Cheonan Incident Updates (More Below)
The Cheonan incident has claimed another victim, a diver who died in the recovery effort. That effort — Yonhap has a detailed report on it — can hardly be considered a rescue effort now, but one hopes that something can be learned from this disaster so that someone might be saved if something like this happens again.
With so much uneducated speculation about the cause of the explosion aboard the Cheonan — here, I include myself — I’ve been waiting to read something a little more informed. Kim Tae-Jun is a 34-year Navy veteran who commanded a patrol boat and went on to become a professor at the Korea National Defense University. Kim thinks it’s unlikely that a collision with the rock would have caused the explosion, but doesn’t rule out an internal explosion. He does not conclude that North Korea sank the Cheonan, but offers some useful observations about how it could have:
If we look at the possible involvement of North Korea, we can think of a torpedo or mine attack from a submarine or a disguised merchant vessel.
Pyongyang has vowed to retaliate for its defeat in the Battle of Daecheong, and North Korea could have studied the operation pattern of the South Korean ships to stay close to the island. A North Korean submarine may have hidden near the island and fired a torpedo to the rear of the ship. When a torpedo approaches from the rear, sonar cannot detect the acoustics of the torpedo.
Also, we cannot rule out the possibility of a mine attack since North Korea has conducted submarine mine drills in the past and the explosion was powerful enough to puncture the ship instantly. Mines can be ignited by various triggers, such as noise, magnetism, pressure, sensors or a combination of these factors. A mine can be anchored at the sea bottom and the explosive can be placed in the middle of the water, so the explosion can happen at the middle or rear of the ship.
Lastly, North Korea could have used a civilian vessel or a submarine and fired a missile at the rear of the ship. However, there is no report of North Korean vessels passing around the Cheonan at the time, and this possibility is very low. The direction the steel plates bent as a result of the explosion would provide a critical clue to determine the cause. [Kim Tae-Jun, Joongang Ilbo]
The Chosun Ilbo discusses another theory I had mentioned in my first post on this story — an unconventional attack by semi-submersible. It does so in the context of describing North Korea’s “human torpedoes.” Like a lot of things about North Korea, it’s far-fetched on its face, yet all of this (sea-borne commandos, suicide missions, sneak attacks) is within the limits of North Korea’s established behavior:
One former North Korean sailor who defected to South Korea said the suicide squads have many semi-submersible vessels that can carry two bombers and either two torpedoes or two floating mines. In areas like the West Sea where the underwater current is fast, the suicide bombers train with mines rather than torpedoes.
One defector who served in North Korea’s intelligence service, said, “Following the first naval battle in 1999, North Korea realized that it cannot defeat the South Korean Navy by conventional means and began studying unconventional methods.” The best method is said to be the use of “acoustic mines” carried by small, semi-submersibles that travel at speeds of less than 2 km/h. The craft could be detected by South Korean sonar if they travel any faster. If the underwater squads returned after placing the mines on the hull of a ship, it would be very difficult to find evidence of the attack. [Chosun Ilbo]
But then, maybe James Steinberg knows something I don’t:
Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg said that while South Korea was leading the investigation into Friday night’s maritime explosion, he had heard nothing to implicate any other country.
“Obviously the full investigation needs to go forward. But to my knowledge, there’s no reason to believe or to be concerned that that may have been the cause,” Steinberg told reporters. [AFP]
I’m sure plenty of American diplomats and defense planners badly want this not to be linked to North Korea. For that matter, I can imagine that President Lee would rather not have the headache of having to respond to that. It certainly wouldn’t make diplomatic, economic, or military sense for North Korea to have done this, at least not from our rational frame of reference. But that is just as true of North Korea’s nuclear program, nuclear tests, proliferation, and its “handling” of its economy. None of this seems rational in light of the better alternatives that self-interested governments everywhere else have chosen, except when considered in the context of North Korea’s history of profiting from the perception that it is irrational. If that bluff factor doesn’t explain their behavior, all we can do is revert to psychoanalysis.
Update, 9 p.m.:
It sounds like the South Koreans are about to take the most likely accidental cause off the table:
South Korea’s Navy has tentatively concluded that the sinking of a warship last week was not due to an internal explosion, according to a top presidential official Tuesday.
In his report to President Lee Myung-bak, Navy chief Kim Sung-chan said it is almost certain that the 1,200-ton vessel Cheonan was torn in two due to “powerful outside pressure or an explosion,” according to Lee Dong-kwan, senior secretary for public affairs at the presidential office. [Yonhap]
If that’s true, it still doesn’t convict North Korea. It wouldn’t rule out an old South Korean mine as the cause, though the Defense Minister claims that the Navy hasn’t placed any in the area. It also wouldn’t rule out the accidental southward drift of a North Korean mine, which would not have the same implications as the recent and intentional placing a mine or explosive. This would be analogous to the leftover sea mines that are still being found in the Baltic and Black Seas today, but which are hardly a causus belli against Germany today. The Armistice Agreement awards Baekryeong Island to the South and requires freedom of navigation in the Han Estuary, but doesn’t explicitly require the removal of all sea mines from the area. If the mine simply drifted south, it would be a terrible case of negligence, and grounds to demand compensation and apology. But it would not be an act of war.
Still, these waters get a great deal of traffic from patrol boats and fishing boats. It just seems unlikely, though not impossible, that the ROK Navy would strike a mine now, 26 years after the last one was seen. And if it was a mine, it’s unlikely that we’ll ever know when it was placed, even if we ever find out who placed it.
South Korean suspicions seem to be closing in on North Korea as the “prime suspect,” yet the U.S. government still seems genuinely skeptical.