Is There Still a Case for Food Aid to North Korea?

I’ve generally been underwhelmed by the performance of the Human Rights Industry when it comes to North Korea, but Kay Seok of Human Rights Watch is a bright light in this dreary landscape. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Seok finds the regime’s misappropriation of its resources on a Kimjongilia flower festival to be “outrageous” at a time when “North Koreans may face the worst food shortage since a famine claimed a million lives in the 1990s.” But if that is so — and most recent predictions of large-scale famine in North Korea, including mine, have been wrong — then how does Seok justify what follows: a call for the resumption of food aid that the donors don’t know will feed those who need it most?

Seok answers the obvious question by stating, a bit sheepishly, that “there is some precedent for meaningful, if not optimal, monitoring of food aid.” By setting the bar as low as this, Seok manages to make an arguably true statement, but the “meaningful” monitoring was short-lived, required very hard bargaining, and lasted no longer than the aid’s overall usefulness to the regime itself. Then, in late 2005, the regime slashed the program by two-thirds. Since then, of course, it has evicted American food aid workers and refused a large offer of U.S. government food aid.

More broadly, Seok cannot argue — even with the best of intentions — against a long history of North Korea resisting not only monitoring, but the aid itself. As Seok seems to acknowledge, food is cheaper that a lot of the other things North Korea prefers to buy with its money. North Korea has the means to feed its people; it’s the will that’s lacking:

The markets in North Korea have finally stabilized due to increased food rations which have gone up by 80% nationwide, according to a source on April 2. Except for those who work at farms, 80% of North Korean citizens receive rations, 600g for adults and 300g for students. Given farmers take up 20-30% of the population, 60% of the population is receiving rations.

This is unprecedented; such distributions have not been handed out since the Arduous March.

Our source stated that rations have been distributed since February 16 in almost all areas, including Pyongyang, Shin-ui-ju, Sariwon, Musan, and Chungjin. Additionally, the rations will be distributed at least until Kim Il-Sung’s Birthday on April 15, and the price of food will not rise for a month. The source stated that the food seems to have come from Storage #2 in order to support the public since the failed currency reform, which has caused famine in many parts of the country.

The price of food has dropped since the distribution of rations. On April 2, the rice price was 300g per kg. On April 1, rice was 280Won per kg in Pyongyang. Compared to the rice price on March 8 which was at 1,300 won, the rice price fell by 70%. Corn price has also stabilized at 120-150 Won per kg. [Open News]

No one knows if this will last, of course. Sadly, the regime’s will to feed the people is a function of its perception that the lack of food threatens the stability of the regime (Seok also draws this link). It probably isn’t coincidental that the outpouring of rations coincides with reports of rising discontent. In that case, might the regime be more inclined to feed its people if the people were more politically empowered to resist and destabilize the regime? And if North Korea lacks the will to feed its own people (the better to buy their allegiance), why would it let us feed them?

Regular readers of this site know that I’ve long been supportive, in principle, of giving food aid. Nothing that caused the misery of the North Korean people is their fault, after all, and monitored food aid is one of the few potentially effective means of “engagement” I can imagine. But the more time passes, the more convinced I become that food aid has little impact on North Korea’s food situation anyway, at least in comparison to markets.