The Iranian Revolution: On Again

Two weeks ago, I had resigned myself to the view that it was all over except for the show trials. But the discontent just won’t go away.

After the sermon, downtown Tehran erupted in violence. Security forces attacked demonstrators, older and grayer than recent gatherings, who were chanting “Death to the dictator!” and “God is great.”

Tear gas filled streets as protesters sought to enter the gates of the university, which riot police had locked. The crowds swarmed through downtown, chanting slogans, lighting cigarettes and holding them in front of their faces to counter the effects of the tear gas. Masked demonstrators also set fire to trash in the middle of roadways to burn off the tear gas, videos posted on YouTube showed. One group shut down two highways, while a second handed flowers to smiling policemen and kissed them on the cheeks, according to witnesses.

Another large group gathered in front of the Ministry of Interior, which is under the control of Sadegh Mahsouli, a wealthy ally of Ahmadinejad. “Mahsouli! Mahsouli! Give my vote back,” they chanted, according to a video posted to YouTube. [L.A. Times, Borzou Daragahi and Ramin Mostaghim]

The press can’t confirm that the crowds are back to what they were weeks ago, but Iranians believe they are:

Reformist websites estimated that more than 1 million people participated. That number could not be confirmed, but even supporters of the hard-line camp who attended the prayer session to show support for Khamenei acknowledged that the crowds were huge. “Mousavi caused all these problems,” said a 50-year-old man who identified himself only by his first name, Hossein. “This is his fault.”

As night fell, the boisterous roar of “God is great” could be heard from rooftops across the capital in what has become a daily gesture of protest against Ahmadinejad, who is to be sworn in for a second term early next month.

This video, obviously uploaded by one of the protesters, shows the crowds in front of the Interior Ministry and has great captions:

I’ll just add a few observations. First, it’s a strange thing to see something like this start with a speech by a man as corrupt, and as widely reviled for his corruption, as Rafsanjani. I suspect that in these times, the Shah could sprout from his dusty repose, bony fingers first, zombie-hobble his way to the top of a soapbox in Tehran, and get 15% of the vote simply by croaking out a criticism of Ahmedinejad. That wouldn’t mean that the Shah or his policies had any popular appeal of course; it would be negative turnout, Iranian style. To take it a step further, I doubt that even Mousavi really commands the deep love of the people for anything other than the alternative he represents.

Second, it’s apparent that the regime became a victim of the propaganda that its system was somehow democratic. I certainly don’t believe that it ever was. I know how the candidate slates were manipulated and the opposition had been silenced, and I don’t doubt that vote counts have been rigged for years. But whether we believe anything has really changed or not, the Iranian people believe that a legitimate franchise they had possessed until very recently has been stolen from them.

Third, I don’t believe that anyone really knows what kind of a system of government the Iranian street really wants right now, and I’m sure the Iranian street is fractured about that, too. Some probably want things to go back to what they were under Khomeini, which they won’t without the man and the long-lost milieu of revolutionary zeal. Some probably want Khomeini lite, and some may want a system that we’d call democratic, though with a thousand permutations of what speech and religions they’d still ban. A consistent theme does emerge theme does emerge, however. “Azadi” means “freedom:”

A democratic system could handle those differences, of course. They’ll have their great debates about legalizing Bahai’i and the extent to which they’d protect the freedom of Christians and Jews, and given the chance, they’ll eventually get it right. What gives me this confidence? Mostly, the demographics and appearance of the crowds. Their dress, their style, and their adept embrace of technology is consistent with, and probably inspired by, that of people in other countries Iranians identify as “liberal,” as the word is used in the classical John Stuart Mill sense. It’s reasonable to associate the desire of young men and women to cast off their ashes and sackcloth and be beautiful to the opposite sex with social liberalism, which translates to political liberalism in Iran to a larger extent than it might in Europe or America. An Iranian government that reflects the will of the people will reflect their will to live fulfilling lives, not their bitterness that fulfilling lives are denied them.

And as hard-liners repeated their signature cries of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel,” Mousavi supporters overwhelmed them with chants of “Death to Russia” and “Death to China,” referring to the two U.N. Security Council members that have shielded Iran from much tougher sanctions over its nuclear program.

Fourth, “death to China” is — I admit it — a refreshing thing to hear on several levels. These kids today — I doubt they really mean the death of the Chinese nation-state and its people; to the extent they’re doing anything but answering the nostalgaic chants of the Basij, they mean the death of an oppressive system of government. That happens to be a sentiment I share, and one that plenty of Chinese probably also share, though see “third” above for an idea of the permutations that probably takes on. Russia’s flag was torched, too. From my rudimentary Persian, I can clearly make out “marg bar rusieh,” or “death to Russia,” at the end of this one:

You can hear the same thing two minutes into this one, which also gives you some idea of the size and anger of yesterday’s crowds:

At three minutes in, I thought I caught “marg bar sinieh,” meaning “death to China.” China’s foreign policy, of course, is most deeply admired by a smirking clique of Machiavellians in the West who are fond of mislabeling themselves as “realists.” This school of thought is faddish today among grad students and think tank interns who think they’re just a fellowship away from being issued a box of Partegas and a key to the smoke-filled room where the civil liberties of swarthy peoples abroad are traded away for tariff agreements. They’re the progeny of those who invested our Iran policy in propping up the Shah despite his murderous Savak (I wonder if they can really explain how that’s served our interests since?). Today, they’d invest us in Ahmedinejad the same way, or at least stand conspicuously aside while the Basij does what it will. They’re the ones who disengaged us from Afghanistan in the mid-1990’s when the Taliban was taking over, and who still grovel at the feet of the Saudis, who’ve brainwashed half of the Muslim world with medieval nihilism. They’re also the ones who’d have fled Iraq in 2006 and left the next Afghanistan behind. What “realism” almost always means in practice is to the pursuit of short-term pecuniary interests and the path of least immediate resistance. The reality of “realism” is often little more than an intellectual veneer over poor impulse control and blindness toward the longer-term consequences of what seems easy and profitable today. China, as we’re seeing, will pay some long-term price for its conduct, though never what America would, simply because hating America is so often the mirror image of lust for its culture and envy of how we live. Hate will always be the mirror image of that to some extent, especially when we threaten the power of dictators, mullahs, commissars, power-hungry intellectuals, and nosy aunts everywhere by advocating individual freedom and empowerment. China can’t be hated as much as we can until it becomes an object of envy, and China will never inspire envy as long as its creativity and enterprise are suppressed by an increasingly permanent class of unaccountable bureaucrats. That’s why the biotech industry where I live has drawn in such a large population of China’s brightest young people. China isn’t a magnet for anyone but starving North Koreans.

Fifth, a change of government in Iran would not bring the immediate end of Iran’s nuclear program or its support for terrorism in Lebanon, Iraq, or elsewhere, but if reasonable people end up in power, it would mean that ordinary diplomatic methods would have some real chance for ending those things though a process of negotiated give-and-take. As long as Ahmedinejad and Khameini are in power, investing our hopes in diplomacy alone could not be further from reality.