How much should we worry about N. Korea’s missiles? Basho explains.

My post on North Korea’s alarming progression toward a nuclear missile capability inspires a knowledgeable reader and friend to send me an extended comment. Because he has asked me to withhold his name and where he works, we’ll call him “Basho, an observer of Things, and international affairs raconteur.” Without saying more, I’m confident that Basho has a basis to know what he’s talking about. I print his comments in their entirety, unedited except that I embedded his hyperlinks.

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There are tested and fielded road mobile missiles in the DPRK inventory. The biggest threat to us is the question of whether they have a tested, capable, and fielded, road mobile ICBM. The surmised vehicle that may have an intercontinental capability (defined as a missile capable of 5,500 Km or more range) is the KN-08. (link)

Western ‘experts’ have said until relatively recently the ICBM threat from nK is negligible because the north Koreans are not capable of making a small enough nuclear warhead to fit on an airframe like the KN-08. In Spring ‘14 the north Koreans put the launch vehicles on display with mock up missiles. (The transporter vehicles were sold by PRC to north Korea as ‘lumber trucks’).

The United States Forces Korea (USFK) commander’s comments a few days ago indicated that the north Koreans are able to miniaturize a nuclear warhead, which would be essential to fitting a nuke to one of their missiles. Just a year or two ago, our experts and analysts were testifying to Congress that the north Koreans couldn’t field anything like that for years. Oops.

The South Korean MOD’s comments supporting this supposition may not be that credible – I get the sense they’re just jumping on Gen. Scapparotti’s comments to garner more support (i.e. funding) for missile defense.

The public comments also come at a curious time considering the tensions related to the potential fielding of THAAD to ROK. Airing these conversations publically has more to do with influencing that discussion than any real technological satori.

Other road-mobiles that *could* be nuclear-capable:
– Musudan IRBM, possibly just shy of being considered an ICBM (link)

– Nodong MRBM (this is potentially the missile that will be tested as an SLBM)

Public analysts frequently reduce their reporting to the trees rather than the forest,  whether ‘they’ might have something or not, reporters seem to totally gloss over any analysis related to what the real risks are if the north Koreans do have something. That’s a bit frustrating. While we shouldn’t overreact, prudent man theory indicates we should acknowledge the risks of the worst case.

The newest threat is whether the north Koreans will have a nuclear-capable submarine fleet capable of launching missiles. Granted, their submarines are largely Cold War diesel-electrics but they present a threat to the region and, possibly, the United States.

Diplomacy. As for the diplomatic strains between the three-party group (Japan,ROK, US), I would offer that Japan and, to a lesser extent, South Korea are both pursuing diplomatic options with China and nK because of the lack of leadership by our executive and diplomatic efforts. The DOD is heavily engaged with South Korea on the potential employment of THAAD accompanied by the implications of missile defense for Seoul, and the handover of military authority from the U.S. Forces Korea to the South Korean military – two huge topics.

As for Japan, I don’t think our mil-to-mil relationships have ever been stronger. The Japanese have agreed to host a second missile defense radar in their country that will not just protect Japan, but also bolster missile defense for the US and our allies in the Pacific region.  The governments of Japan and the United States just signed agreements on space surveillance tracking that will advance scientific research. Also, Japan has committed to buying several more Aegis missile defense destroyers over the next few years.

Because of their recognition of the regional threats, and interest in respecting common global interests, I’m not terribly worried about them holding bilateral talks with north Korea on other issues (e.g. kidnap victims, etc.). They’re only doing bilateral talks as a result of the vacuum of US leadership.