions with Kim Kye-gwan, do you see a way forward out of this [inaudible] “rough patch,” as you said?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I think, at some point we would have to see what they’re prepared to put down in a declaration. I made very clear that for us to proceed we need a complete and correct declaration. We cannot hide problems. We cannot pretend that problems don’t exist when they exist. We cannot pretend that activities don’t exist when we know that the activities have existed.

So I think it was useful to go through all of this and to make very clear why we are insistent on having a complete and correct declaration, which is called for in the Six-Party agreement. And I like to think the DPRK delegation understood our points on that. We also made very clear to them that we are committed to following through on our obligations and that they should know that as they do their obligations, we will do ours.

QUESTION: When you mentioned uranium enrichment, did you bring up whether North Korea had purchased equipment to enrich uranium?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, we have a situation where they have purchased some equipment and have been trying to show to us that this equipment is not being used for uranium enrichment — on the theory that if you can show that the equipment is not being used for uranium enrichment, therefore we don’t have a uranium enrichment problem. And they’ve taken some steps in that regard.

What I wanted to encourage Mr. Kim to understand is that, as they take steps to show us that they’re not using equipment for uranium enrichment, that those will be considered positive steps. I think from the DPRK’s point of view they are always concerned that when they tell us something, that what they tell us will be followed by additional questions. What I want to assure them is that, yes, there will be additional questions, but not an infinite number of questions. We are simply asking questions for the purpose of seeing if we can get the answers that can resolve the matter. So I think we had a good discussion on that.

QUESTION: Next week, with the New York Philharmonic visit, what do you think this will do for U.S.-North Korean relations, and what do you hope for?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: The New York Philharmonic visit is very much in keeping with the New York Philharmonic’s role in many countries, where it has gone to very unusual places and has played music and in many ways has been a kind of precursor to American diplomacy in that regard. I want to stress that this was a private initiative by the New York Philharmonic, but I also want to equally stress that this private initiative is one that we very much support.

Now what effect it will have is really hard to say. I certainly would like to make very clear that as we go forward in the Six-Party process — although it is to be sure a nuclear deal — it’s also an effort to, I think, address broader issues, address broader relationships. And to the extent that anyone in the DPRK feels there’s some kind of justification for nuclear weapons because of a so-called American hostile policy, they should maybe think again — because clearly we don’t have a hostile policy. We have a hostile policy to nuclear weapons.

So we’ll see what the effect of this is. You know, sometimes the North Koreans don’t like our words; maybe they’ll like our music. So we’ll see.

QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, you said yesterday at the airport that you discussed the idea of phase three. Why talk about phase three when phase two hasn’t been completed?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, you know, sometimes you like to kind of have a sneak preview of what’s coming next. And I think it’s fair to have a little look at how phase three might look. Obviously, you’re right. We have to get through phase two in order to have phase three. But, you know, sometimes you do like to look in the kitchen to see what the next course will bring.

Thank you very much.

QUESTION: When are you heading to [inaudible]? This afternoon?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I don’t think I have a lot of time. Thank you very much.

###

Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill
Remarks Upon Arrival
February 20, 2008
Haneda Airport
Tokyo, Japan

QUESTION: Are you going to meet Wu Dawei tonight to talk about the Six-Party Talks?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE HILL: Yes, tonight, as I understand the schedule, I will meet with my Chinese counterpart, actually the head of the Six-Party Talks, Mr. Wu Dawei. Then tomorrow I think I have a very full program at the Japanese Foreign Ministry. I look forward to meeting with Saiki-san for the first time in his capacity as the head of the Six-Party delegation. And I also have a meeting with the North America Director-General, Mr. Nishimiya.

QUESTION: Just in brief, in Beijing you received a kind of proposal from China to get over the stalemate?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, I think China in its capacity as chairman of the talks would like to see what can be done, and so we are in constant communication with the Chinese about that. My main purpose on this trip is to prepare for Secretary Rice’s visit here, where she will be meeting with all the partners in the Six-Party process. And so I look forward tomorrow to have a good discussion with the Japanese and to see how we can go forward, just as I did that in Beijing with the Chinese. And because Mr. Wu Dawei was in Europe, I’m only able to meet him here in Tokyo.

QUESTION: You were talking about the Chinese providing some ideas, and they —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: As chairman of the process, they are always looking for ideas, and I look forward to discussing my ideas and hearing what Wu Dawei has to say as well.

QUESTION: Is there any specific ideas the North Koreans are interested in?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, not that I’m aware of.

QUESTION: Where are you going to meet with Wu Dawei?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I believe we will meet at the Chinese Embassy, but you’ll have to check the American Embassy to confirm that.

QUESTION: Do you have the time as well?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, I don’t. I’m sorry, I’m a terrible scheduler. I just do what people tell me to do.

QUESTION: Is there any possibility that Ms. Rice is going to visit Pyongyang this time?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, she has a very busy program, which involves going to Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul for the inauguration of the new Korean president. So she has no other travel plans in the region.

QUESTION: Even after you report back about the meeting with the North Koreans, she will not change her mind?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, she will not change her mind. I mean, it’s a very busy program. I think she gets into Seoul very late Sunday night and will go on from there to Beijing and then to Tokyo.

QUESTION: During her stay in Japan, is she going to express great concern over the allegation in Okinawa?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Look, I don’t want to speak for Secretary Rice in this regard. Obviously, we are very much concerned by these incidents, and I look forward to discussing these matters and other bilateral issues with the Director-General for the North America Division, Mr. Nishimiya. I will be doing that tomorrow morning.

QUESTION: And will she —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: She will be coming next week, and I’m sure she will also be discussing these and other bilateral issues as well.

QUESTION: There’s a plan for New York Philharmonic to visit Pyongyang on the 26th. Is it going to happen as scheduled?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I’m not a spokesman for the New York Philharmonic, but my understanding is, yes indeed. And they have a program. They have worked very hard to make all the arrangements. It’s a private initiative, but it’s one that we have very much supported.

QUESTION: When is your next visit to Pyongyang? Is it planned?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I don’t have any onward travel plans to Pyongyang at this point. As I said when I was in Seoul and in Beijing as well, I did have very good and useful discussions with Mr. Kim Kye-gwan. They confirmed the DPRK’s continuing interest in trying to find a resolution to the problems of phase two. I discussed with him my own concerns about what needs to be done to get through phase two. So it’s been a difficult issue, but I want to remind everybody that we’ve had many other difficult issues in the Six-Party Talks. So let’s see if we can find a way through this one.

QUESTION: What are you going to talk about with Mr. Wu Dawei?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, he’s the chairman of the Six-Party process, and I was not able to see him in Beijing. So I’m very fortunate that I can see them here, and I think we will be talking about how to get through phase two. I hope also I can have some discussion about how we might approach phase three, because obviously we are already close to getting into March 2008. We hope to get this done in this calendar year. So it’s going to be difficult, and we need to do some consultation about it.

So if you’ll excuse me, I really need to get moving here.

QUESTION: Tomorrow are you going back to Washington directly?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Actually, I’m going to Los Angeles. I’ve got a speaking engagement there, and then San Diego, and then back here, and back to Seoul. # # #

Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill
Remarks to Media
February 20, 2008
Okura Hotel
Tokyo, Japan

QUESTION: How was your meeting with Wu Dawei?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I don’t really have any details for you, just that I briefed him on my meeting with Kim Kye-gwan and my meeting in Seoul. And we talked about how we can get through the second phase, and we talked a little about what are the elements for the third phase and how that could be set up. I also briefed him on the issues that Secretary Rice would be interested in discussing. So I think in that regard we are kind of teed up and ready for Secretary Rice’s trip back to the region. So tomorrow I’ll have several meetings at the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and then I’ll get on the plane and get moving.

QUESTION: Did you discuss the timing of the next Six-Party Talks?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, we didn’t talk about the timing of the next Six-Party Talks, because we were talking about the fact that we will be together in Seoul next Sunday and then will also be together in Beijing next Monday night or Tuesday.

QUESTION: You mentioned that Secretary Rice will be meeting with all the parties of the Six-Party Talks. Does that include the North Koreans?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No. Thank you for parsing that statement and seeing the inaccuracy there. No, she will just be meeting with China, Japan, and the ROK.

QUESTION: Was there any progress in the meeting with Mr. Wu Dawei?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, you know, we weren’t really looking to measure progress, except that it was a good discussion, and we’re trying to think what can be done to get through this second phase. And so I think it was an encouraging meeting. But we’ll see. We’re not there yet.

QUESTION: About the Chinese proposal? Are you generally in agreement on how to move forward with that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, you know, the Chinese want to make progress and so do we. But we’ve made very clear that we cannot accept something that is not complete and not correct. That’s what the October agreement calls for, and I think the Chinese understand that. So we have to have complete and correct, and within that context there’s not a lot of room for creativity. But certainly we can talk about how we might accomplish that. Again, I don’t want to get into specifics at this point.

QUESTION: Is there any gap in between the U.S. and the Chinese?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think we’re okay with the Chinese. They have some ideas about how to proceed. But it really will come down to what the North Koreans are prepared to say in their declaration, and we’re not sure yet. I certainly spend a lot of time explaining to the North Koreans why we need complete and correct. And if we get that, we’re prepared to move ahead on our other elements.

QUESTION: Is that what you’ll be speaking about with the Japanese?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh sure, yes, absolutely. Of course this is the first time that I will see Saiki-san in this context. So I will welcome him to the Six-Party process.

QUESTION: Have you met Mr. Tang Jiaxuan, Chinese State Councilor?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, I did not. Just Wu Dawei. And he had just flown in from London, which is an eleven-hour flight, so he was tired.

QUESTION: Was it just by chance that you met him here though? Was there anything pressing that you just had to meet him?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I wanted to meet him because we were preparing for Secretary Rice’s visit next week. And in trying to schedule that, the only way to meet him was in Tokyo — because I couldn’t be in Beijing tomorrow because I have to be in Los Angeles tomorrow. So this is how we did it. All right, thank you very much. See you later. # # #