Will South Korea Go Nuclear Next?
For more than a year, the Lee Administration has been talking about “closing the nuclear fuel cycle” with respect to the uranium it currently uses to produce electricity. Denials notwithstanding, I had concluded that President Lee had given up on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program, and worried that the limitations of America’s will weakened the sufficiency, in his mind, of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over which South Korea frets so much. But now, calls for South Korea to go nuclear are coming out into the open. This Joongang Ilbo editorial is the most prominent call I’ve seen so far. The call comes as the U.S. Joint Forces Command says that South Korea and Japan have the means to develop nuclear weapons quickly, should they choose to do so.
The recent history of American diplomacy and the widening differences between how Americans and South Koreans perceive their own interests does not inspire confidence. Since the idea of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula has been so much bong resin for the last 20 years, one can understand why South Korea may be ready to sacrifice the mantra of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula for the sake of restoring deterrence.
I say, “go for it!” Why not, we let the norKs and Iran have em, why not our close ally?
Because Japan is also a close U.S. ally.
Sure, let Japan have em too. I mean, what the heck. Why are we gonna let all tinpot dictators have em if we ain’t gonna let our (current) friends have em too?
Seriously though… I, like many others, would love to see a nuclear free world. But just like our gun laws in the US, we seem to want to stop all the sane people from having them while criminals continue to stockpile them. This world has gone nuts. We rail against the ROK or Japan if they want nukes, but we sit around twiddling our thumbs wasting time while the norKs and Iran build theirs.
I thought that it was a good idea to limit ROK’s nuke and missile technology in the past. But that was before the DPRK demonstrated that they potentially have several nukes, with which they openly threaten us, Japan, and the ROK. In addition, they openly admit that they are working on HEU technology. Since these revelations, I have been coming around to Thomas’s way of thinking. Seeing as how the prospect of a nuclear-free peninusla is now remote, I think we should be encouraging both the ROK and Japan to go nuclear. Lacking any leverage over the DPRK on the nuclear issue, asking both the ROK and Japan to go nuclear is really the best way to gain some leverage on the anti-DPRK side. Doing so, would likely undermine any prospect of a 6-party dialogue. But considering the present state of things, I do not think that that will be a great loss. Absurdly, the ROK and Japan have had basically no influence in these talks. A nuclear-armed Japan and ROK would change that.
Moreover, I do not see how we will be able to justify having bases in the ROK and Japan after the DPRK’s inevitable collapse. They will have to fend for themselves in the end and will have to rely on nukes to keep from being completely dominated by China.
In the meantime, the ROK needs to continue to work to close the technological gap in missile defense technology with Japan and the US. Ultimately, between us, Japan, and the ROK, I think the ROK and Okinawa are the targets most likely to be hit with a nuke in the event of a war with the DPRK.
@lollabrats
As and FYI:
In 2001 Korea joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and has been developing their own (in cooperation with the Russians) space launch capabilities (which will give them ballistic missile capabilities). They are a facility built in the Kokhyn district of the Cholla-Namdo province. Additionally, they have already developed M-SAM and L-SAM capabilities to replace the aging US Hawk Missile Systems deployed in Korea. All they need to do now is figure out how to put nukes on their domestically developed delivery systems.
Now if only they could get a satellite into orbit
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/25/south-korea-satellite-launch
All they need to do is make sure they launch any nukes at nK from imjin-gak. in that case, they “should” hit somewhere within the north!
But wouldn’t the fallout effect the ROK and its people from an above ground nuclear explosion on the peninsula?
i was being sarcastic! LOL of course it would. but then again, if they nuke the north, i’m sure it would only be in retaliation for an attack from the north. therefore, the south would already pretty much be in deep kimchi.
I’m thinking about building a time machine for the purpose of drowning a small child by the name of Kim Il Sung to prevent all of this. Hope it turns out ok.
@a listener
The way I see it, a nuclear-armed ROK would not use nukes against the DPRK under any circumstances, even as retaliation for a nuclear detonation over Seoul. There are only counterproductive and negative consequences in South Koreans or Americans nuking North Koreans. In addition, nuking the North is unlikely to cause true believers of Juche to surrender. Seoul and Washington will have to rely on the strength of their conventional military capabilities to win a Korean War II and secure WMDs as swiftly as possible. In a non-war situation, nukes would be useful as leverage and something the DPRK would be pressured to deal with in negotiations. Should Japan also have nukes, that would only further complicate their position. But no one should think that the South Koreans would gain any strategic benefits from nuking Koreans.
Also, failure of a fairing separation can happen to anyone.
^^;
@thomas
Well, the field of South Korean space rocketry today is still pretty nascent and the success of the Naro program–along with any openly covert ICBM programs–largely depends on technology the Russians will not authorize sharing with the Koreans. No one else will help much because this is an issue related to America’s nuclear-free-peninsula objective.
As for their anti-missile SAM technology, I do not actually know what their system will look like in a couple of years. They say they will have a domestically produced something by 2012, which they intend to implement. But this is some serious mathematical and engineering feat. I’m sure they’ll have something that suits them and I wish them luck.
Whoa, did my comment really disappear?
:/
Their SAM program is coming along, but I know they’ve had some failures. Part of the problem is their desire to domesticate so much of the program. Especially the high-rel components used in the systems. They have had problems with many of their domesticated programs because of this very reason. Only time will tell.
Two points to make.
First, isn’t the JAD article saying that the US should bring back its tactical nukes, not that South Korea should get its own?
Second, the Japanese public wouldn’t go for having nukes. It’s a nonstarter.
Third, the alliance with the US that South Korea and Japan both enjoy is not only about North Korea, and it will be quite important even after the peninsula is reunified. Ask Taiwan.
Yes Kush, I understood that. I was just having some fun.
Well, there are those for whom all those points are seriously made.
@kushibo
Nobody is talking about walking away from any alliance. Maintaining an alliance and keeping bases are two different matters, regardless of what Washington would like it to be known. Bases in Korea and Japan will become untenable after reunification. Political pressure will become insurmountable. Pressure will come from the Chinese, the Koreans, the Japanese, liberal Americans, and conservative Americans.
Northeast Asia is a small neighborhood, after all. After reunification, the only major source of regional instability left will be the Communist Party in China. On the one hand, I do believe that the more successful the Communists are at steering their economic growth, the sooner they will obsolete themselves. And should a democratic revolution take place in China, northeast Asia will become a secure zone like much of North America, Europe, and Oceania. Taiwan will then freely join China. This is the ideal ending, anyway. I do think this is a realistic possibility.
On the other hand, China has a long ways to go to get to that point, I think. In the meantime, the Japanese will have to evaluate for themselves whether China will let them feel secure enough to go without arming themselves. Today’s Chinese leadership wants warmer ties with Japan. But no one knows what will happen when a communist China becomes the regional military hegemon we all expect them to become. In the mid term, we shall see whether Japanese feelings regarding nukes are truly immutable.
In my musings above, however, I was wondering whether a nuclear ROK and Japan would at least give us more leverage over the DPRK than we have now. Right now, the six-party talk is really a meeting of America and the DPRK, with China desiring to stay out of it. The other three nations are pretty superfluous, though this does not matter since the objective of the talks–that of a nuclear-free peninsula–has clearly failed and is not likely to succeed. At this point, I think Washington is more concerned about the DPRK’s history of proliferation than the security of South Korea. A nuclear ROK may have to happen as a result. However, if Japan also went openly nuclear, that would amplify the DPRK’s and China’s and the ROK’s insecurity. The six-party talks would then become a more important forum than it is now. And our leverage should increase because of it. But I think you understood that I was merely musing.
Finally, you make it sound through condescension like we have gained no benefit from our alliances with the ROK and Japan. That is curious.
Nuclear weapons for the ROK have always made sense . The question for the Yanks out there is, does it make sense for US long-term interests?
Nope. Nuclear weapons are a mighty fierce genie to put back in the bottle, and once they’re out, if the US wants them back in, it’s going to have to pay an equally mighty fierce price. And that’s the least of Washington’s worries – other things like “armed neutrality” and “independent foreign policy” come to mind.
Yes, South Korea should go neclear and Japan too. As much as they don’t like it it is probably the best way to defend themselves aganist North Korea and China. That is how we probably should have been handling North Korea all along because talking to them is no use(sad to say); they are not going to disarm. We, the U.S. are making a mistake with this new neclear agreement with Russia, it will just make us weaker. Neclear weapons, unfortately, are a neccessary evil.
@Jack
Your article seems a bit dated. ^_^;
Since I know little about South Koreans’ attitudes on nukes during the KDJ and RMH years, I can’t comment on your article. But South Koreans today may rather develop their own HEU-based technology than depend on the reliability of the DPRK’s. Should the DPRK collapse today and the ROK and America deploy troops into the North, I do not think that the ROK would consider it a big loss not to take control over the DPRK’s Plutonium-powered bombs–the ones, which have quite famously “fizzled.” And what Washington thinks today is that the ROK has the capability to develop their own bombs quite easily without DPRK technology. And I think this is probably true. The trick, which the South has not figured out yet, is how to stick it on top of a large rocket. Given a choice, I am certain that the South would rather figure out from scratch how to do this by themselves than rely on the DPRK’s notoriously inept rocketry.
I understand that no American president wants the NNPT to die on his watch. However, neither Democratic nor Republican president may be able to stop either the DPRK or Iran from developing HEU-powered bombs. The Arabs and the South Koreans will have to decide soon how they will respond.
lollabrats wrote:
I think you are wrong on two points. First, bases on the ground (in addition to ships nearby) have a psychological effect on one’s potential attackers that ships nearby alone do not. It is a virtual guarantee that you will have to mess with two countries, not just the one being invaded. China may be emboldened that they can turn the heat up on that frog. One only has to look at China’s moves in the disputed Spratly Islands after the US military left its bases in the the Philippines to recognize such a possibility.
North Korea may be tempted that if they hit just the right way they might be able to take Seoul and force the ROK to surrender if the Blue House decides that continued war would inflict far too much damage — before the ships in the water have had a chance to turn around. A US presence on the ground in South Korea has been a virtual guarantee that June 1950 could not happen again.
As for the “insurmountable” political pressure, while there would not doubt be calls for a smaller force, a lot of people would see the value of the Pax Americana in terms of maintaining stability, keeping people from dying, and making the world safe for American trade. In South Korea, without the chinboista fifth-column, there would actually be less opposition, not more. If Yongsan is still around, the calls to move quickly to Pyongtaek will remain, but a base that’s out of sight and out of mind but helps protect Korea from Chinese designs will welcome, enthusiastically by some and tacitly or grudgingly by others.
So your feeling that the US should not maintain a physical presence in Northeast Asia, where such a presence has probably been the most stabilizing force the region has seen in centuries, is based on a two-pronged fantasy that somehow, some way, the Chinese Communist Party will no longer be in power, and that whatever replaces it will magically not have hegemonic designs on the region?
Okay, then.
Have you visited Hiroshima or Nagasaki? I think one needs to visit those places to get a taste of what Japanese learn about their victimization by nukes before one talks about how willing they might be to become a nuclear-tipped nation themselves.
As for China wanting warm relations, I don’t quite agree. The CCP wants whatever relationship with Japan that suits them at the moment. If that’s warm relations, that’s what they want then; if it’s a confrontational relationship in order to channel an antsy public’s restlessness away from the CCP, then it’s confrontational then. There’s your mutable government sentiment.
Possibly. The Obama administration yesterday (see story #1 here) has basically restricted use of its own nukes for all countries except Iran and North Korea because of their own pursuit of nukes in violation of international agreements, so maybe such a threat can be used to nudge the North back.
Whether you’re musing or not, there are people in power who muse such things in such a way that it could become closer to reality, hence my desire to take it seriously.
As long as Japan has outstanding territorial issues stemming from a war where it invaded and brutalized its neighbors (and it does with South Korea, China, Taiwan, and Russia), Japan getting a stronger military and/or nukes is a highly destabilizing factor. It would lead to an arms race, especially in the absence of a strong US presence in the region.
Whether they publicly state it or not, the players involved are comfortable with the US presence. It makes sure countries don’t get invaded and it provides a wet blanket to anyone getting too uppity. The US has a historic interest in the region but it has not been a usurper or territory (except, arguably, the Philippines, which it voluntarily gave up six decades ago) and is seen by no one as a threat to territorial integrity. Its unique position makes it an ideal force for stability and peace, and getting rid of it will directly result in a major war within a decade or so of its departure.
Oh, I do, do I? I think you’re reading that into my words, but it’s not there. I am a firm believer in the Pax Americana not just for the benefit of Northeast Asia, but for the benefit of the US as well. I think our role in the region has been of great benefit to the US, at a price that is very cheap compared to the alternative.
@kushibo
You clearly have misread what I wrote. What part of “after reunification” do you not understand? After the ROK annexes the territory held by the North, pressure will increase from east Asia and domestically for us to remove our bases. I just do not see us being able to keep our bases in Japan and Korea after the DPRK’s collapse. My sense is that neither most Koreans nor Japanese would consider Chinese communists reason enough to lease out bases to us. And I think it would be a good idea to let them deal with a communist China on their own terms. I think the alliance would actually gain more value by closing our bases. They will take security concerns–and us–more seriously and our friendship with them would be our major source of influence in the region. The rest of my musing starts from this assumption.
So, without American bases in Japan, the Japanese will have to come to grips with what level of security they are willing to live with. A democratic China would indeed have hegemonic ambitions. However, that does not translate into saying that their behavior will be exactly the same as a communist Chinese hegemon’s. A democratic China will have an openly fractured voice and Japan and Korea will have to play the influence game from within Beijing. But we’re a long ways away from that world. Until then, if the communist Chinese military takes an overly aggressive posture in the region, I have doubts that sentimental feelings over Hiroshima and Nagasaki will trump national security.
Regarding border disputes, which of China’s neighbors have not had border disputes with them. Such conflicts will neither be helped nor hindered by American presence. America’s stance should be to stay agnostic.
Regarding my use of the word, “warmer,” I think disagreeing with my choice of wording is inconsequentially petty. Whatever their aims, China right now wants economic ties with and investments coming from Japan.
Regarding Japan’s militarization, I think the Japanese must go that route and I think everyone else needs to deal with it. This is the only way they will be able to learn to trust each other. First of all, China need not fear Japan ever again. This fact alone will temper any fascist Japanese aggression. But a united Korea that is technologically advanced probably will not need to fear, either. People think of Korea as a small country, but they are already a huge country. And a united Korea will likely grow to be a massively large one in terms of population and act like it in terms of ability. At some point, the region needs to come to the conclusion based on a new collective experience of keeping the peace with each other that they can indeed trust each other. Our Pax Americana would only hinder such natural developments. I think military and economic cooperation, transparency and constant dialogue, and other usual ways of keeping the peace will come into play then.
In sum, what I’m saying is, your notion of Pax Americana will need a bit of tweaking after reunification.
^_^;
Hey kushibo, I was trying to figure out how I even found myself wasting my time musing about what might happen after reunification in the first place. Then I noticed that I was responding to your own comment responding to one of my own:
“the alliance with the US that South Korea and Japan both enjoy is not only about North Korea, and it will be quite important even after the peninsula is reunified..”
Oh, goodness. And now quite off topic.
Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Kuwait, South Korea, Japan, Germany, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Italy — do we know that they don’t actually have nukes? Do we care? A nuke without a delivery system is like a tank without diesel — a very powerful local force only.
The problem with nukes is that of a hand grenade at a football game — safe if held by a policeman, but a nightmare if held by an unstable adult. Pakistan is an actually unstable nuclear power that hates India and has Delhi as its target; Iran is a potentially unstable power that hates Israel and has Tel Aviv as its target; North Korea is a stable but frighteningly unpredictable nuclear power that hates “the West” and has Pusan as its target. Not Seoul — that is targeted by gas warfare so most of the buildings and industry survives. Pusan as a dead zone would keep Japan away, as well as leaving the UN with nowhere to land after Seoul falls in 48 hours. The fallout goes to Japan too.
South Korea with nukes is not a particularly severe threat in my lifetime. It’s no big deal — until Genghiz Khan rides again. A recurrent daydream is the unification of North and South under Kim as part of an aggressive Manchurian “kingdom” devoted to the overthrow of Han China, in alliance with the Russian Far East and the Uighurs. A nuke or two on Beijing could be a real game changer. Ten million dead at once, and 200 million starving to death over the next year, makes the Arduous March or the Great Confiscation mild by comparison. But that could happen next year without South Korea getting its own bomb.
A South Korean nuclear force won’t deter North Korea. It would alarm Japan. But the more bombs there are on the peninsula, the more trouble there is for China. China should really want a nuclear free peninsula — and it is a measure of the incompetence of their Communist foreign policy that they haven’t realized this.
lollabrats wrote:
The part about China was referring to post-reunification. I added the North Korea part because the current deterrence is along the same lines, but I could have made that clearer.
When I have time I might try to respond to the rest, but it’s clear you and I have very different ideas of how well the US presence has prevented major conflict, or the likelihood for major conflict if the US goes “agnostic” and other countries are forced to “deal with a communist China on their own terms.”
The Japanese are not merely “sentimental” about actual nukes, and they would choose US bases in Japan over nukes in a heartbeat. As for Korea, post-reunification, every single president — left or right, including Roh Moohyun — have stated the need for a US military presence in South Korea after unification.
It’s been nearly sixty years since the end of the Korean War in 1953, and there has been no major conflict between the players of Northeast Asia, including Taiwan and Russia. By contrast, there were four major wars on or through Korea in the previous sixty years.
Sadly, the success of the deterrence makes some people think the deterrence is no longer necessary, but there is zero trust between China and its neighbors, and it’s only a matter of time before the ensuing powder keg that will come from a post-Pax Americana arms race gets ignited by something.
@kushibo
Oh. I see now. What you’re really saying is that we should stay in Korea and Japan…for the rest of time. I didn’t understand where you were going with all this. Ok. Now that I know what you’re saying, you suddenly seem much more reasonable to me. I also admire your argument: if we leave Korea or Japan, the whole place will go kablooie (like Afghanistan and Somalia?). You’ve completely stumped me with your airtight case. And yes, a united Korea will indeed be no better off than Korea was between the 1880s and 1950s. Sadly, because I have been blinded by the fact that our bases have kept the peace for the last 60 years, I must admit that I have been misguided in my belief that, today, Korea and Japan just may be capable of providing their own deterrence…if they try…just a little….
Three points, lollabrats.
First, I did not say or suggest “for the rest of time.” In fact, I talked about specific destabilizing factors, the absence of which might lead to a different situation. Among possible game-changers would be resolving Japan’s Imperial-era territorial disputes and China no longer being run by a totalitarian group that is bent on hegemony.
Second, I’m not worried about Northeast Asia turning into Afghanistan and Somalia in a post-Pax Americana era. I’m worried about it turning into Northeast Asia prior to the Pax America. Again, post-1953, zero wars. In the sixty years prior, four major wars.
Third, you should be aware that your attempts at sarcasm don’t actually make you smarter, your ideas cleverer, or your musings more informed.
(1) “First, I did not say or suggest “for the rest of time.†In fact, I talked about…China no longer being run by a totalitarian group that is bent on hegemony. ”
-kushibo
vs
“So your feeling that the US should not maintain a physical presence in Northeast Asia, where such a presence has probably been the most stabilizing force the region has seen in centuries, is based on a two-pronged fantasy that somehow, some way, the Chinese Communist Party will no longer be in power, and that whatever replaces it will magically not have hegemonic designs on the region?”
-kushibo
(2) “I’m worried about it turning into Northeast Asia prior to the Pax America. Again, post-1953, zero wars. In the sixty years prior, four major wars. ”
-kushibo
vs
“And yes, a united Korea will indeed be no better off than Korea was between the 1880s and 1950s.”
-me and my failed attempt at sarcasm
^_^;
(1) “First, I did not say or suggest “for the rest of time.†In fact, I talked about…China no longer being run by a totalitarian group that is bent on hegemony. â€
-kushibo
vs
“So your feeling that the US should not maintain a physical presence in Northeast Asia, where such a presence has probably been the most stabilizing force the region has seen in centuries, is based on a two-pronged fantasy that somehow, some way, the Chinese Communist Party will no longer be in power, and that whatever replaces it will magically not have hegemonic designs on the region?â€
-kushibo deliberately misconstruing my position (EDIT)
(2) “I’m worried about it turning into Northeast Asia prior to the Pax America. Again, post-1953, zero wars. In the sixty years prior, four major wars. â€
-kushibo
vs
“And yes, a united Korea will indeed be no better off than Korea was between the 1880s and 1950s.â€
-me and my failed attempt at sarcasm
^_^;