Must-Read: Dan Blumenthal and Aaron Friedberg on Agreed Framework 2.0

What is interesting, though not stated in the article, is that Blumenthal is one of John McCain’s senior advisors on Asia policy.  The article certainly doesn’t purport to speak for McCain, though it doesn’t seem far afield of his views.  If McCain were elected, it suggests that both he and his advisors would want

The piece begins with plenty of substantive criticism of where the Bush Administration has brought us, all of which is on the mark, but which you’ve probably read here.  Blumenthal and Friedberg then talk about the limitations of the verification measures that Hill is proposing.  Not surprisingly, they’re not calculated to get to the truth of what the North Koreans are actually up to:

All of which brings us to the heart of the problem. In dealing with North Korea the only sensible approach is to “distrust and verify.” To date, however, North Korea has not agreed to, and the Bush administration has not yet insisted upon, any serious measures to verify the full scope and status of the North’s nuclear weapons programs. Those measures that reportedly have been discussed-site visits, interviews with scientists, and further access to documents-apparently apply only to a limited number of facilities at Yongbyon. As useful as it may be to gain firsthand access to these, what is more important is to set up procedures that will permit full access to all known nuclear-related installations, as well as mechanisms for ensuring (or at least reducing the chances) that other, hidden facilities do not exist.

For this purpose, the best available instrument is an understanding that would permit no-warning, challenge inspections of any suspicious facility or location, by the United States, other countries, and the IAEA. This is what Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi agreed to in order to demonstrate that he was serious about nuclear disarmament. In the Libyan case, the United States, the IAEA, and the U.K. had inspected facilities and destroyed and removed 55,000 pounds of nuclear related materials including design information, uranium enrichment materials, and thousands of centrifuge parts almost two years before President Bush announced the lifting of sanctions on Libya. If Kim Jong-Il is equally serious in changing the direction of his country, he should be willing to make a similar commitment.

As it reviews the status of the Six Party talks, the next administration should return to first principles and reexamine its goals. If the aim of American policy is still-as we believe it should be-the “complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement” of all North Korean nuclear programs, then there is no escaping the need for an inspections regime of the sort just described. Instead of being left for the very end of the negotiating process, verification should be moved to the top of the agenda. If the North is unwilling to accept the necessary measures, the United States should be prepared to walk away.

If, on the other hand, the next administration decides to settle for Yongbyon and a pile of plutonium, it should insist on an early date for their dismantlement and repatriation. But it should also be candid about the risks it has chosen to run. And it should begin at once to prepare for the next North Korean nuclear crisis.  [Dan Blumenthal and Aaron Friedberg in the Weekly Standard]

There is a certain other critic of this piece who says that it’s based on the false assumption that we have more pressure to apply to the North Koreans as an alternative.   But as  I’ve often repeated here, we have plenty of unused and potentially devastating weapons in our arsenal.  Once the next president concludes that unilateral concessions won’t work, some of those weapons will have to be unpacked and cleaned.  If it’s McCain,  we  may well see  a policy review, hopefully quicker and more decisive than the one Bush tried in 2002:

Whoever takes office in January 2009 will inherit a process and a set of understandings that supporters claim have finally brought that goal within reach. But have they? A new administration should take the opportunity to pause and conduct its own assessment of where things stand and where they may be going. 

Read the rest on you own.