N. Korea: Obama Just Like Bush!

Someone still isn’t feeling the hope and change:

North Korea blasted U.S. President Barack Obama on Monday as no different from his predecessor in trying to “stifle” countries that are uncooperative with the U.S., referring to Washington’s move to punish Pyongyang’s rocket launch.  [….]

“With nothing can the U.S. justify such illegal provocation as forcing the UNSC to table the issue of the DPRK’s (North Korea) launch of a satellite for peaceful purposes and issue ‘a presidential statement,'” the North’s foreign ministry spokesman said in an interview with the Korean Central News Agency.

“All the facts go to clearly prove that although the present U.S. administration plays tricks, talking about ‘change’ and ‘multilateral cooperation diplomacy’ it is nothing different from the preceding administration which frantically worked to stifle by force other countries which incurred its displeasure,” the unidentified spokesman said.  [Yonhap]

And in related pronouncements, the U.N. is an American shill.

I don’t disagree with the North Koreans about the similarity of Obama’s North Korea policy to Bush’s.  The transition has mostly been notable for its continuity so far, though there are some signs that Obama may yet take a mildly harder line, or at the very least may have been dissuaded from taking a softer line.  Yes, the flow of unilateral concessions has stopped, but what else could Obama really give the North Koreans under the present circumstances?  Chris Hill has already given away pretty much the whole store, and North Korea’s behavior doesn’t exactly help Obama sell his outreached hand/unclenched fist argument.

Are the North Koreans really that oblivious to how their actions will be perceived here?  Unequivocally, no.  Underneath the illusion of temperamental bluster, the North Koreans’ provocations always seem highly calculated, at least to me.  They expect their worst behavior to result in tangible gains, and when is the last time history really proved them wrong?

The key test will be whether someone is prepared to propose a Plan B (as OFK readers know, I hold a copyright over the use of that term):

North Korea is unlikely to rejoin the six-way talks on its nuclear program for the time being, but it is too early to talk about a “Plan B,” South Korean officials said Friday, countering growing skepticism about the future of the troubled framework.

“Nobody thinks that North Korea will return to the six-way talks anytime soon, given its recent statements and behavior,” a foreign ministry official handling the nuclear issue said. “But we and other related nations share the understanding on the need to resume the talks. It is premature to talk about an alternative.”  [Yonhap]

Let’s hope this is another case of saying one thing to signal the very opposite.  Talks without pressure will continue to fail, and I can’t think of a single intelligent observer who still believes otherwise.  Even the Council on Foreign Relations, in a report co-authored by Brent Scowcroft and William Perry, concedes in a new report that “North Korea … shows no signs of being willing to negotiate [its nuclear arsenal] away.”  You can get your own copy here.

Given such an extensive refutation of the Sunshine concept in its application, it would be governmental malpractice for the various allies not to have discussed a Plan B.  These bills might be a good starting point for such a policy.