After the Collapse

Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings, who (imho) did his best work on Iraq, refocuses on what happens after Kim Jong Il goes off to meet Saddam. Unlike me, O’Hanlon thinks a major U.S. troop presence in North Korea is inevitable. I think it’s just about the last thing we need:

The notion that the United States could somehow outsource most of this DPRK stabilization mission to its South Korean ally falls apart the minute one begins to consider the immediate stakes and the long-term strategic nature of some of the challenges listed above–and the possible degree of uncertainty, confusion, and violence that could accompany many collapse scenarios. If the main task were to simply restore order in North Korea, rather than defeat a combined air-armor offensive by DPRK forces, it might seem logical to defer to Seoul as much as possible.

South Korea may have the numerical capacity to handle North Korean stabilization. North Korea is a mid-sized country, slightly smaller than Iraq or Afghanistan demographically. Its population is estimated at just under 25 million. That implies a stabilization force of 500,000. South Korea has that many soldiers in its active Army, and eight million more between its reserves and its paramilitary. Such reassuring arithmetic may help explain DoD’s apparent inclination to view this problem as manageable largely by ROK forces themselves. [Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings]

And we think the Chinese will just let this happen? O’Hanlon is right about one thing — we should be putting much more thought and good diplomacy into preparing for this.