Open Sources, January 27, 2014

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NORTH KOREA PLANNED AN ATTACK ON INCHEON AIRPORT? If Park Geun Hye seems “skeptical about North Korea’s recent conciliatory proposals” and suspects that they could be “a prelude to an attack on South Korea” this may be why:

North Korea secretly carried out military exercises simulating an attack on a civilian airport in South Korea, mobilizing special jet fighters designed to infiltrate Southern territory, a source told the JoongAng Ilbo. A South Korean government official who is engaged in North Korean affairs said Wednesday that North Korea conducted simulated military drills targeting Incheon International Airport in South Korea, the biggest civilian airport in the country, while making conciliatory proposals to Seoul at the same time.

“The South Korean government performed an in-depth analysis on the nighttime military exercises by North Korea’s special airborne unit on Jan. 19,” the official said, “and we found the drills targeted our civilian airport.” “Currently, we have raised the military alert for a possible attack from a North Korean base in Taetan County, North Pyongan Province, and strengthened security at Incheon International Airport,” the official said. [Joongang Ilbo]

If that’s true, it deserves to be a very big story. At least one good reporter should try to tell us whether North Korea really did plan an attack on one of the world’s largest civilian airports — something that should have a wide range of policy consequences — or whether this is just more NIS B.S.

North Korea was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008. Discuss among yourselves.

Update: A reader writes in to note an inconsistency in this story. There is no Taetan County in North Pyongan Province. Taetan Airbase is in Taetan County, South Hwanghae Province. It is a long, hard-surfaced runaway capable of handling jet fighters, and with underground shelters. The only operational aircraft out in the open appear to be MiG-17s and Mi-4 helicopters (there are also some older MiGs, including MiG-21s, that look like hangar queens). I have never seen An-2s on on a one of these hard-surfaced 10,000-foot runways. There are probably smaller runways in that area that do host An-2s, but I don’t have all the small runways marked. The error is most likely a reporting or transcription error, because the NIS is undoubtedly well versed in these facts, too. Thanks to my reader for catching that.

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REALLY? THEY KILLED THE KIDS, TOO?

All relatives of the executed uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, including children and the country’s ambassadors to Cuba and Malaysia, have also been put to death at the leader’s instruction, multiple sources said Sunday. [….]

“Some relatives were shot to death by pistol in front of other people if they resisted while being dragged out of their apartment homes,” another source said. [Yonhap]

The report relies on anonymous sources, presumably in the South Korean intelligence service, the NIS. I obviously can’t say whether it’s true, but it fits with (1) reports that those ambassadors were purged, (2) reports of mass arrests (but not of on-the-spot shootings) of Jang’s relatives in parts of Pyongyang, and (3) North Korea’s history of collective punishment of whole families.

Historically, I had not heard reports of children being executed after their parents were purged, but for years, we’d heard reports of children of purged officials being sent to die in camps, and infanticide of babies born to refugee women. Most recently, we’d heard a report that nine orphans who were returned to North Korea last year were also executed (also unconfirmed, but not pursued by foreign media).

Only in North Korea could we call a report like this plausible. North Korea’s defenders would say that it’s an easy target for lurid rumors because of its (ultimately self-defeating) obsession with secrecy. But then, the regime certainly acts as if it has a lot to hide, and when people conceal the truth, we’re entitled to a few adverse inferences about what they’re hiding. If this is true, it wouldn’t be far beyond the range of what we know North Korea is capable of, but it would still set a new low, and offer more evidence that Kim Jong Un is even worse than his father.

Update: Much more detail on this at North Korea Leadership Watch.

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STARVING SOLDIERS BEG FOR FOOD:

However, contrary to the Rodong Sinmun reports, the actual condition of the majority of KPA soldiers is dire, many reported to be suffering from chronic malnutrition. As the ASIAPRESS North Korea Reporting Team has been reporting in recent years, it not only the ordinary soldiers but the subordinate officers that are also emaciated, and it is not unusual to see these soldiers visiting ordinary people’s homes, knocking door to door, asking for food.

“Asking” is better than the other alternative we often hear about.

It’s often repeated that the North Korean army is a million strong, but my sense is that many of those units are military in name only. The Special Forces and front-line units are trained and equipped for combined arms warfare and get the lion’s share of the rations, although a spate of reports in 2011 and 2012 told us that even those units were going hungry and suffering from disciplinary problems. The rest of North Korea’s army largely consists of uniformed construction companies or poorly trained militia (Worker-Peasant Red Guard). We’ve been hearing credible reports of malnutrition in the North Korea army since at least 2005, and ever since.

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UNTIL RECENTLY, ORASCOM had been the only conspicuous example of an apparently successful investor in North Korea. As it turns out, that appearance was a deception:

An audit report by Deloitte posted on the Orascom website recently says, “North Korea has implemented currency control restrictions and, in particular, rules surrounding the repatriation of dividends to foreign investors.” [….] But red tape is preventing it from sending back the profits. Orascom chief Naguib Onsi Sawiris was quoted by U.K. website Middle East Online late last year as saying he would make no more investment in North Korea until the company sees some returns.

Unless your name is “Kim Jong” something, investment in North Korea is always eventually a losing proposition.

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TODAY DENNIS RODMAN, TOMORROW GUUS HIDDINK: So, Guus, have you considered the possibility that a “futsal” stadium isn’t really what North Korea needs most right now? While not all sporting goods are covered by the EU’s luxury goods ban, I’d think a broad interpretation of the term would be appropriate, in light of the North’s food situation today. This is a bad idea. Please drop it.

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SHODDY CONSTRUCTION depresses living standards in Pyongyang: “The root of the problem plaguing these modern yet defective apartments is evidenced in several issues: A lack of materials results in low quality and fragile structures. Further, the rush to construct the buildings, led by the engineering battalion and compulsory-mobilized teams from local workplaces, means that basic building requirements are compromised.”

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I REALLY JUST CAN’T SAY THIS ENOUGH: Stay the f**k out of North Korea, people. Ko Samui is lovely this time of year. Rent a motorbike, keep your passport, take all the pictures you want, eat yourself into guilt-free obesity with delectable seafood dishes, and no minders.

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NORTH KOREA BY MODEL T, IN THE 1920s: I found these photos recounting a drive from Pyongyang to Haeju, across the nearly roadless countryside, at a car web site. It’s interesting to see how friendly the rural people were to foreigners then, despite the almost complete lack of development where they lived. I suppose it isn’t ignorance that teaches us to hate each other, but indoctrination spread by efficient modern technology.

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ON SEPTEMBER 2, 1945, the Japanese government signed the instrument of surrender to the allies. Some Japanese soldiers refused to believe that the reports were true, hid out, and fought on. For decades, governments across Southeast Asia flushed Japanese “holdouts” from their hiding places in isolated jungles. The last of them was Hiroo Onoda, who had been declared dead in 1959. Fifteen years later, a young Japanese explorer contacted him in the jungle, located his former commanding officer, and flew him down to the Philippines to coax Onoda out of the jungle. That was in 1974. The Filipino government pardoned Onoda for shooting several villagers and policemen in the intervening years.

Onoda went on to learn to drive, marry, and emigrate from a country he no longer knew, to start a cattle ranch in Brazil. Eventually, however, he went home to die. Last week. At the age of 91. I’m rather stunned that this man lived to see the year 2014. But in several ways, the story of Onoda is the story of post-war Japan itself.

On a somewhat related note, those interested in Japan’s reckoning with its conduct during the war will find this book review interesting.