Congress asked for a real report on North Korean terrorism. The State Department hit CTRL-V and called it good.

As regular readers of this site have heard a few times by now, President Bush removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism on October 11, 2008, and despite overwhelming evidence, the Obama Administration’s official view is that North Korea is “not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.” A few years ago, a less inquisitive Congress might actually have bought that, but in recent years, as North Korea’s sponsorship of terrorism has become increasingly brazen and undeniable, Congress has made its views plain — members of both parties want North Korea back on the list.

Last year, Chairman Ted Poe (R, Tex.) and Ranking Member Brad Sherman (D, Cal.) of the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade called in the State Department to ask about (among other things) one of the several federal court decisions finding North Korea responsible for sponsoring terrorist acts against U.S. persons. State’s performance at that hearing was an embarrassment for the ages, with the key witness appearing to know nothing about the subject matter and essentially repeating, “We’ll have to look into that,” on an endless loop.

Understandably dissatisfied with that, Poe and Sherman introduced H.R. 5208, which listed two dozen or so things North Korea has done since 1987 that sure as hell sound like terrorism to me, to Chairman Poe, and to Ranking Member Sherman. I mean … kidnapping human rights activists? Sending hit-men to kill dissidents? Shipping arms to Hezbollah by the boat-load? Threatening terrorist attacks against movie theaters all across America? For each of these acts, H.R. 5208 asks the State Department to say (1) whether North Korea did it, and (2) whether it counts as the sponsorship of terrorism. Then, the bill asks the Secretary of State to go on the record as saying whether North Korea has “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” After all, similar or lesser conduct counted as terrorism in the State Department’s view when Saddam Hussein, Ayatollah Khomeini, Hafez Assad, and Moammar Qaddafy did it. Does North Korea enjoy some sort of undisclosed transactional immunity from the consequences of its actions? Its dictator could be forgiven for believing it did.

Today was the day by which the State Department really should have “looked into that,” when it released its annual Country Reports on Terrorism covering the events of 2015. And here is the entire North Korea section:

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Overview: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. In October 2008, the United States rescinded the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that the DPRK had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the provision by the DPRK of assurances that it would not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

Four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a 1970 jet hijacking continued to live in the DPRK. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities in the 1970s and 1980s. In May 2014, the DPRK agreed to re-open its investigation into the abductions, but as of the end of 2015 had not yet provided the results of this investigation to Japan.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In May, the United States re–certified North Korea as a country “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. In making this annual determination, the Department of State reviewed the DPRK’s overall level of cooperation with U.S. efforts to counter terrorism, taking into account U.S. counterterrorism objectives with the DPRK and a realistic assessment of DPRK capabilities.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The DPRK is not a member of any FATF-style regional body. In July 2014, it was admitted as an observer, but not a full member, of the Asia-Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. Nevertheless, the DPRK failed to demonstrate meaningful progress in strengthening its anti-money laundering/ combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) infrastructure. While encouraging the DPRK’s continued engagement with FATF and APG, the FATF highlighted continuing concerns about North Korea’s “failure to address the significant deficiencies in its [AML/CFT] regime and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system.” For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes:  http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

So, nothing about the murder of Pastor Han Chung-ryeol, even if only to say they’re looking into that, too? Or the hit the North Koreans reportedly ordered on defector-activist Ko Young-hwan? Or the promotion of terror master Kim Yong-chol, the hacking of the Seoul subway, or continued kidnappings of refugees from China? What about those drug dealers the North Koreans paid $40,000 to kill Hwang Jang-yop, or any of the various threats to nuke Washington or Seoul? Or Pyongyang’s directive to its overseas workers to assault journalists investigating their working conditions? Or its threat to shell defectors for floating harmless leaflets to its isolated and half-starved citizens? Or its expression of support for the slashing attack on Mark Lippert, the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, an honorable man and a highly effective diplomat whom the bureaucrats who wrote this report have so casually dishonored?

Do none of those things merit a passing mention? The brave young North Korean refugee-activist Hyeonseo Lee says, “I am human also. I am scared.” Does anyone in Foggy Bottom give a fig? Do we stand with North Korea’s refugees, and its brave dissidents in exile, or with their persecutors?

[“We’ll have to look into that and get back to you.”]

But there’s something else about the report that looked drearily familiar to me. That’s because it’s an almost verbatim copy of the 2014 report. See for yourself. I’ve underlined the very small differences in language.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Overview: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. In October 2008, the United States rescinded the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that the DPRK had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the provision by the DPRK of assurances that it would not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

Four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a 1970 jet hijacking continued to live in the DPRK. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities in the 1970s and 1980s. In May 2014, the DPRK agreed to re-open its investigation into the abductions, but as of the end of 2014 had not yet provided the results of this investigation to Japan.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In May, the United States recertified North Korea as a country “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. In making this annual determination, the Department of State reviewed the DPRK’s overall level of cooperation with U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, taking into account U.S. counterterrorism objectives with the DPRK and a realistic assessment of DPRK capabilities.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The DPRK is not a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In July 2014, it was admitted as an observer, but not a full member, of the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. Nevertheless, the DPRK failed to demonstrate meaningful progress in strengthening its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) infrastructure. While encouraging the DPRK’s continued engagement with FATF and APG, FATF highlighted continuing concerns about North Korea’s “failure to address the significant deficiencies in its [AML/CFT] regime and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system.” At each of its plenary meetings throughout the year, the FATF renewed its call on members to “protect their financial sectors from money laundering and financing of terrorism risks emanating from the DPRK.” For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Notice anything missing? That report didn’t so much as mention the threats that drove “The Interview” from cineplexes in towns and neighorhoods across America, and which President Obama personally attributed to North Korea, saying, “We cannot have a society in which some dictators someplace can start imposing censorship here in the United States.” After all, “if somebody is able to intimidate us out of releasing a satirical movie, imagine what they start doing once they see a documentary that they don’t like or news reports that they don’t like.” But censor they did, and “The Interview” wasn’t the only movie affected. Also unworthy of a mention by our State Department was North Korea’s 2014 hacking of South Korean nuclear power plants, with the intention of causing reactor malfunctions.

Go back another year to the 2013 report and it’s the same story. That report is an almost verbatim recitation of the same mendacious pabulum. In fact, much of the slight variation in language between the 2014 and 2015 reports is language that State copied from the 2013 text and pasted it into the 2015 text.

If I were a member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade right now, I’d be livid. I’d have the strong impression that I’d been dismissed, played, and insulted. The word “contempt” is difficult to put down. I’d demand a real report. And if I didn’t get it fast, I’d call a hearing. Mostly, I’d want someone to dignify my intelligence by telling me the truth. (This happens to be the very thing I also want, as a common citizen.)

As the Treasury Department begins to impose serious sanctions on North Korea, perhaps the financial importance of sanctions for North Korea’s state sponsorship of terrorism has receded some. Perhaps that means that the legal consequences of sponsoring terrorism are too slight. Whatever your views of that question, we deserve better than a government that lies to us. We deserve a government that values and defends our freedom to speak, and our freedom from fear.