Kathleen Stephens: The Wrong Person for the Job

A  few months ago, the Korean press reported that State had submitted the name of Kathleen Stephens to be the next U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, to replace the competent and affable  Alexander Vershbow.  At the time, I did not have strong opinions about Ms. Stephens’s fitness for that position.  Further research has convinced me that Ms. Stephens, though well qualified for the job and apparently a perfectly fine person, is the wrong person to be our next Ambassador to Seoul.

Background  

Stephens was born in Texas, grew up in New Mexico and Arizona, and according to her State Department bio, now  calls “Western Montana home.”  A brief CV (Sources:  Wikipedia; U.S. Dep’t of State):

• B.A. in East Asian studies, Prescott College; Master’s degree, Harvard University; studied at Oxford University and at the University of Hong Kong.  
• 1975-1977, Peace Corps volunteer, Buyeo and Yesan, South Chungcheong Province, South Korea.  Reportedly adopted the Korean name Sim Eungyeong.  [Photograph, circa 1970’s; see also Korea Times]
• Exchange student, University of Hong Kong. 
• 1978:  Joined the foreign service. 
• 1978-1980:  U.S. Mission, Trinidad and Tobago.
• 1980-1982:   U.S. Mission,  Guangzhou, People’s Republic of China.  Served as a consular and public affairs officer.
• 1984-1987:  Political officer and internal political unit chief, U.S. Embassy, Seoul.
• 1987-1989:  Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate, Pusan.
• 1991-1992:  Political Officer, U.S. missions in Belgrade and Zagreb.
• 1992-1994:  Senior Desk Officer, UK, Bureau of European Affairs.
• 1994-1995:  Director for European Affairs, National Security Council.
• 1995-1998:  U.S. Consul General, Belfast, Northern Ireland.
• 1998-2001:  Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Lisbon.
• 2001-2003:  Director, Office of Ecology and Terrestrial Conservation, Dep’t of State.
• Dec. 2003-June 2005:  Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, European and Eurasian Affairs.
• June 2005-present:  Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
• Languages:  Fluent in Korean and Serbo-Croatian; Limited Cantonese and Mandarin. 

The Chosun Ilbo reports that as a political officer in Seoul, Stephens “established ties with South Korean political leaders, including former presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung.”  It claims that Stephens is “regarded as a pro-Seoul diplomat,” although it’s not clear exactly what that means.  While serving  as a political officer in Seoul and while working in the Balkans, Stephens became  a close acquaintance  of Christopher  Hill. 

At EAP / State Department Politics  

Stephens appears to be a close confidant, ally, and protege of Hill to this day.  The sometimes-reliable Nelson Report  claims that Stephens was one of the people Hill planted in the East Asia Bureau while purging out some of the more starry-eyed  Clinton hold-overs:

Even more worrisome is the clear determination of Hill, with Rice’s endorsement, of “cleaning out” the East Asia Bureau. Hill has made private remarks which show this is deliberate, and not coincidental. “Evidence” includes the shabby treatment handed out Principal DAS/Korea expert Evans Revere, and his replacement as Principal DAS/Korea chief by Hill’s fellow European expert, Kathleen Stephens. No one doubts Ms. Stephens’ intelligence or commitment, but her experience in Korea is very limited, and more than 20 years ago.  [The Nelson Report, via Nautilus]

Although there is much room for criticism of Stephens’s policy views, Nelson’s criticism here appears misplaced.  Ms. Stephens appears to have  deep background in Korea and a strong familiarity with its language, culture, and  government. She is also  one of  Christopher Hill’s key lieutanants, placing  her at the center of Hill’s failing diplomatic initiative.

That is also  the principal reason why she is the wrong person for the job.  Despite her obvious qualifications, Ms. Stephens appears to have fundamentally misread the North Korean regime’s intentions, which calls the quality of her judgment into question.  And regional expertise isn’t much good if you can’t apply good judgment to the facts you have.

Advocacy of a Peace Treaty with North Korea

At EAP, Stephens’s  signature functions were to assist in the  creation and implementation of the February 2007 agreement and to  take “charge of Korean peace treaty issues” as Hill’s Principal Deputy, beginning  in  June 2005.  Because President Bush has publicly opposed any peace treaty before North Korea fully dismantles its nuclear program — leading to a testy public spat with  President Roh  (video) —  Stephens has had to fly under the Washington  radar.  Her contacts with the previous South Korean government on this topic, however,  were revealed as being  extensive. 

Initially, according to the Chosun Ilbo, Stephens also had “several rounds of arguments” with the Roh Administration “over North Korean issues and the question of establishing a peace framework on the Korean Peninsula.”

Those differences were less apparent by January 25-28, 2007, when Stephens made what was to have been a low-key visit to Seoul to Seoul to discuss “creating a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and the structure and role of the United Nations Command after dissolving the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command.”   Stephens visited several ministries, including Foreign Affairs, Unification, National Defense, and the National Intelligence Service.  A government official later confirmed the purpose of the visit to a Donga  Ilbo reporter, saying, “We were given an overall review of pending security issues between Korea and the U.S. We talked about a peace treaty as well as the six-party talks.

Naturally, this alarmed some South Korean conservatives:

The U.S. is putting bait on a hook called peace treaty in addition to an offer to partly unfreeze the Macau accounts. Kathleen Stephens, the principal deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, visited Seoul in strict secrecy last week for talks with national security and foreign affairs officials on concluding a peace agreement with North Korea. This shows how fast everything is proceeding.  [Chosun Ilbo]

Relations with South Korean Government

Overall, Stephens seemed to enjoy good relations with the Roh Administration.  When USFK Commander Gen. B.B. Bell spoke in strong opposition to delaying USFK restruction and the move of its Headquarters to Pyongtaek, the Foreign Ministry used Stephens as its messenger to  deliver a rebuke to Bell. 

Little is known of Stephens’s views on human rights in North Korea.  Her mention of those issues is so  conspicuously absent as to suggest that she chose not to mention them.  However, Stephens did  visit the Kaesong Industrial Complex in June 2006, thus becoming the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit to do so.   Notwithstanding the concerns of  the U.S. Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea, Stephens’s comments were laudatory:

“I think I have a sense of what this means to Koreans, and of how their aspirations are so high for it,” said Ms. Stephens.  “Of the scope of the project as they envision it.  I don’t think I’d really appreciated that before.” 

About 6,000 North Koreans, handpicked by Pyongyang, work in the zone for more than 10 South Korean companies. South Korean authorities say they hope to expand the zone to give more than half a million North Koreans employment in the global economy.  South Korea says the North Korean workers receive about $50 a month, paid through North Korean authorities. However, U.S. North Korea Human Rights Envoy Jay Lefkowitz drew fire from South Korean officials earlier this year when he cautioned that “little is known” about actual working conditions there.  Other critics of North Korea have said it is not clear how much of the salary actually goes to the workers.

Stephens says South Korean guides assured her that efforts are underway to make Kaesong operations conform to global labor standards.  “I get the impression that there are still parts of this that are going to be worked out, to be more transparent both to the workers and to the outside world,” she added.

Stephens cautions, however, that North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs pose a serious obstacle to the Kaesong zone’s plans for growth.  “We’re still waiting to see if that strategic decision has been made by the DPRK, that they really do want to engage in this process, and which would only underpin and galvanize, if you like, the vision of what Kaesong could be that I heard today,” She noted.  [Voice of America]

By contrast, Lefkowitz later referred to Kaesong as “material support for a rogue government, its nuclear ambitions, and its human rights atrocities.” 

Stephens’s support for Kaesong and her opposition to financial sanctions may not be offensive to some elements of President  Lee Myung-Bak’s new  administration.  We’ll get a better idea  of this  after the upcoming parliamentary elections, and after the  unfolding freeze in North-South relations hits its nadir.   

As for the  exact contours of  their support for a full peace agreement with North Korea, President Lee and D A/S Stephens have both withheld the details; however, Stephens may find that Lee’s own views on the subject are much  less ambitious than Roh’s.  Nominally, Lee supports the establishment of a “peace regime” on the peninsula, but Lee will harbor few illusions that he can negotiate a peace treaty with North Korea bilaterally, or without some reciprocal improvements on denuclearization,  human rights,  and North Korea’s conventional threat.   Hill and Stephens have  fought to abandon those  and engage in bilateral talks with North Korea.

Role in Dismantling Treasury Sanctions

Stephens has been a key player in dismantling the Treasury Department’s sanctions against North Korea’s illicit activities.  On March 7, 2007, State sent her as its minder in talks between Treasury and the North Koreans.  Leading the U.S. delegation is Treasury Undersecretary Daniel Glaser, a vocal defender of the sanctions, who was then forced to explain to the North Koreans how they could regain the benefits of access to international finance. 

Stephens said the meeting had been an opportunity to discuss issues related to sanctions Washington has imposed on Banco Delta Asia, a Macau-based bank it accuses of being the North’s main money laundering channel. She added the meeting was unrelated to the nuclear issue but she hoped the six-party talks would resume soon.

The Treasury said it explained the sanctions were imposed because North Korea’s money laundering through the bank exposed the U.S. banking system to an intolerable risk, according to a statement. It added the U.S. “will continue to take action as necessary to protect ourselves against threats to our financial system and our institutions.”  [Chosun Ilbo]

Glaser has no doubt noted that North Korea has neither admitted nor agreed to end the illicit activities that drew those sanctions in the first place.   Although the issue of  North Korea’s illegal activities has never been a subject of negotiation, much less  resolved, Stephens later said:

“I don’t think there is any doubt that the [BDA] accounts are open and available,” said Stephens.  She admitted that the bank account issue had been “more complicated and more technical than expected”. But she said any remaining problems on Pyongyang accessing the money were between the bank in Macau, part of China, and the account holders.  [Space War]

Role in February 2007 Agreement  

At the time, she  seemed to  place considerable faith in the current diplomatic process, and in the usefulness of the  U.N.’s role in it. 

Stephens said the US was encouraged by a visit by IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei to Pyongyang last month and by the creation of a series of international working groups.  “We are seeing a pretty intensive and hopefully intensifying schedule of bilateral consultations as well as multi-lateral consultations,” she said.  She hoped it would help move towards the wider goals of a de-nuclearised Korean peninsula and a peace treaty between the two Koreas, she added. [Space War; emphasis mine]

The following month, when the North Koreans failed to meet an April 2007 deadline to shut down their 5-MWe nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, it was Kathleen Stephens who gently but publicly prodded the North Koreans to comply.

Hill was the one who  recommended her to become Ambassador.  She was State’s only nominee. 

Conclusion

There isn’t much doubt that North Korea’s very predictable noncompliance  with Agreed Framework 2.0 will require a  U.S. policy shift, either during this Administration (probably a shift  of tone)  or the next (probably a shift  of substance).  It will also mean a harder line by the South Koreans, followed by North Korean threats that someone will have to take seriously and react to accordingly.  With North Korea again threatening Seoul with nuclear attack, an advocate of removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism is the wrong person to play a key role in that response. 

A U.S. Ambassador  somewhat to the left of Chris Hill might have made sense if  Chris Hill’s  policy were succeeding, but multiple revelations  during the last year show how badly Hill misjudged the  North Koreans.   If Chris Hill’s own future role ought to be called into question — he should resign —  it’s also appropriate that one of his key cronies should not advance now.