N. Korea sanctions are failing because of China. That’s why we need secondary sanctions.

Last November, I put up a post cataloging China’s long and deep history of breaking U.N. sanctions against North Korea. The post, which relied heavily on reports of the U.N. Panel of Experts monitoring North Korea sanctions, attracted a great deal of attention, including from Senate staff as they considered the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act. The new POE report, released yesterday, is almost 300 pages long (including exhibits) and has more than enough material to make a rich sequel to that post. It has almost as much evidence of China’s willful blindness or outright duplicity as the rest of the reports combined.

Yesterday, I singled out one of the most brazen examples, in which the Bank of China told a North Korea-linked customer to hide those links when it processed $40 million in wire transfers through the U.S. financial system (the Chinese government delayed the release of the report because of its objection to that finding).

And there is so much more. For example, multiple U.N.-designated North Korean arms smugglers and proliferators are still operating openly in China. Leader Trading Company and Korea Taesong Trading operate out of Dalian and possibly Dandong (paras. 169-170), while Korea Tangun Trading Corporation still operates out of Shenzhen, under the alias Ryungseng Trading Corporation (para. 174).

They’re keeping busy, too. A cargo of missile-related parts seized on its way to Syria passed through Dalian, despite being linked to Leader Trading Company and Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, or KOMID (also designated). The North Koreans “used two companies, Dalian Union International Trading Co., Ltd. and Dandong Yongxinghe Trade Co., Ltd. … to procure the items” from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other locations.

Few of the suppliers asked who the end users were, but in the one case when one did, the Chinese middlemen didn’t answer (paras. 62-70). In the annexes, you can see multiple documents associated with Leader Trading and KOMID’s shipments to Syria, listing addresses in China.

In 2013, an unnamed member state intercepted a shipment of SCUD missile parts on their way from Beijing to a trading company in Egypt. (Sharp-eyed readers may wonder if this is the same Egyptian trading company the Treasury Department designated here, under Executive Order 13687 last year. It wasn’t, which suggests that Egypt’s links to North Korea aren’t just a one-off, but an issue that deserves more diplomatic attention than it’s getting.) The North Koreans flew the parts to Beijing aboard Air Koryo. The shipper, Ryongsong Trading Co. Ltd., used the same address as North Korea’s embassy in Beijing (paras. 71-75).

The North Koreans obtained UAVs with military applications from suppliers in China, or from Chinese intermediaries (paras. 78-91). There are many documents on this in the exhibits, mostly from Chinese suppliers.

Remember when the South Koreans recovered UAVs that had overflown the Blue House and Baekryeong Island? This seems rather damning.

Remember those special “logging” vehicles the North Koreans bought from Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Company — quite possibly the world’s only manufacturer of extraterrestrial logging equipment — until they showed up in a parade hauling missiles through downtown Pyongyang? Senator Cruz gave that one an honorable mention in an angry letter he sent to President Obama this year, calling for secondary sanctions on China.

Well, guess what just happened again? This time, Chinese trucks are being used to haul 300-millimeter rockets, which are a serious threat to Seoul, and to U.S. military installations in South Korea (paras. 96-100). China’s defense is that it told the North Koreans to use these $50,000-a-pop trucks strictly for commercial purposes only. (I’m guessing the trucks North Korea actually uses for strictly commercial purposes have somewhat lower Kelly Blue Book values than this.) Except when North Korea lies about end-uses to normal, law-abiding countries, said countries tend to stop selling them those things. Now, UNSCR 2270 prohibits the sale of dual-use trucks.

A Chinese middleman, George Ma, procured at least four armored Mercedez S-Class sedans for His Corpulency. The cars were purchased from Germany and customized in the United States (I’m guessing the services included putting in extra-strong rear springs). There’s no evidence in the reports to suggest that the German supplier or the American customizer knew where the cars were headed, but the U.S. shop appears not to have done its due diligence on the Chinese purchaser (paras. 118-121), which revealed its North Korean connections on its website. Depending on the timing and other factors, this could be a violation of Executive Order 13551.

I wonder how many kids you could feed for what one of those cars cost. Remember, it’s the sanctions that are starving North Koreans. Just keep repeating that until you believe it.

Mirae Shipping, a subsidiary of U.N.-designated Ocean Maritime Management, helped broker the 2013 Cuba arms deal from its office in Shenzhen. From there, things get so unbelievably weird that I’ll just put it out there and let you read it for yourself:

143. Around the time of the designation, in July 2014, Mirae operated several foreign-flagged vessels as charter parties. However, it failed to make its payments, given that it was experiencing financial difficulties. The vessels’ owner companies and mortgagees (“the claimants”) requested maritime courts in Wuhan and Qingdao, China, in August and September 2014, respectively, to arrest and detain several vessels, including the Great Hope and the Benevolence 2. 71

144. In response, the Harbour Superintendence Authority of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea arrested and detained the claimants’ vessels in the country’s ports on the pretext of “tax evasion” (see annex 87). Another vessel owned by the claimants was already being detained by the country owing to a prior dispute between the charterer and the Korean Ocean Shipping Agency.

145. Subsequently, the Ministry of Land and Marine Transport intervened on behalf of OMM. The Ministry/OMM then led the negotiation by framing the disputes as a single package deal. The negotiations resulted in a set of complex arrangements aimed at achieving the simultaneous releases of multiple vessels among the various parties. The Panel notes the clear influence exerted by the Ministry/OMM over the Harbour Superintendence Authority and the country’s other shipping companies.

146. The negotiations were settled in December 2014 with the release by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of the claimants’ vessels in exchange for the claimants’ release from China of the Mirae-operated vessels (see annex 87).72 The settlement’s terms significantly favoured OMM. Mirae was released from outstanding debts. The claimants were forced by the Ministry/OMM to abandon another vessel, which was then transferred to Korea Tong Hung Shipping and Trading (the vessel’s operator) at no cost.

The upshot:

That OMM and the Ministry of Land and Marine Transport, in particular the Ministry’s senior official, Mr. Kim Yu Il, coerced the claimants to transfer to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at least two vessels (Benevolence 2 and Great Hope) operated by Mirae (acting on behalf of OMM), which constitutes evasion of the sanctions imposed under paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraphs 8 and 11 of resolution 2094 (2013). The Ministry acted on behalf of OMM and assisted in its evasion of sanctions;74

China wasn’t alone in being implicated in the report:

• Para. 30-33. North Korea’s KN-08 ballistic missile looks like a clone of the Soviet 9M79. Unfortunately, the report doesn’t say how the North Koreans got the plans for the missiles, or whether they got them after the U.N. first imposed its sanctions in 2006. The KN-11 submarine-launched missile also looks a lot like a Soviet SS-N-6/R-27, because the North Koreans obtained one from the Soviets in the 1990s and reverse-engineered it.
• Para. 61. Burma continues to purchase suspicious nuclear-related items.
• Para. 94. Eritrea appears to be doing some kind of arms deal with the North Koreans.
• Paras. 101-106. Namibia got busted hiring KOMID to build it a weapons factory. The key North Korean personnel are diplomats posted in South Africa, who shuttle back and forth between the two countries.
• In multiple parts of the report, it’s clear that Syria continues to be a major North Korean arms client.
• Paras. 112-117. Uganda and Viet Nam have both hired North Korean military or police advisors, something that the Panel of Experts thinks was already a violation of past resolutions (me, too), but which is now a definite no-no under UNSCR 2270.
• Para. 123-129. Israel sold North Korea $346,726 in gold, India sold them $1,913,677 in precious metals and stones, Thailand sold them$262,908 worth of cars, and Brazil sold them some unknown amount of jewelry. Once again, with feeling: sanctions starve babies.
• Para. 182-186. A Taiwanese company, Royal Team Corporation, sold pressure sensors to North Korea for its missile program, and not for the first time. RTC has been supplying the North Koreans continuously since 2004, often hand-carrying the merch to Pyongyang through (you guessed it) Beijing and Macau. In 2008, a Taiwanese court even convicted RTC for supplying sensitive technology to North Korea. RTC needs to be sanctioned to extinction. Then, its officials should be locked away Supermax, its factory razed, and the grounds sown with salt.
• Annex 1. The POE is investigating possible attempted North Korean arms dealing involving the UAE, Malaysia, and Ethiopia.

There is also more evidence of North Korea’s abuse of engagement programs to obtain sensitive technology, including from The Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (para. 46) and the International Astronautical Federation (paras. 55-58 and this post).

Overall, the Panel concludes that North Korea is as determined as ever to acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and that sanctions are failing due to member states’ failure to enforce them.

Given the stated intentions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its continued efforts to enhance the scope of its nuclear and missile programmes and to seek international acceptance and legitimacy for these prohibited programmes, there are serious questions about the efficacy of the current United Nations sanctions regime.

The Panel’s investigations have shown that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been effective in evading sanctions and continues to use the international financial system, airlines and container shipping routes to trade in prohibited items. Designated entities conceal their illicit activities by embedding agents in foreign companies. They use diplomatic personnel, long-standing trade partners and relationships with a small number of trusted foreign nationals. Its designation in July 2014 notwithstanding, Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited continues to operate through foreign-flagged vessels, name and company reregistrations and the rental of crews to foreign ships. This enables it to obtain access to foreign ports in the region and beyond, as well as maritime insurance, a prerequisite for operation. [….]

All these activities are facilitated by the low level of implementation of Security Council resolutions by Member States. The Panel has consistently highlighted the problems of non-implementation of the resolutions, which allows prohibited activity to continue. The reasons are diverse, but include lack of political will, inadequate enabling legislation, lack of understanding of the resolutions and low prioritization.

The introduction calls out Africa and the Middle East — and certainly, there is evidence of violations there. Indeed, many other states have failed to turn in their compliance reports, or have provided reports of low quality, including non-permanent members of the Security Council. But for the Panel to fail to mention the one state that’s involved in facilitating just about every last one of these violations, either through its banks, intermediaries, immigration authorities, or ports, is telling, especially given the delay in publishing the report. I can only assume that the Chinese representative pressured the Panel to water down this language.

Despite the otherwise excellent investigative work of the Panel, its report shows us that the moral suasion of U.N. alone isn’t enough to make sanctions work. That will require a credible threat of secondary sanctions to get Chinese banks, ports, and businesses to comply, and that will probably require making some examples. For conduct that happens after February 12, 2016, there will be some new rules, and there should also be some very hard consequences.