Lee’s N. Korea Policy Will Be, as Lee Says, ‘Pragmatic.’
Suzanne Scholte has accepted the Seoul Peace Prize, offering this prescient comment in her speech:
“When all the atrocities committed by North Korean dictators are exposed in the future, people will assess how adequately the Seoul government then responded,” said Scholte, referring to the current administration. “Consider the judgment of history.” [Chosun Ilbo]
I’m hoping to have a guest post from a reader who was there. Warning: this post will now enter a stream of consciousness.
You can already see a divergence between the image Lee wants to project and what he’ll actually do in practice. Yes, the prize is an indication that the new South Korean government is more willing to confront this issue when it it helps Lee build constituencies in America, but at the same time, his government is asking civic groups to stop sending leaflet balloons into North Korea. Lee’s rough handling, thus far, of speech he doesn’t agree with suggests that he’ll take more “decisive” action if asking nicely doesn’t suffice. And if Obama wins, something that looks inevitable right now, don’t expect Lee to openly defy Obama and demand a harder line in the same way Roh that openly defied Bush and demanded a softer line.
Lee is inherently much more practical and less ideological than Roh, and will put South Korea’s interest in better relations with the United States ahead of his views about North Korea. What Lee will likely do instead is to gradually shift the leadership of the Korea Society, Korea Foundation, Korea Economic Institute, and other Korean lobby groups so that their considerable influence reflects more closely, and supports more subtly, Lee’s policy goals in Washington.
One significant accomplishment Lee can already claim is forestalling the final phase of U.S. troop reductions in the South, and securing a U.S. promise not to cut force levels further for the next several years. Unfortunately, there was no corresponding Korean commitment to increasing the share it pays for the cost of keeping those Americans in Korea.
Still, we’ve made progress since the time, not long ago, when the Unification Ministry covered up the presence of counterfeit $100 bills at the Kumgang Resort in North Korea. It had been doing this since at least 2005. What’s not specified is that the bills were the high-quality variety known as “supernotes.” For years, it had been South Korean policy to subsidize North Korea’s worst behavior with our money. The use of dollars at Kumgang is also an interesting choice in light of North Korea’s 2002 announcement that it would no longer accept dollars. And I suppose if I lived in Newcastle, I wouldn’t want to be paid in coal, either.
So what will Obama do about North Korea? Pretty much what Bush did. He’ll react to North Korean provocations with empty tough talk. He’ll make occasional cryptic references to North Korea’s atrocities against its people at moments of convenience. Behind the scenes, the State Department will be firmly in charge, and State will continue — even accelerate — a policy of unilateral concessions. After Obama wins, expect the North Koreans to declare themselves open to some kind of “new beginning” with America … if only we’d drop all of our sanctions and ease up on verification. We’ll agree, and this will start a whole new renegotiation of a deal that had already ceased to pretend to disarm. Come February, the Groundhog will see his shadow, and so will you. The most Lee will do to oppose this is to work quietly through friends in Washington and allow a few carefully timed leaks to slip out. Obama may not be able to deliver significant economic benefits to the North because the North will need to keep up a state of hostility with the United States, thus giving Republicans reasons to oppose him. Also, all of the Republicans who kept quiet during Bush’s second term will suddenly realize that appeasement is a bad thing after all. They will then run against Obama’s “weakness” — the charge will happen to be accurate — to make gains in Congress in 2010, as is typical of mid-term elections.
None of this will matter in the end, because eventually, North Korea will collapse for its own reasons, largely because Lee Myung Bak and Kim Jong Il would both have to agree for there to be any kind of “soft landing” or reform, and neither of them does agree. When the collapse comes, America will be unprepared. The Chinese will estimate Obama as unwilling to confront them and will seize the opportunity to take control, through friendly generals, over an Outer Koguryo Autonomous Zone, which of course has “historically” been a part of China.