Senate intel bill would require report on N. Korean gulags

Yonhap points me to S.2741, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, introduced by Committee Chair Diane Feinstein the day before Congress went into summer recess, and a few days after the House passed H.R. 1771, the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act.

Section 316 of S.2741 would require the CIA to report to the House and Senate intelligence oversight committees on North Korea’s political prison camps:

SEC. 316. REPORT ON POLITICAL PRISON CAMPS IN NORTH KOREA.

(a) In General.–The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on political prison
camps in North Korea.
(b) Elements.–The report required by subsection (a) shall–
(1) describe the actions the United States is taking to support implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including the eventual establishment of a tribunal to hold individuals accountable for abuses; and
(2) include, with respect to each political prison camp in North Korea to the extent information is available–
(A) the estimated prisoner population of each such camp;
(B) the geographical coordinates of each such camp;
(C) the reasons for confinement of the prisoners at each such camp;
(D) a description of the primary industries and products made at each such camp, and the end users of any goods produced in such camp;
(E) information regarding involvement of any non-North Korean entity or individual involved in the operations of each such camp, including as an end user or source of any good or products used in, or produced by, in such camp;
(F) information identifying individuals and agencies responsible for conditions in each such camp at all levels of the Government of North Korea;
(G) a description of the conditions under which prisoners are confined, with respect to the adequacy of food, shelter, medical care, working conditions, and reports of ill-treatment of prisoners, at each such camp; and
(H) unclassified imagery, including satellite imagery, of each such camp.
(c) Form.–The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form and may include a classified annex if necessary.

Subsection (b)(1) shares a common purpose with Section 303(b) of H.R. 1771, in that it asks State to report on what, exactly, it has done to effect the recommendations of the COI report. Fortunately for State, that report shouldn’t impose a high burden of draftsmanship. In a spirit of friendly outreach to my friends at the Department of State, I’ll even suggest a text:

“This page intentionally left blank.”

There — done! Succinct and perfectly truthful. You’re welcome, Department of State!

As I’ve noted more than once on this site, the President could effect one of the COI’s key recommendations with the stroke of a pen, by signing an executive order blocking the assets of North Korean persons and government entities that are responsible for North Korea’s prison camps, extrajudicial executions, denial of food aid, and other crimes against humanity. The President has signed similar executive orders against the leaders of Iran, Zimbabwe, Belarus, and other countries.

Subsection (b)(2), requiring a report on the prison camps, is ripped nearly word-for-word from Section 302 of H.R. 1771. But let me state with high confidence that the drafter of that language — whoever that person might be — would no doubt accept this implied compliment graciously and offer all the gratis assistance said committee staff is willing to accept.

One opportunity I hope the Intelligence Committee staff will seize at some future date is to require a report on China’s sponsorship of North Korean hackers, and of web sites like Uriminzokkiri that publish threats against the United States and South Korea. The report should also ask the CIA where the hackers are getting their training, and whether any foreign persons or entities are knowingly or unknowingly involved in providing it.

~ ~ ~

First, the good. The bill means that another important congressional committee is interested in getting more intelligence about a topic that the State Department would prefer Congress didn’t discuss at all. It also means that a key Democratic Senator from a state with a large Korean-American population is concerned about election-year perceptions that our government hasn’t paid enough attention to this issue. Because this section was introduced by a senior, respected Democratic Senate Committee Chair with a hawkish reputation, and mirrors a provision that the House has already passed, it’s almost certain to become law.

So that would be one section down, and 19 to go.

Now, the less good. First, much of this provision has already become law. Section 7032(i) of the Fiscal Year 2013 Appropriations Act, which the President has signed, already requires the State Department to “to establish and maintain a database of prisons and gulags in North Korea, including a list of political prisoners.” The most significant upgrades Section 316 offers above that are its requirement in subsection (b)(1) for State to report on its COI implementation efforts, and its requirement for CIA to report on what the prisoners in the camps make and where those products are sold.

By itself, the language of Section 316 does nothing to hold the responsible individuals accountable under U.S. national authorities, including by blocking their assets under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The information in the report could, however, be useful for a future tribunal.

The borrowing of language from H.R. 1771 shows that the Intelligence Committee staff is paying attention to the House’s efforts to impose tougher sanctions and greater accountability on senior North Korean officials. So why did the committee staff go only this far and no further? The most likely reason is jurisdiction. The Intelligence Committee would have been out of its parliamentary swim lane to take on sanctions and other matters within the jurisdiction of the Banking and Foreign Relations committees. In fact, a Foreign Relations Committee staffer could argue that subsection (b)(1) already reaches over its rope.

Of course, the best way for SFRC to preempt that would be to introduce its own companion bill to H.R. 1771.

If you view the effort to change North Korea policy as a marathon rather than a sprint, this is a positive development. Committee chairs and members in both houses and both parties are paying more attention to North Korean human rights. They want more oversight over State, which can only lead them to the conclusion that State has failed to address the issue in any meaningful way.