Angola may be defying U.N. sanctions against North Korea

A report last month by the U.N. Panel of Experts found that Namibia has been involved in joint projects with KOMID, a designated North Korean entity, to build an arms factory in the African nation. The finding drew a defiant response from the Namibian government, but as a defense to a sanctions violation, it was a blue answer to a red question. In response, I wrote this post — which attracted much attention in Windhoek — rebutting Namibia’s argument and explaining the potential legal consequences the Namibian Defense Ministry would face if its defiance continues. I also tweeted links to reports that Namibia may also have sold uranium to North Korea.

This week, it’s Namibia’s neighbor to the north, Angola, that’s sharing unwanted headlines with North Korea. First, Radio Free Asia reports that “[a]round 10 North Korean workers dispatched to Angola have died of yellow fever” during an outbreak that has killed 178 people. 

It said some 1,000 North Korean workers are in Angola, including construction workers and medical staff, the report said, referring to the workforce North Korea dispatches overseas to earn money.

The recent deaths of the North Koreans calls into question the quality of North Korea’s yellow fever vaccine and the veracity of North Korea’s claims to have inoculated its workers sent to the African country, according to the report.

Those who became sick have asked to be repatriated, but the North Korean government has opted to not comply out of fear that they could cause the disease to spread at home, the media company said. [Yonhap]

Second, the Angolan government may also be defying UNSCR 2270’s ban on security cooperation with North Korea. Like Namibia, Angola was named in the most recent report of the Panel of Experts. The panel found that Angola bought “items for military patrol boats” from a (subsequently) U.N.-designated North Korean trading company, Green Pine, with the help of our old friend, Josef “Boaty McBoatface” Schwartz.

Then, last week, the official Angolan news agency Angop published this cryptic report, defending the country’s unspecified sharing of “experiences in public security” with North Korea. Meaning?

On the occasion, the board of the Angolan Ministry of the Interior thanked the contribution of the people and government of North Korea have made to Angola, since the early period of the African country’s struggle for national liberation.

The friendship and co-operation relations between the governments of Angola and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are based on a politico-diplomatic framework, as well as on the General Agreement signed in May, 1977, a time that Angola’s first president, Dr António Agostinho Neto made an official visit to North Korea.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was among the first states to recognize the independence of Angola (11 Nov, 1975), which the Asian country officially acknowledged on 16 November 1975, a date that marked the start of official relations between the two states, immediately followed by the opening of the Asian country’s diplomatic mission in Luanda (Angola’s capital). [Angop]

The Angolan government may be under the illusion that this kind of argument helps its situation. In fact, it only attracts more attention from troublemakers like me by highlighting the Angolan government’s spurious reading of the sanctions. Like Bill Newcomb, I’ll reserve final judgment about whether Luanda’s security dealings with Pyongyang violate UNSCR 2270 until I know exactly what those dealings are. Still, it’s hard to imagine any form of security cooperation with Pyongyang that wouldn’t violate it.

For the Angolan government to answer that it enjoyed comradely relations with the North Koreans is irrelevant. The sanctions don’t require Luanda to sever diplomatic relations with Pyongyang; they do require it to cease its military cooperation, arms trafficking, commerce in dual-use items, and dealings with designated entities. A reader could reasonably infer that Angop’s report was a response to the panel’s revelations about Angola’s purchases from Green Pine. And why would Angola still feel the need to defend its dealings with North Korea if they’re all in the past? At the very least, it merits further investigation by the Panel of Experts. (This isn’t the full extent of Angola’s questionable commerce with North Korea, which would violate UNSCR 2270 if proven, but I’ll keep the rest to myself.)

Of course, one lesson we’ve learned over the last ten years is that U.N. sanctions don’t enforce themselves. The world’s less responsible actors will continue to engage in opportunistic (and prohibited) trade with North Korea until they confront the risk of consequences. In 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department presented banks around the world with that choice by designating Banco Delta Asia, and by sending Treasury officials around the world to clarify those consequences for banks that didn’t immediately get the message.

It’s time for a similar approach to North Korea’s arms clients in Africa, whose patronage is probably a significant source of income for Pyongyang, and continues to fuel conflict in Africa. The radical idea I’m calling for here is for our State Department to practice some diplomacy. If State is serious about enforcing sanctions against North Korea, it should promptly arrange a tour of Africa, to warn the appropriate ministries in Luanda, Harare, Kampala, Windhoek, Asmara, Addis Ababa, and Cairo that in addition to the unenforceable U.N. sanctions, the NKSPEA attaches serious mandatory sanctions to military cooperation with North Korea — including the blocking and forfeiture of assets, loss of aid, and visa bans.

Not only could such an approach enhance the credibility of the U.N. and cut off a key source of income for Pyongyang, it could also yield valuable information about North Korea’s arms trafficking, either from newly cooperative African governments, or from North Korean arms dealers who come under pressure from sanctions and are consequently induced to defect.