Nuclear blackmail watch

As Pyongyang may be about to nuke off, and then again may not be, Glyn Davies is pleading for Agreed Framework III.

A U.S. envoy on Tuesday suggested Washington could accept “reversible steps” from North Korea on denuclearization in order to jump-start frozen negotiations.

“What they do, quite frankly, in the initial stages would be perfectly reversible steps that they would take, declaratory steps,” said Glyn Davies, the Obama administration’s special envoy for North Korea policy. He emphasized, however, that Pyongyang could only return to the long-paralyzed six-party process if it accepted the “fundamental premise” that the negotiations were focused on the permanent shuttering of its nuclear weapons program.

If only they had another cooling tower to blow up.

Davies was responding to a reporter’s question on whether the United States was still demanding from Pyongyang concrete proof of its commitment to irreversible denuclearization as a precondition to returning to the negotiations, which also involve China, Japan, Russia and South Korea.

“Davies’ answer suggests that if the six-party talks were to begin, the first actions the U.S. and its partners would demand would be aimed at limits that curb the D.P.R.K.’s nuclear and missile potential,” said Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association executive director, in an email.

Potential reversible steps that the North could take to gain the confidence of other countries could include a pledge to suspend nuclear and missile testing. A stillborn U.S-North Korea agreement reached on Leap Day 2012 involved such a promise of a testing moratorium; Pyongyang was seen to quickly break faith with Washington when it weeks later unsuccessfully attempted to send a rocket into space.

Although Davies is being coy with us, a careful parsing of his words doesn’t allow the reader to tell whether he’s demanding complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear program — the position of the United States until now — or settling for something more like a freeze, which can be unfrozen at any time.

The insistence on “permanent shuttering” — or whatever words Davies actually used — is the closest thing we’ve seen to a denial of previous reports that it was willing to soften its disarmament demands. It isn’t much of a denial.

Let’s go with a wild assumption here that North Korea would sign any deal premised on CVID (the more likely outcome is that the deal would be silent about it, and both parties would walk away with different understandings). Any such deal would come at a heavy up-front cost in aid. Congress, however, has already prohibited most forms of aid to North Korea, and prohibits all aid to North Korea unless Congress approves it in a specific appropriation. Good luck getting this Congress to approve one in an election year.