Lankov in the NYT, on Negotiating with North Korea

Andrei must really hate peace to say something like this:

People in Washington have finally realized what should have been understood years ago: Under no circumstances is North Korea going to surrender its nuclear weapons.

North Korean leaders believe that they need these weapons both as a deterrent and a diplomacy tool. Only through the existence of the nuclear program can North Korea, a destitute third-rate dictatorship, manipulate the outside world into providing generous aid. It is often suggested that Pyongyang might be lured into surrendering its nukes by a large lump-sum payment that could kick-start its economy (this is, essentially, the official strategy of the South Korean administration). Alas, a cash-for-nukes solution will not be acceptable to Pyongyang: The lump sum payment would be spent quickly, and without nuclear weapons, additional aid would be very moderate and would come with strict conditions about monitoring distribution. Such conditions are not acceptable, from the North Korean perspective, since the regime uses the foreign aid, above all, to reward the faithful and bribe those groups whose discontent might threaten its survival.

Therefore, the only survival strategy is to keep manipulating neighboring powers in order to extract more aid, with the nuclear program being the major tool of this blackmail diplomacy. [Andrei Lankov, N.Y. Times]

Andrei’s argument hold that we should keep talking to the North Koreans, even as we remain realistic in our expectations and our determination not to give up too much too soon for illusory benefits. And in this, I’m in agreement with him. What Andrei might also concede is that intensifying sanctions are the only chance we have to achieve anything concrete in those talks, and that as sanctions take effect, time becomes our ally.

Read the rest on your own.