New North Korean War Plan: Grab Seoul, Negotiate
Via the Joongang Ilbo, North Korea’s on-the-shelf invasion oplan no longer calls for invading all of South Korea, but in recognition of stronger U.S. and South Korean military capabilities, now calls for quickly occupying Seoul and then negotiating favorable terms.
With the new plan, the North would concentrate its early fire on Seoul and neighboring areas, where most of South Korea’s social and economic infrastructure is located.
“North Korea would try to occupy Seoul early,” the source said. “And from there, it could either try to go farther south, or try to negotiate [for a cease-fire] from an advantageous position.
I’m sure Selig Harrison would call this progress.
A military expert who requested anonymity said the North took cues from the Gulf War in 1991 and Iraq War in 2003. Iraqi forces had armored vehicles similar to the North’s, but they were destroyed by the U.S. military’s precision strike weapons. North Korea, in other words, has concluded that if its mechanized units engaged in old-fashioned combat without extra help, they would be no match for the more sophisticated U.S. weapons systems.
As part of the change, North Korea has bolstered its frontline mechanized corps with extra mechanized divisions, the military source said. Also, the frontline corps have each received an extra light infantry division, and light infantry battalions on the front have been expanded to regiments.
There may also be a recognition here of North Korea’s logistical limitations — that is, its general inability to sustain an invasion with long, exposed supply lines.
I certainly don’t claim to be a military expert, but I’ve studied enough history to know how other armies have beaten back similar attacks from Kursk, to the Seelow Heights, to An Loc, to Grozny, even when badly outnumbered by their attackers. History shows that these blitzkrieg tactics bog down quickly when thrown into restricted terrain with well-prepared defenses held by a well-trained, well-armed opponent. That’s particularly true when the defender holds air supremacy. Thus, even the reduced expectations seem unrealistic. North Korea could probably do severe damage to Seoul on Day One, but by Day Two, most of its longer-range artillery capable of hitting Seoul would be silenced, and allied air power would be seeking out North Korea’s more numerous, shorter-range tactical artillery sites and its more elusive and dangerous short-range ballistic missile launchers.
It’s one thing to damage a city, another thing to take it. If this report is accurate, the North Korean strategy still depends on the use of mechanized and motorized conventional forces, which would have to cover 40 miles of highly obstructed terrain with no air cover and under assault from American and South Korean air power. North Korea has few heavily armored main battle tanks, and even these stood up poorly to such light infantry weapons as the RPG-7 in Afghanistan and Chechnya. The majority of North Korea’s tanks are lighter amphibious models designed for the easy fording of rivers, but with such light armor protection that even .50 caliber machine guns would grind them up.
Again, assuming that this report is accurate, it suggests that South Korea ought to accelerate long-delayed plans to upgrade its helicopter gunships, the most efficient way to destroy vehicles in crowded urban areas. It also suggests that the ROK should invest in a large number of inexpensive anti-tank weapons for its infantry and plenty of close-quarter training in their use.
With all that said, even if the new report is a case of a new hypervigilance, that’s certainly a healthier attitude than the dreamy complacency that has dominated South Korea recently. I take for granted that a North Korean invasion could be stopped before it reached Seoul, but whether it would be — and with a minimum of casualties — depends on how well the ROK army trains and equips itself.