Silent vs. Vocal Diplomacy: More Thoughts on How the State Department is Approaching the Saberi and Lee-Ling Hostage Cases

[OFK:  It’s my great honor to present this first guest post from Jodi, formerly the author one of my very favorite K-blogs, The Asia Pages.  The end of the Asia Pages left many of us missing the warmth, compassion, honesty, and elegance of Jodi’s writing. I hope this will be just the first of many posts, and I hope you’ll join me in welcoming her.]

The United States is in an uncomfortable position: Three of its reporters have been detained by two countries which were identified by the Bush Administration as part of the infamous “axis of evil.” As the events surrounding the journalists’ fates have unfolded, it’s been interesting to observe the State Department’s approach in dealing with these two rogue nations in light of the hostage situations taking place.

Hands down, the Roxanna Saberi case in Iran has not only received more media attention than the detainment of Euna Lee and Laura Ling in North Korea, but it has also drawn harsher words from the United States with Hillary Clinton calling the accusations against Saberi “baseless and without foundation.” From her soapbox at the State Department, Clinton has even gone as far as saying that the U.S. “will continue to vigorously raise our concerns to the Iranian government” about the situation. And they most certainly should.

Interestingly enough, a similar reaction was never issued to North Korea in relation to the detainment of Lee and Ling. At most, we’ve heard how the State Department “is making every diplomatic effort to free the two women” – a rather muted response compared to the bold statements made in regard to Saberi’s detainment.

So what is the rationale behind these contrasting approaches?

Simply put, North Korea is not Iran. And when it comes to dealing with the two diplomatically, North Korea is much harder to crack compared to its evil twin in the Middle East.

North Korea, as we all know, is indifferent to U.S. threats and as readers of this blog have already mentioned, the regime craves attention. They have demonstrated that they have no problem using hostages for political gains, so the brighter the spotlight Washington gives to the Lee-Ling case, the more valuable the two reporters become. Opinions among readers on this blog have suggested that the less attention given to the two, the more likely we will see their eventual release as they will be less valuable to the regime.

(Unfortunately, that contradicts with the job of the media which is to report the news – something that isn’t happening with the Lee-Ling case.)

Given what we know about North Korea’s lust for attention, such opinions could be true, however, I can foresee this less aggressive approach by the United States backfiring as well; North Korea does have a tendency to act like a naughty child and like all spoiled brats, when it isn’t getting the attention it wants, it pushes the envelop a little further. It wouldn’t be surprising then, that in a defiant act of rebellion, North Korea goes through with sentencing Lee and Ling to years in a North Korea work camp, all because the U.S. wasn’t giving it the acknowledgment it wanted. (However, that doesn’t mean the States should always entertain the desires of terrorist regimes.)

As for the attention Saberi has been receiving, it has been proven in the past that Iran also has no problem using hostages for media attention, but unlike North Korea, the country does have a history of caving into pressure.

Case in point: Remember the royal navy hostage situation in 2007? Here’s a refresher in case you forgot. The naval crew was released days later in a “face-saving” gesture which Iran referred to as “a present to the British people.” As far as I know, the British didn’t pay a thing for the release of their crew but did ante up the pressure which resulted in their eventual freedom. When releasing the hostages, Ahmedinejad capitalized on the spotlight and used it to make himself look generous and forgiving, although thankfully, most of the world could see through that. Basically, Ahmedinejad used the captives to gain attention, and once he had his fill, he cut them lose.

North Korea, on the other hand, can’t seem to get enough of the spotlight. The regime seems to thrive off outside pressure and is even empowered by it which is why it will take any attention it can get – good or bad. Having said that, perhaps the White House is hoping that a little reverse psychology may do the trick.

Ultimately, I think Charles Pritchard, the U.S. negotiator with North Korea when the six-party talks began in 2003, is right: What North Korea really wants are bi-lateral talks with the United States. I suppose they are hoping the detention and show trial of Lee and Ling will increase their chances of having some individual face time with Obama – or at least get his attention.

But might I also suggest another reason for the muted tone coming from D.C. in regard to North Korea and the Lee-Ling case? Might this silence be related to the fact that until recently, Washington didn’t even have a nominee for assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs? Imagine how chaotic and unorganized it must be in the White House with this North Korea situation escalating, and no one in this position to consult with. Maybe this is a just a case of no one in D.C. knowing what to do or say, rather than a diplomatic tactic.