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23 February 2010: “The Little One”

Kim Jong-Eun still has a way to go to gain the adoration, much less acceptance, of the North Korean elites:

According to a high-level source, the nickname of Kim Jong-il’s heir, Kim Jong-Eun, is “the little one.” According to multiple sources, the North Korean elites officially call Kim Jong-Eun “the great leader” and “successor of the great accomplishments of the military-first policy,” but inofficially, Kim Jong-Eun is referred to as “the little one. “The little one” is usually used in North Korea to refer to children or younger siblings. It is also used to refer to a boss who does not have enough credentials.

Kim Jong-Il’s nickname is “pot belly.”

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Did China oppose the succession of Kim Jong-Eun? While I can see reasons for China to oppose anything that would make North Korea a less stable puppet, I’m skeptical about any reports sources to high levels in the North Korean or Chinese regimes.

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What is the likelihood of Kim Jong Il’s indictment in the international criminal court? Low, if it depends on governments taking action:

“Under ICC rules of procedure and evidence, it’s impossible for the court to investigate or indict North Korea on its own, because North Korea is not a signatory to the Rome Statute,” Kwon said. “But South Korea and Japan can ask the ICC to place Kim on trial if they are determined, because crimes like abuse of South Korean POWs and abduction of South Korean and Japanese citizens took place within the territories of the two countries, which are signatories to the Rome Statue and are within ICC jurisdiction.”

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Another report that South Korea will step up demands for the return of its abducted citizens.

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A Korean expert suggests putting a time limit on the six-party talks to discourage North Korean stalling. Personally, I see much cosmetic value in the six-party talks, and I like the idea that there are open lines of communication — at least among the other five parties — in the event the Kim regime becomes unstable, or in the event that there’s a striking enough change in conditions that real progress becomes possible. That isn’t the case now, of course. But the answer isn’t to cut off diplomacy, it’s to invest our policy in the constriction and subversion of the regime while pretending to emphasize diplomacy. President Obama seems uniquely well postured to carry off that pretense credibly, if he’s smart enough to shift the emphasis of his policy toward more promising directions.

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North Korea’s indigenous word processing software is called Changdeok 7.0:

Another Changdeok system indicating the absolute power of Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-il are CTRL modifier keys. for “Kim Il-Sung” and for “Kim Jong-Il” are only modifier keys allowed in the Changdeok system These special characters and modifier keys is one side of Kim Il-Sung’s and Kim Jong-Il’s idolization. But, considering “Kim Il-Sung” and “Kim Jong-Il” in North Korean published works must be in bold text, special characters and modifier keys are for convenient editing processes as well.

Someone has managed to invent software even crappier than Vista. The lack of competition tends to have similar results in different places.

6 Responses

  2. Greg is right: China is pulling all the strings in NK at the moment through judicious applications of cash. Your link to the Daily NK indicated that the little boy’s visit in July 2009 “adopted a positive attitude to inviting Chinese capital into the North.” That seems to me to be a nice way of saying mutual bribery…. you invest in our economy, and we’ll give you great returns on investment. That can really only mean mining. But from what little leaks out, mining is almost exclusively a military prerogative. Even the trial balloon about the $10 billion line of investment looked to be port- and mining-oriented for its financial returns, with secondary populist investments for little financial return (although major public works may need to “buy” Chinese cement using the yuan credits.)

    But the real money goes to the military businesses, not the Party businesses. I go back to my view that, sooner or later, and I hope it is very soon indeed, China will permit a military coup to replace pot belly. What I would hope would come from this coup is a trade off– DPRK’s nukes, for open investment by China under UN auspices. After all, it was only the Party spokesman and not the military one who, last week, insisted that the nukes were not for trading.

    This is the opposite of One Free Korea, but it is more likely that the people will be fed.

  3. The Rason port deal makes extremely good financial sense for Chinese maritime trade to the USA. Now a container from China cannot yet leave North Korea for Los Angeles — but it could go to Vancouver BC, and be railroaded to Chicago or New York or even Los Angeles, since Canada does allow trade with the DPRK subject to UN regulations.

    Rason to Vancouver BC is about 4600 miles great circle. Dalian via Nagasaki to Vancouver BC is more than 5800 great circle. That constitutes a huge financial savings in fuel oil in an extremely cost-conscious ocean shipping business.

    Now for Rason to work, the UN sanctions will have to change. This seems to me to give us, the US, a huge bargaining chip with China and the DPRK. First we need to see the road or railroad being built, then the port aprons and container storage lots, and then the dozen or so container cranes (at $40 million each) — but if it happens, it will be big.

  4. A more natural translation of 꼬맹이 in this context is “little guy.” North Koreans need to update their nicknames for the big guy to reflect his present condition. What’s the best translation for “droopy mouth”?

  5. On Chinese opposition to succession plans, the most recent PRC Foreign Ministry press conference sort of rebutted the original Asahi story while news media (Global Times/Huanqiu Shibao) played it (the denial and thus the story) up.

    For whatever reason no English translation of the press conference has yet been issued, but I make a run at the Kim Jong-Eun relevant extracts here:
    http://adamcathcart.wordpress.com/2010/02/23/china-north-korea-succession-tiff/

    If in fact Kim Jong-Eun made a visit to Beijing in June 2009, it’s possible I ran into his girlfriend that day near the DPRK embassy (a truly pathetic 1990 Honda Civic recoated with black spray paint with DPRK diplomatic plates was double-parked out front — his ride? Unlikely). But then again, according to the MFA, nothing has been confirmed, which isn’t much of a denial considering that the original story (though voiced as “Japanese media report that…”) was front-page news in June in Beijing.

    But what would China have to gain from making its opposition or discontent with the successor public? Obviously, they would gain further trust (or at least forestalled belligerence) from the North Korean gov. if they swatted these rumors down with more strength.

    I think Beijing found another lever it’s using, not without subtlety.