For the Thousandth Time, Secretary Rice, We Are Not Giving Up Our Nukes.

Somehow, I don’t think Condi Rice’s “‘very strong message’ about [North Korea’s] nuclear disarmament obligations” quite got through:

North Korea reportedly asked to be recognized as a nuclear state at a meeting of foreign ministers from countries in six-party talks on Wednesday. North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun urged the U.S. to stop its hostile policy toward the North, saying verification of the nuclear facilities and stockpiles it has declared is not a duty but cooperation. [Chosun Ilbo]

Somewhere, Jack Pritchard must be smiling. In May, when he brought back this very same message from Pyongyang — “that the United States should get used to a nuclear-armed North Korea” — the State Department lit into him with the sort of fury you only see in the face of damaging truths and unexpected betrayals (State probably saw the dovish Pritchard’s denunciation of its current policy as both of these things).

That brings us to Rice and Hill’s distorted characterization of the meeting with Pak, which should fuel Congress’s doubts about their candor. I’ve pasted the texts of their subsequent statements to the press below the fold (thanks to a reader). Scan those carefully for any hint of what just happened here: a flagrant North Korean renunciation of any intention to disarm, even as Hill and Rice continue to tell us that they will. Any boldface in the remarks is my own emphasis.

Provided the Chosun Ilbo’s report is true — and Pritchard’s corroboration suggests that it is — we have our third and biggest whopper from Hill, now joined by Rice, on North Korea policy (here’s the first; here’s the second). Imagine how the sleeping watchdogs in our media would have treated lies and obfuscations like these if they had come from John Bolton, Douglas Feith, or Paul Wolfowitz.

I should note that the Chosun Ilbo’s report comes via an unnamed “diplomatic source,” which might mean some highly placed person in the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and then again, might mean a Japanese diplomat. Japan recently made it known that it will opt out of giving North Korea one yen of aid until its abducted citizens are accounted for, an issue on which it reports “no progress whatsoever” thus far:

“Unless and until North Korea really comes to grips with this issue of abduction, there is no way for it to expect economic assistance from Japan,” Kazuo Kodama, a spokesman for Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura, told reporters late yesterday in Singapore. [Bloomberg]

A few other points to take away from those transcripts below:

• Rice says twice that there were no surprises in her discussions with the North Korean Foreign Minister. There are two ways to interpret that, both of them bad.
• There is no agreement on any sort of time frame for verification. Read: license to stall.
• Hill speaks of the North Korean declaration as an issue we’ve put behind us so that we can get on with verification. So much for continuing to press the North Koreans on answers about uranium, existing weapons, fissile material, or proliferation to Iran and Syria.

Parting shot: when you read Hill and Rice speak of this picayune verification mechanism they’re working day and night to put in place, ask yourself how detailed a mechanism you can fit into four pages.

Remarks, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, With Traveling Press After Six-Party Informal Ministerial, July 23, 2008, Shangri-la Hotel, Singapore

SECRETARY RICE: Look, it was a good meeting, no surprises. It was just an informal opportunity. I think everybody essentially confirmed the September agreement, confirmed the October 2007 agreement, confirmed that we need to move ahead rapidly to finish phase two obligations; a lot of discussion of the verification protocol and the importance of the verification protocol; a call to have better bilateral relations among the various parties.

And I thought it was ““ you know, the atmosphere was actually very good. The Chinese did a really excellent job of running the meeting, and I think they are very focused on moving forward. And I think they would like to have a more formal ministerial at some point, but no one ““ we didn’t commit to a date for that, although we said we would.

QUESTION: Did you get a North Korean ““ what kind of assessment do you have of him and what he said?

SECRETARY RICE: It was not ““ nothing surprising. He talked about the importance of everybody meeting their obligations. It was a not a —

QUESTION: So he talked about the importance or you did?

SECRETARY RICE: About ““ of everybody meeting their obligations, but I don’t want to go, you know, into detail about what everybody said, just to say there weren’t any surprises. But it wasn’t ““ you know, it wasn’t a standoff with people just stating their positions. I think we had probably three or four rounds of comments. So, you know, the initial ““ very often, these things, the initial thing is people read a statement. But a couple of people didn’t and then there were several ““ it was interactive. It wasn’t just people making statements, which is good.

QUESTION: Did you get any kind of sense about what they think about the draft protocol?

SECRETARY RICE: No, but we —

QUESTION: It was just —

SECRETARY RICE: We didn’t. You know, it’s important that we get a response, that the parties, the Six Parties get a response. It was actually China, as the chair of the denuclearization working group.

QUESTION: Did they give any indication about when they might?

SECRETARY RICE: You know —

QUESTION: This seems to be ““ much like Iran, you know —

SECRETARY RICE: We didn’t get into specific timetables, but look ““ the spirit was good because people believe we’ve made progress. But there is also a sense of urgency about moving on, and a sense that this ““ we can’t afford to, sort of, have another hiatus of several months.

Okay?

MR. MCCORMACK: Okay, guys.

QUESTION: Oh, one more thing.

SECRETARY RICE: Yes.

QUESTION: Did you shake hands with the —

SECRETARY RICE: Yes.

QUESTION: I didn’t see it.

SECRETARY RICE: With the North Korean —

QUESTION: With the North Korean, you shook hands with him? And —

SECRETARY RICE: Twice.

QUESTION: Twice?

SECRETARY RICE: Yes.

QUESTION: And secondly, did you ““ you said beforehand that you were going to give a firm message that they had to meet their commitments and their obligations on all aspects of the nuclear program.

SECRETARY RICE: I ““ yes, I did, but so did others.

MR. MCCORMACK: All right, guys.

QUESTION: Okay.

SECRETARY RICE: All right.

QUESTION: Thank you.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
On-the-Record Briefing, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill, Roundtable with Traveling Press, July 23, 2008, Shangri-la Hotel, Singapore

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Okay. So the Secretary already briefed. Did you catch that?

QUESTION: Yeah.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Okay. So what am I supposed to do?

QUESTION: Tell us that she’s completely wrong. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: No, could you give us a little bit more? I mean —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I mean, she really —

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I’m sorry?

QUESTION: She made it clear there was no timeline for the verification protocol and —

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

QUESTION: You told us yesterday that you thought that ““ that at this meeting, you would ““ hopefully, you would get some indication about how serious the North Koreans are and —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I mean —

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Frankly, it was ““ I mean, it was a general discussion. I think that’s the first thing to understand. The ministers did not get into the weeds, by any means. But it was a good discussion. The ““ I would say they talked about a number of issues, but I would say the main issue was about verification and the fact that now that the ““ that the North Koreans have put forward a declaration, and now it’s time to put together a verification protocol. And we’d like to get that done as soon as possible.

I would say there was a broad understanding about that. The North Korean didn’t bring up the issue of ““ you know, that everybody has obligations that need to be verified. But there was a consensus around the table that while everybody has obligations that need to be met, the issue right now is to put together a verification protocol for the North Korean declaration.

QUESTION: Could you talk a little bit about the sort of atmosphere among the ““ did Rice directly engage the North Koreans several times? How did it work?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: There was ““ they started ““ they did ““ the Chinese started. Yang Jiechi gave a kind of long ““ I won’t say long, but, I mean, you know, an introduction, maybe 10 minutes, something like that. And then he went around the table. Secretary Rice spoke second.

QUESTION: What did she say?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: The ““ she spoke about the importance of getting a verification protocol. That was her main, main point. She made the point that while a lot of people have obligations, we’re all prepared to fulfill our obligations, but what we’re trying to do now is to get a verification protocol. Then the South Korean spoke and he had a similar theme.

Let’s see, South Korean then ““ so Chinese, American, South Korean ““ I think the North Korean spoke next and he read from a prepared statement and made the point that he would ““ that North Korea would fulfill its obligations and fulfill the terms of the September ’05 statement. He referred specifically to September ’05, which calls for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The ““ then the Russian spoke, and again, he wanted to make clear that what we’re really trying to do is verify the declaration, and said as for, you know, making sure that everybody follows their obligations, yes, that’s true, but they’re ““ the purpose of verification is to address the declaration. And let me see, I think the Japanese spoke sixth —

QUESTION: About the abduction issue?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Japanese raised the abduction issue. Secretary Rice also spoke to that issue.

QUESTION: But apparently, she spoke to that at the end.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yeah.

QUESTION: She pulled ““ at a pull-aside, right? Not in the open session, is that correct?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think she spoke to the need to try to ““ that countries should try to address their outstanding bilateral issues. And I think she referred, in particular, to the DPRK-Japan relationship.

QUESTION: Was there any sort of chemistry between Rice and the North Korean? I mean, did they, you know, engage in ““

QUESTION: They’re getting married next week. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: — very interactive conversation? I mean ““ or was it just a formal —

QUESTION: You still think my story was dumb?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: (Inaudible.) No, I take it back, Nick. You’re okay now. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Let’s go ““

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I take it back. Chemistry. There were six chairs there. They were pretty far apart, if that’s what you are driving at.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, I mean, it was ““ there was some interactive discussion. I mean, after these initial, sort of set piece interventions, where people refer to notes but I think only the North Koreans actually read his speech, then there was a ““ there was a discussion. And, in particular, I think the Chinese raised some issues. Secretary Rice responded. The North Korean actually made a comment as well.

I mean, I’m sorry I can’t get into what everyone said. But it was a perfectly normal and, you know, useful discussion of the issues, with the main issue being the need to get moving on the verification protocol.

QUESTION: So, no friction at all, for example ““

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No.

QUESTION: — between the North Korean Foreign Minister and the others?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No friction at all, no, no. It was a congenial atmosphere.

QUESTION: Chris, you said yesterday that some of the verification ““ part of the process will go alongside phase three, right?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yeah. Now, this ““ they didn’t get into all that stuff.

QUESTION: Right. No, I know. I wasn’t ““ I didn’t mean that they did.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yeah.

QUESTION: I just ““ just as far as the (inaudible) is concerned, have you yet talked about what happens to the plutonium? Have they, in principle, agreed to either destroy it or hand it over? What’s going on with —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No. Their argument is the plutonium already produced, i.e., the so-called weapons, because we don’t even — we haven’t even verified that these ““ that the plutonium is actually contained in firing devices at this point. So the issue of what to do with a separated plutonium is a later phase issue. And there is a consensus among the five that the next phase should be the so-called abandonment phase. The North Koreans have not called the next phase the abandonment phase, but they did reiterate their obligations under the September ’05 statement to completely denuclearize.

QUESTION: Komura had talks with Minister Pak bilaterally ““ shortly, briefly after the plenary session or the ministers —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I’m sure — you know, there was a lot of milling around and people were talking to each other. But I ““ I’m sure it happened. I just wasn’t there.

QUESTION: How was Secretary Rice with Minister Pak?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: It was brief, a, you know, friendly enough discussion, but Secretary Rice emphasized the need to get moving on the verification protocol and also the need to address the abduction issue.

QUESTION: And how was Minister Pak’s response?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I would ““ it was certainly not negative, but I would not call it a substantive response.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) right after the session was over and it (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yeah.

QUESTION: The Secretary’s talked about ““

QUESTION: (Inaudible) said yesterday, right?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: What?

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: You mean right after the meeting?

QUESTION: Yeah.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes.

QUESTION: She made the point of ““

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Let the record show the witness nodded his head affirmatively. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: I’m sorry, I was looking at something else on my screen

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Okay.

QUESTION: — so I didn’t see you nod.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: All right.

QUESTION: The Secretary made a point that the North Korean ““ the response to the draft should be given ““ and she said first the U.S., but then she said, actually, the six ““ the other five parties, because the Chinese are the chair. But what they have in front of them, is that a draft that is agreed upon by the other five parties, or is ““

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Now you’re asking questions that are separate from the six —

QUESTION: Separate from. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Because she referred to —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yeah, you know, several countries put together some notes, some pieces of paper during the denuclearization working group. The U.S. tried to put together a comprehensive protocol based on the principles, written principles that were discussed with other parties. So in putting a piece of paper on the table in Beijing, we were trying to focus, especially the North Koreans, on agreeing on what a verification protocol would like. And since this had been shared with parties already, our idea was not to have any surprises, but to simply show them what we would expect of a international standard of a protocol that would meet international standards, which, by the way, is a term that Lavrov used, as well as the Secretary and others. So —

QUESTION: So (inaudible) a compromise of everything that you wrote and then notes that the others have, you wrote another version of it (inaudible)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, we had discussions with the other parties about what verification was, and we actually tabled a piece of paper which listed several principles. Some parties felt that while everyone agreed these are principles of verification, there was discussion over the last few weeks in bilateral channels that some parties felt some of the principles were, you know, too specific or too vague. But based on that piece of paper and based on feedback, we put together something that was a draft protocol. And the issue —

STAFF: This will be the last question.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: The issue was for the North Koreans to respond to the draft protocol. Based on the discussions that were ““ that took place in the chief of ““ in the head-of-del meeting, head-of-delegation meeting, where there was a list of principles which the Chinese put out in a statement, we also reformatted the protocol to look like the list of principles that came out of the head-of-del meeting, suggesting that we are flexible on how ““ on what the format might look like, but a lot less flexible on what the elements would look like.

QUESTION: Could you tell us what you have discussed with the North Koreans today, (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: With whom?

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: With what?

QUESTION: The North Koreans. Yeah, bilat.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, oh, with ““ well, we didn’t have a bilateral meeting. There was no bilateral meeting. There was just, at the end, a handshake and the Secretary asking him —

QUESTION: You and Ri– Ambassador Ri in the ““

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, oh, my ““ oh, my discussion. My discussion.

QUESTION: Yes.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, you know, it was along the same lines, the need to respond to the verification protocol.

QUESTION: You said last night that you hoped (inaudible) ““

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, my discussion with former Ambassador Ri from London, not ““

QUESTION: (Inaudible).

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, I thought you said Pak. No, Ri is the —

QUESTION: Former ambassador —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: He is the ambassador-at-large. Yeah. I had a discussion with him to ““ asking him to convey messages to Kim Kye Gwan about our need to get some specific comments on the verification protocol.

QUESTION: You said last night that you hoped that you’d have something by mid August. Are you any closer now to getting (Inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: It’s hard to say because the Foreign Minister is obviously not in the position to deal with these issues specifically. I’d like to think that there was a ““ because there was such a strong view around the table on the need to engage on a verification protocol that we have moved the ball, but we don’t know yet.

QUESTION: And any time for a Six-Party ministerial? The Chinese said they wanted it soon.

QUESTION: The formal one?

QUESTION: The formal one.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think we ““ that would probably come a little later.

QUESTION: So what happens next?

QUESTION: A little later? That’s —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I don’t know. I don’t want to predict it. But, you know, it’s up to the Chinese. I would say this informal went pretty well.

QUESTION: Well, what happens ““ so what’s next?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think the next is the Korean Foreign Minister ““ South — North Korean Foreign Minister is obviously taking back a lot of comments on the view that we need a protocol, and we need to hear back from them, and we would expect to hear back from them soon.

QUESTION: Yeah, but didn’t (inaudible)?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I’m sorry?

QUESTION: Didn’t they already go back with that after you gave them ““ after you gave them the protocol?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yeah, we haven’t gotten an answer and it’s been about 12 days. And we had another discussion today and it was raised at the foreign minister, so let’s see if they come back. But, I mean, we’ve made very clear that we need ““in order to go forward, we’re going to need this protocol.

QUESTION: I understand that, but I guess I just don’t understand what happened and why was it important or significant and why anyone thinks that it’s contributed to the momentum if actually nothing has– I mean, is it just the fact that the meeting was held at all?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: What? Are you talking about the —

QUESTION: What happened? I mean, why is what happened today any different than what happened —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I just told you what happened today.

QUESTION: Well —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I didn’t characterize it. You did.

QUESTION: Well, others have. I mean, the Secretary ““ she said it was a good meeting. She said —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: It was a good meeting.

QUESTION: So why was it a good meeting?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: It was a good meeting because they were —

QUESTION: Because everyone sat around the table and said that they’ve recommitted themselves to something that they committed to long time ago?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I’ll bet you have meetings at AP that fall well below that standard ““ (laughter) ““ and you still call them good meetings.

QUESTION: I don’t, actually. I don’t go to them because I think they’re a waste of time. Why was —

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I mean, it was the first time —

QUESTION: Convince me this wasn’t a waste of time.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I’m not going to try to convince you of that. I’m simply going to tell you that the six ministers gathered around a table, or gathered around a circle —

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: — for the first time together (inaudible) and they discussed–

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: –and they discussed the need to get moving on verification. I would say there was unanimity among the participants. I think it was useful for the DPRK Foreign Minister to see the importance that is attached to the verification protocol. And I think, as I said yesterday, and I’m sure as the Secretary has said, the real importance of it can’t be determined at this time.

QUESTION: Do you think they felt the love by the Secretary being there? I mean, do you think that they felt that this is a turning point in relations?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Take it back. (Laughter.) I think it was useful for the North Koreans to hear directly from the Secretary of State of the importance we attach to a verification protocol. I’m not sure that quite sings in the way you want it to, but —

QUESTION: Not as sexy as you wanted.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yeah.

STAFF: Okay, thank you, guys.

QUESTION: Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: All right.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Remarks, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Roundtable with Press, July 24, 2008

[OFK: I edited out the non-Korea stuff.]

QUESTION: On Korea, on your ““ (laughter) —

SECRETARY RICE: Now all the good questions are (inaudible).

MR. MCCORMACK: Now the move to a parallel universe. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY RICE: Yeah. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Or is it the real one? But on the ““ on your meeting yesterday with your colleagues in the Six Parties, this was the first time the ministers have met since the Six-Party Talks began in 2003, and now the issue is verification. You know, it’s political season in Washington, there are a lot of people saying a lot of things about this protocol that you’re working on, that you proposed to the North Koreans.

Could you address the issue of how strong this protocol will be? Could you speak to what you’re going to leave? It seems you’ll have ““ this will have to also be continued by the next administration, and so there are people concerned that there might be some holes in this protocol entrance of being able to really verify whether the North Koreans (inaudible).

SECRETARY RICE: Well, first of all, it is a protocol that we have shared with and worked some with our other Six-Party colleagues ““ or Five Party colleagues. And the meeting was about verification yesterday, overwhelmingly. And I think you will note that the ““ that Minister Yang noted that the discussion about acceleration was about the verification protocol. And so I don’t think the North Koreans left with any illusions about the fact that the ball was in their court and that everybody believes they have got to respond and respond positively on verification.

We will try to do several things. The first is that this declaration has left some questions. And we have to have a way to add to those questions, we have to have a way to ““ nobody is going to trust the North Korean number on how much plutonium they need. Fortunately, there are very good, tried and true, as one of my colleagues called it yesterday, international ““ internationally recognized methods to verify the number of kilograms of plutonium make.

So this will be ““ will have to be specific. It’ll have to have specific measures. It’ll have to have means for access. And it will also have to have means to continue this process as new information becomes available. One of the facts is that in this process, thus far, we have learned more about some activities, questionable activities in North Korea than, frankly, we had learned before we engaged in this process. And so I ““ this will be a strong protocol, that all of the parties yesterday talked about a rigorous protocol, talked about one that is to international standards. So I think we’ll ““ we have to have a protocol that allows us to know what has happened there and is ““ still has to be.

Now we have to recognize that the achievement thus far of essentially setting back, if not ending the North Korean capacity for the production of plutonium is important. It may have been an oil reactor, but it was by no means obsolete, given that it was making plutonium up till very recently. And given the proliferation risks of plutonium in the hands of a opaque, nontransparent regime, particularly in ever larger quantities, it is very important to shut down that capability. And having done it now with four other parties who have the right mix of incentives and disincentives, I think it makes it more difficult for the North Koreans to start reversing themselves.

But the ball is in the North Koreans’ court and we’ll see what they come up with.

QUESTION: And in the 45 days, just to follow —

SECRETARY RICE: Yeah.

QUESTION: — on this, the President said that the terrorism list ““ he notified Congress there is a —

SECRETARY RICE: Right.

QUESTION: — 45-day period.

SECRETARY RICE: There’s a 45-day notification period, which is a minimum notification period. I think it should be very well understood that unless we’re satisfied that we can verify the declaration, we’ve been very clear that we’re taking that into our assessment of when to go forward.

QUESTION: But does that mean that you want the protocol to be agreed on and accepted by the North Koreans by this 45-day deadline?

SECRETARY RICE: Nick, as I said, it’s a 45-day minimum notification, but we certainly expect, and we’re watching very carefully, to see whether or not North Korea is going to come through on the essential issue, which is verification, and to act accordingly.

QUESTION: One question on —

MR. MCCORMACK: Nicholas, we got five minutes left, so why don’t we give some of your colleagues —

SECRETARY RICE: Yes, (inaudible).

QUESTION: My question wasn’t right. No, I meant are you still going to delist North Korea before it (inaudible) the protocol? That’s my question.

SECRETARY RICE: As I said, we will have to know about the prospects for verifying this declaration, because the President’s made very clear we’re going to take that into account before we make any decisions. But I just wanted to clarify it’s a 45-day minimum notification, not maximum.

QUESTION: You’ve said that you’d be looking for a very strong protocol on all the parties. You’re talking about this vigorous protocol. Could you be a little bit more specific as to what this protocol would entail, the IAEA inspectors, how many of them on the ground doing what?

SECRETARY RICE: No. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Could you be so specific as to what —

SECRETARY RICE: Sue, a lot of this is still to be worked out. But first of all, I expect that there would be ““ and we’ll have to work out what IAEA ““ you all remember that this is verification under a Six-Party framework, and the verification of the disablement was actually carried out by the United States, Russia and China. So I can’t get into details about it, but it’ll be ““ I think the best line that was used about it was it has to be an internationally acceptable standard.