Collapse Watch: Have We Reached Stage Five Yet?

One of the most interesting experiences of my four years with the Army in Korea was a “collapse briefing” I was able to attend at USFK Headquarters. I had not been able to find a copy of the briefing summarized online until Robert Kaplan published one in The Atlantic, which I commented on in this post. So for the new readers, I feel obliged to remind you of what I mean when I refer to “Stage Four” and “Stage Five.”

Phase One: resource depletion;

Phase Two: the failure to maintain infrastructure around the country because of resource depletion;

Phase Three: the rise of independent fiefs informally controlled by local party apparatchiks or warlords, along with widespread corruption to circumvent a failing central government;

Phase Four: the attempted suppression of these fiefs by the KFR once it feels that they have become powerful enough;

Phase Five: active resistance against the central government;

Phase Six: the fracture of the regime; and

Phase Seven: the formation of new national leadership. [Robert Kaplan, The Atlantic, quoted here]

We weren’t really able to see Phase Three as quasi-autonomy for local generals, so much as we could perceive cells of corruption within government and military organizations. It was the beginning of this year’s purges and the rise of drug trafficking and abuse in the North that really began to illustrate the extent of the corruption.

Recently, thanks mostly to Good Friends and the Daily NK, we’ve heard many reports of the regime trying to reassert control over North Korea, and most significantly, the military. This is the story I’ll be watching more carefully than all the rest. After years of “military first” governance, there are initial signs that the party — with the secret police as its instrument — is reasserting control by “inspecting” garrisons. And while obvious cautions apply to the often third-hand reports the Daily NK and Good Friends are able to receive, both sources have had a good track record as harbingers of wider political, social, and economic trends in the North:

The Daily NK has two new reports from different locations, suggesting that the party secret police have already provoked tension with the Army. The first incident occurred in Hoeryong, on the Chinese border, when party police stopped an Army mechanic who had smuggled Chinese liquor in his bag.

The agent tried to take the bottle away from the mechanic saying that it must have been smuggled. The mechanic protested bitterly saying, “I bought it at a Jangmadang [market]. If you must say this single bottle of liquor was smuggled, why shouldn’t I say the Chinese glasses and shoes you are wearing were smuggled too?”

The source said, “As a fight broke out between the agent and the mechanic, people began to crowd around them. Then, as the mechanic tried to leave the scene saying he was getting late for work. the enraged agent pulled out a gun and shot the mechanic in front of the crowd.

Upon hearing of the incident, the victim’s family and neighbors ran to the scene, which soon became chaotic as they began to scream and cry. Soldiers of the No.8 Bureau also came to the scene, fully armed. The soldiers ran around wildly saying they would shoot and kill all those “Gruppa [North Korean word for the inspection unit] bastards. [Daily NK]

The commander of the brigade the mechanic worked for then protested the killing to the leadership of the local party and inspection group, meaning that the tensions have reached the highest levels of the two potentially opposing forces.

Another story reports that the head of the Chollima Steel Works in Nampo, one of the centerpieces of North Korean industry, was also purged and shot for alleged corruption. As significant as that is, I found this to be even more so:

“The inspection units led by the Party were established to extensively inspect the army near Pyongyang and the units of rear services” the source said. “The managers of the parachute troop in Pyongyang’s Duru-dong district, the military food factory in-front of Mirim station, the private hotel run by the April 25 Unit, and the shooting range run by the Sports Division were purged one after another for suspicion of embezzlement. [Daily NK]

As with the Chinese military, then, the North Korean military apparently runs businesses for profit. If this is true, it would tell us that the Party is challenging military commanders’ sources of profit, not just in the distant provinces, but also in the “core” areas around Pyongyang.

This is the most dangerous thing Kim Jong Il could possibly do, and events like this dramatically increase the odds of regime change in the short term. As I noted here, the Army doesn’t have to plot a coup against Kim Jong Il to dethrone him. With the food situation deteriorating rapidly and with people less afraid than ever to voice their discontent openly, the Army (or a portion of it) need only sit on its hands if there’s a demonstration or a food riot. With some research, it’s possible to compile a lengthy history of dissent and rebellion against the regime. All of that dissent was ultimately contained by an Army that remained disciplined and loyal to Kim Jong Il, and which obviously outguns the secret police. When the state’s monopoly on force fractures, it’s over.