Claudia Rosett on North Korean Loggers in Russia
The defection of those two loggers at the South Korean consulate in Vladivostok inspires further thought from Claudia Rosett:
I’ve seen those North Korean lumberjacks–or at least their predecessors. In 1994 I was working as a reporter for The Wall Street Journal in Moscow when a story turned up in the Russian press, saying that North Korea was running lumber camps in remote areas of Russia.
In Moscow, Russian officials confirmed to me that they had two big logging operations manned and policed by North Koreans. Both were in the Russian Far East, in areas once part of Stalin’s old gulag. One was based in a place called Tynda. The other was headquartered in a town called Chegdomyn, straddling a rail spur that ran a few hundred miles north from the major city of Khabarovsk, one of the main stops on the Trans-Siberian railroad.
These camps were the legacy of a 1967 Brezhnev-era deal between the Soviet Union and the North Korean regime of Kim Il Sung. The Soviets supplied the equipment and the forests, in rough terrain where during the long winters the temperature dives far below zero. North Korea supplied–and supervised–the lumberjacks. The two governments sold the lumber abroad and divvied up the profits.
In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed. Surrounded by a freer Russia, these logging sites carried on as de facto slave labor camps, totalitarian outposts of North Korea. For the Russian foreign ministry at the time, this was a human-rights embarrassment. One Russian official told me there was “harsh treatment” in the camps, including “torture, beatings” and even “controversial” deaths. But the Russian Ministry of Agriculture, which was raking in money from the lumber sales, saw it as an excellent deal worth continuing. One of their spokesmen explained that Russians would not be willing to log such hostile turf for the pittance the North Koreans were paid.
Having heard this tale, I recruited the help of a young intern and interpreter in our bureau.
Latest word is that the loggers will actually demand to be sent to the United States. Under Article 2 and 3 of the South Korean Constitution, however, the men are South Korean citizens, and pursuant to long-standing principles of international and immigration law, an applicant for asylum must generally apply for asylum at the first country of refuge where asylum is sought. The natural place of refuge is the place where these men are already citizens, and let’s face it, Chung Dong Young isn’t the President of the Republic of Korea. It’s reasonable to assume that these men can live safely in South Korea.
Still, isn’t it interesting that after a lifetime of indoctrination that Americans are big-nosed, baby-bayoneting rapists, these men would still prefer to live in the United States, notwithstanding all of the linguistic and cultural barriers living here would mean for them?
In Gulag, Anne Applebaum discussed such use of ‘private enterprise’ in logging sites at the height of the Stalin era.
Given the time-frame for *official* disbanding of the slave-camps, Kim Jong-Ryul certainly was using raised monies to buy apple strugels for Kim Jong-Sung.
One sad aside of this sordid tale is how Ms Rosett notes several times in passing the formerly free or democratizing nature of Russia, which seems like a by-gone era.
Quite a few of the refugees I’ve talked to choose a third, more multicultural country due to the anonymity it affords them. In the ROK, they only need to engage in simple conversation to be identified as North Korean – in the US or Canada, it is rare to find people who can. Given that the popular perception among North Koreans is that the ROK is infested with DPRK spies, protecting their families back home (or to a certain extent, their own personal safety) may be one driver for them to choose the enemy of their enemy – rather than any new-found ideological beliefs.
Not that these loggers would be aware of the following, but however much the ROK is better than the DPRK – more food, freedom, democracy, modern amenities – DPRK nationals struggle in the ROK in many ways.
As Jack said, they merely have to speak a few words for any ROK national to immediately recognize them as defectors, and other than (some) Christian groups, civic organizations, and other concerned elements (Korean War veterans), defectors are discriminated against by the ROK public. It is no surprise that many defectors in the ROK contact third-country relief organizations for help on how to relocate to such third countries, because the difficulties of life in the ROK (the aforementioned discrimination one of the biggest difficulties) are often too heavy a burden for them to bear.
Yes, Jack, that was my gut-feeling, but I needed someone with personal knowledge to confirm it. Is it accurate?, rather like the various agents/sympathizers for the East German amongst the intelligensia/activist ranks in Britain.
I recall an episode of The Shield (not necessarily accurate, I know) portrayed conflict between ‘North’ and ‘South’ Koreans.
Alec: the question is, who knows. There are certainly a myriad of forces in the ROK (heck, even major political parties) that are quite sympathetic to the DPRK. One of these parties spent nearly ten years of rule suppressing North Korea related human rights advocacy at the expense of rapprochement. Of course, that’s old hat if you read this blog. 😉
As for real live DPRK intelligence agents operating within the ROK – I don’t doubt it. All countries spy on each other, and I think the DPRK would be foolish not to use this “sleeper agent” factor lest things go awry fast. Until the 1990’s liked to infiltrate folks via submarine until this incident kind of screwed the pooch for them (although they would try smaller operations up till at least 1998).
When Hwang Jang-yop defected, North Korea had the manpower ready to go to assassinate a different high-profile defector in his apartment in the Seoul suburbs.
I had never really considered that as a major reason not to choose South Korea as a final destination, but I think it is reasonable for these defectors to fear for their safety there, at least somewhat.
Thanks for the insight, Jack.
According to a report in Le Monde in June 2009, the Russians were very upset with the arrogance of North Korean consular officials in Vladivostok in the aftermath of the 25 May 2009 nuclear test. So it seems logical that the local DPRK diplomat-capitalists would be getting strenuous in Vladivostok at the moment, and that they would be rebuffed.
Having received their 50-year lease to two big terminals at Rajin, maybe the Russians aren’t interested in doing any favors for the DPRK.
And by God, that Forbes website to which you link and at which Claudia Rosett writes (well) is indeed festooned with all kinds of garbage. It makes me suddenly glad that you don’t have any ads on this site.
Thanks for that, Jack. I recall the Gangneung emergency at the time. Which RoK parties were you suggesting?
I’ve had an exchange with one of the nutters in the Socialist Party of Great Britain who was arguing that the DPRK is state-capitalism.
Gawd, they’re insane.