War on Prostitution Not Working So Well in North Korea, Either

As with their southern bretheren, the North Koreans are being reminded of the persistence of the oldest profession, largely because of the traditional confluence of state power and corruptable masculine hydraulics.  The Daily NK reports that some twenty North Korean officials in the city of Hamhung were removed from power — and several senior military officers were shot — over a whorehouse patronage scandal:

The Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (NKnet) reported in its journal “NK In & Out,” released on Thursday that a chief of an army base was charged with smuggling illicit drugs in Hamheung on July 10th and was executed by firing squad. It has also been reported that this execution received more attention locally because the owner of the “˜Yunmi Teahouse’ was executed along with the military official.

The journal added that “The 25 year-old woman known as “˜Yunmi’ operated the teahouse and accrued large amounts of money through the business of debauchery, including prostitution. The teahouse was able to evade various inspections because many members of the military and the Party in Hamheung were its main clients.

Furthermore, it has been discovered that these high-ranking officials spent at least a hundred thousand won (approx. 31 USD) each visit, which resulted in some 20 officials being charged with prostitution.  [Daily NK]

And Robert still wonders how I find all of this so interesting.

The key missing detail here is whether a military or civilian court conducted the investigation and prosecution.  Salacious appeal aside, it’s worthy of mention whenever senior military officers can be removed from power or executed, but especially so when any civilian wields that kind of power over North Korean officers.  Even in our system, after all, the military has its own courts and usually prosecutes its own officers for on-duty misconduct.

Prosecution by a civilian court would tend to corroborate previous views of a budding “military second” policy, which I blogged about here.  If those reports are accurate, the main beneficiary would seem to be first brother-in-law Jang Song Thaek, who has wrested control over the secret police and prosecution since his recent rehabilitation.  And if the reports of Kim Jong Il’s illness are not complete b.s., that would give the men with all the guns an imperative to make sure that Jang doesn’t end up ruling the country.

Discuss the myriad possibilities among yourselves.

Some North Korean observers argue, on the other hand, that the real power at the top is firmly in the hands of the party, and the relative numerical superiority of civilian party officials in Kim Jong Il’s recent entourages is some evidence of this.  No less an authority than Hwang Jang Yop, however, suggests that the military doesn’t have the political power base to seize power successfully.

While I question the value of persuasion in North Korean politics, military banditry has apparently been rife in the countryside for several years.  The failure of senior military leaders to keep their hungry soldiers in the barracks suggests that in the provinces, the military is still supreme … and probably hated.  It also suggests that military morale is low.

Consider the timing of Kim Jong Il’s illness if the reports are true — at a moment of apparent flux in the power structure.  A smiting at such an opportune moment would constitute conclusive proof that God exists and wreaks mischief on the wicked.