The Death of an Alliance, Part 68

Here is a delicious pairing of cause and effect:

The U.S. has notified the South Korean government it will withdraw one squadron of some 20 F-16 fighters by the end of this year. [….]   The Defense Ministry is reportedly busy working out a response. They take the view that the abrupt notice of the withdrawal has something to do with the U.S.’s demand that Korea bear more upkeep cost for the USFK. [Chosun Ilbo]

If you happen to believe that USFK shouldn’t do what South Korea can do for itself, this isn’t all bad. 

Even so, it’s unfortunate that the decline of the alliance has to happen by way of punitive responses to deadlocks rather than through a mutual agreement that the USFK has served the purpose that formerly  required such a big American boot-print.   Even if you don’t  believe that we should have such  a  large force  in Korea, you can still agree that  an improved relationship with South Korea, if reasonably attainable,  can be very helpful in our dealings with North Korea. 

That’s why  I wonder why we’re already  kicking Lee Myung Bak in the teeth a month after his inauguration:

“The North has long had a strategy to go around the South and directly talk to the United States, but such strategy could never work,” [President]  Lee [Myung Bak] said in a press conference held before his state visits to Washington and Tokyo that will begin Tuesday. Lee also emphasized his determination to “work together” with Washington in an effort to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program. “Details of the agreement made in Singapore have not been revealed, and the U.S. has yet to make an official announcement. I would like to make clear that North Korea’s tactic to cut out South Korea and talk to the U.S. only can neither work nor will it ever work,” he said. [Joongang Ilbo]

Lee, who meets President Bush at Camp David this week, will probably direct a polite “WTF?” to his American counterpart.  Lee gets bonus points for class, having made his point without whining on camera about those big, mean Americans … like Roh would have done.  Instead, Lee makes his point with a rather delicate combination of clarity and subtlety.

And he a point.  Sharing intelligence and terms of agreement with our enemies  that we don’t share with our supposed allies —  not to mention  our own Congress —  is the sort of  kind of rank and arrogant  unilateralism at which our foreign policy establishment loves to wag fingers and cluck tongues … that is, if it happens to favor the same policies other foreign governments also happen to favor (here, we tend to see some strained applications of the term “ally”). 

This, just as President Lee is signaling his willingness to make South Korea a true ally again.   

The same, incidentally, is even more true of our most important Asian ally, Japan, which is also spitting  out the teeth we’ve just kicked in by consigning Japanese abductees to rot in hell and absolving North Korea of the consequences for holding them.  To quote Colin Powell, this is not how allies deal with each other.  It tempts you to weigh  those costs against the likely benefits.  With the North Koreans giving up essentially nothing and successfully splitting us from our friends, you have to wonder what vital U.S. interest the Administration’s current strategy is remotely likely to  secure.