Freedom Isn’t Free
USFK has announced that a battalion of Apache attack helicopters, comprising some 24 aircraft and half of USFK’s Apache strength, will leave Korea for Ft. Carson. The choppers are expected to redeploy to Afghanistan and Iraq later on.
Washington had in the past tried to redeploy some of its Apache helicopters from Korea, but such moves were often met with strong opposition from the government in Seoul, which feared a possible reduction of U.S. strength here.
“The situation we are facing today is that there is only a certain number of Apache helicopters the Army has and the Army is struggling to meet their requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan,” the source said of Washington’s need to redeploy the attack helicopters from Korea. [Joongang Ilbo]
Not to worry, says the USFK — it will send over a dozen A-10 attack aircraft … but only temporarily. The Chosun Ilbo wonders what will replace the A-10’s. Personally, I nominate Korea’s new miracle helicopter, which was supposed to be a cornerstone of that whole “independent defense” concept, which in practice meant that Korea would cut its own defense spending, rely more than ever on American soldiers and taxpayers, and simultaneously undermine U.S. interests and declare itself neutral in any potential conflict in the region. The other option under consideration, which I recommend on behalf of all U.S. taxpayers, is for the ROK government to purchase 36 of our certified pre-owned Apaches.
Last April, the USFK announced that a squadron of 20 F-16’s would also be leaving.
Korea’s new president may have reconsidered the wisdom of Roh’s neutrality stance and defense cuts, but he’s been no more reasonable than his predecessor on cost sharing. Naturally, this leads me to wonder whether there’s any linkage between this sudden announcement and South Korea’s pigheaded refusal to kick in more than 43% of the cost of its own defense, even as United States is fighting two wars with negligible Korean assistance:
“The U.S. claims the total annual spending for the troops reaches $5 billion. It demands South Korea share the burden for half of the non-personnel stationing costs, excluding $2 billion in wages for U.S. soldiers,” the official said on condition of anonymity. The two nations ended the fourth round of talks over how much Seoul should pay for the presence of U.S. troops the day before.
South Korea provided the U.S. with 725.5 billion won in cash last year and is expected to pay the same amount this year with an adjustment for inflation under the Special Measures Agreement (SMA). When the deal was reached in late 2006, one dollar was worth about 950 won. The exchange rate now hovers at around 1,400 won against the greenback.
Seoul pays the share in won instead of dollars as the money is largely used to pay wages for Korean employees at U.S. military bases and to construct facilities here. “South Korea’s annual contributions to the non-personnel stationing costs comprises direct cash aid and indirect assistance, such as rent for military bases, public fees, and tax breaks, namely fixed costs,” the official said. [Yonhap]
Meaning that South Korea is careful to make sure that its contributions to USFK, such as they are, go straight back into the Korean economy. The two nations had disagreed on what percentage of USFK’s upkeep Seoul really was paying, in part because of exchange rates and the U.S. desire to factor in the cost of relocating the Second Infantry Division to Camp Humphreys, which the Koreans were resisting. Talks on some of these “contentious” issues were to reconvene later this month.
My favorite South Korean proposal on cost sharing was the brilliant idea of paying USFK in kind with various Korean-made goods, from Lee Myung Bak’s favorite vendors, no doubt. Amazingly, there might actually have been a way to do this legally, but Korea’s insistence that its “burden sharing” funds go to pay the salaries of Korean nationals has already gotten USFK into hot water. This recent DOD IG report dinged USFK for using burden sharing funds to pay for Non-Appropriated Fund instrumentalities, such as the Dragon Hill Lodge. In other words, Korean restrictions on the use of the funds it contributes means those funds are less of a contribution to Korea’s own defense than they appear to be. The IG report may well have been a last straw for some of the folks in the Pentagon.
Good to see that the process of weaning the ROK from The National Tit continues. Everyone, raise your cups or glasses to James Shinn, the able successor to cost-sharing hawk Richard Lawless.
I wonder where those stubborn Korean negotiators were when their government summarily forked over a $20 million ransom to the Taliban. I still wonder how many Americans and Afghans that ransom money killed.
Correction: In an earlier version of this post, I incorrectly stated that Shinn was of Korean ancestry. My apologies for the error.