It’s Official: South Korea Is a Lost Cause

After opening last week in 350 theaters across South Korea, “Crossing” is now showing on 289 screens. As of Tuesday, 654,000 people had seen it ““ a modest number by local box office standards. In fact, the film’s producers are not certain if they will recover the investment of $4 million ““ a hefty sum by local standards.

“Crossing” aims to remind South Korean viewers of an issue that they tend to overlook in a society concerned with its own economic problems.  [Christian Science Monitor, Don Kirk]

Let me be more blunt:  most (and I do not mean all) South Koreans are simply too vain, self-absorbed, and self-centered to care how many North Koreans die, and all of the “We Are One!” UniFiction talk is unadulterated pablum with no basis in either conscience or reason.  As if you didn’t already  know. 

I do not suggest that these are uniquely  Korean traits —  in their personal and family relationships, Koreans more often epitomize selflessness.  My point is that the unrestrained pursuit of vanity and self-interest has  become an accepted part of  a political culture where the leaders lack any sense (as my wife often says) of noblesse oblige.  And it’s because of things like this that I question whether Korean  unification is viable, or whether its democracy is sustainable.  If it is, I don’t see how America’s  asphyxiating  maternal suckling of  its dependency and irresponsibility  is improving matters.

It’s taken quite a bit to cause me to  doubt  my own masthead, but the more I see of  what drives Korean public opinion, the less sense it makes to me, and the more I question whether  the majority of Koreans have the good judgment and the sense of duty to others that’s necessary for a self-governing democracy.   I doubt that  any country could be a more perfect  illustration of  the difference between nationalism and patriotism  than post-386  Korea. 

Clearly, the long-term political trend in South Korea is not going our way, and if the only way we can gain even temporary favor in South Korea is by sacrificing our greater security and economic interests, the cost of the alliance is prohibitive.  Why isn’t poisonous Chilean  pork of any concern to South Koreans?  Because it’s not American, silly. 

What this means for our policies with the South is that we should adopt the same approach the North Koreans and the Chinese have used with great success from a greater diplomatic distance.  That means abandoning any policy that requires support from the majority of the South Korean  population or the support of its government, and shifting our focus to building a Fifth Column of our own.  We can see now how it’s possible for any country that controls one to paralyze South Korea’s government without having to put a single boot on Korean soil.  We can also see the potential to recruit forceful minority constituencies in the  entire region  among Asians  who share our values and interests, especially among Christians, North Korean defectors, and dissident organizations we could more actively  support within North Korea and China. 

The question then becomes whether any significant U.S. military presence in South Korea hinders that goal.  In the past, I had kept my mind open about leaving an air component behind in Korea, depending on how the post-Roh era played out.  I think that jury has come in.  Increasingly, I see even that as an obstacle to greater U.S. political interests and lean toward projecting conventional power through our navy and a stronger alliance with Japan.