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Moon Chung-in throws U.S. Forces Korea out the Overton Window (Update: & so does Trump)

A PATTERN WE’VE SEEN REPEATED OVER THE LAST YEAR goes roughly as follows: First, Moon Chung-in, the left-wing South Korean President’s crazy old uncle1 shouts something wacky from his attic when the Americans are within earshot. The Americans wince and pretend they didn’t hear. President Moon Jae-in and his cabinet walk the wacky remark back and gently hush the crazy old uncle.

But once Moon Chung-in has defenestrated the wacky idea out of his attic’s Overton Window, the hard-left base loots it, and its goon squads make it a fact on the ground while the forces of “law and order” abstain from interfering. That is how the Blue House — sorry, I meant “civic groups” — used illegal roadblocks to stop the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system despite the two allies’ agreement to deploy it, and thus shielded Moon from responsibility for the decision to block it. It’s not that South Korea’s highly trained riot police are incapable of dealing with political protests, of course. They’re perfectly efficient about enforcing the writ of Kim Yo-jong’s Propaganda and Agitation Department against leafleters. Let no one say that South Korea never honors its agreements.

I’ll credit B.R. Myers for identifying this pattern; I’ll credit myself for spotting Moon Chung-in’s veiled threat to whip up anti-American protests to back his bargaining position. Yes, things are aligning just as I’d predicted they would if my hypothesis was right, only much faster than I’d predicted. It’s not that I’m clairvoyant, it’s just that I’ve seen it all before.2

I also expect to see more anti-American protests in Korea soon, over one pretext or another. It can’t be lost on the anti–Americans in the Blue House that this is one of the surest ways to inflame Donald Trump at a moment of their choosing. Manipulating Trump into withdrawing U.S. forces would absolve Moon Jae-in of the responsibility for requesting it. Publicly, Moon could say that Trump was overreacting to free speech by critics of the U.S. presence, and he would be partially correct, except that his own surrogates will have done much to instigate the protests, Moon himself will guarantee “free” speech selectively, and the police will be powerless when the anti-American protests turn violent. I expect this to happen once the hard left feels that Moon’s political position is sufficiently secure, or if his position weakens dramatically and he resorts to anti-American nationalism to buoy his support.

If this sounds paranoid, the Wall Street Journal quotes a leader of Peoples’ Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, a band of hard-left, pro-North Korean Cheonan “truthers” with a history of orchestrating anti-American protests — and which now makes up a major faction in President Moon’s administration — hinting that it will call for a U.S. withdrawal when the time is right.

“The time will come for that debate: whether we should keep our military alliance with Washington, whether the U.S. military should stay, and if so, in what form and how many,” said Park Jung-eun, secretary-general for the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, an activist organization whose former members include some of the top officials in the South Korean administration. [WSJ, Jonathan Cheng and Andrew Jeong]

That quote comes from a news story about the latest fringe idea to be tossed out of Uncle Moon’s Overton Window: the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. Moon Chung-in initiated the now-familiar sequence in an article in Foreign Affairs, where he suggested if there’s a peace agreement with North Korea, U.S. forces may no longer be needed in the South. Here is the paragraph that provoked this conversation:

South Korea is not free from domestic constraints either. What will happen to U.S. forces in South Korea if a peace treaty is signed? It will be difficult to justify their continuing presence in South Korea after its adoption. But there will be strong conservative opposition to the reduction and withdrawal of U.S. forces, posing a major political dilemma for Moon. Although he wants to push for legislative approval of the declaration, in order to assure implementation even after a change in the government, conservative opposition is likely to block such approval, stalling implementation efforts. [Moon Chung-in, Foreign Affairs]

A senior presidential advisor does not write such things unthinkingly in a place where he knows his words will be read by the world.3 Rather, Mr. Moon wrote it to achieve a certain calculated effect. True to the pattern, President Moon and his cabinet are walking back Uncle Moon’s “gaffe,” and have planted the story that Chief of Staff Im Jong-seok is hushing him. They reassure their conservative and moderate voters by insisting that U.S. troops will stay in Korea even after “peace,” as if this is Seoul’s decision to make. They defend Uncle Moon himself on the grounds of his freedom to speak. But of course, the freedom to speak does not consequently imply a right to serve as the President’s Special Advisor for Unification.

I don’t know if Moon said this to stimulate a sympathetic discussion of a U.S. withdrawal at a time of Seoul’s choosing or to subtly threaten to kick us out if the White House drives a hard bargain on negotiations for Korea to pay for a greater share of its own defense. But to be fair, this is a legitimate public policy issue for both Koreans and Americans. There is nothing wrong with raising it. The duplicity lies in repeatedly planting fringe ideas through a semi-official advisor4 and then assuming that we’re dumb enough to believe that Mr. Moon was only speaking for himself, without first having discussed it with the same people who now say they’re hushing him. In fact, we’ve seen the Blue House hinting at a U.S. withdrawal on Pyongyang’s timetable for some time now.

But we were not back to square one at all, as it turns out. This raises a question about the Blue House’s denial of Uncle Moon’s suggestion: if it knew that Pyongyang would interpret the Panmunjom agreement as requiring a U.S. withdrawal, why did it sign an agreement that was, at best, vague enough to support that interpretation?

(Update: Specifically, I refer to this language, from the North Korea’s translation of the agreement: “â‘ The north and the south confirmed the principle of national independence which specifies that the destiny of our nation is set by ourselves and agreed to open up a drastic phase in the improvement and development of the ties by thoroughly implementing the north-south declarations and all the agreements that had already been adopted.”)

The Blue House may or may not be sincere in its denials that it wants us to leave, though I’m skeptical. For now, it seems more interested in suppressing the combat capability of U.S. Forces Korea than reducing the number of its personnel.

Events may soon find us with a large American contingent in Korea, stripped of its missile defenses and weakened by the curtailments of its training cycles. This would present Kim Jong-un without much of a deterrent, but would be a convenient gathering of hostages within rocket range that would have the effect of narrowing U.S. options. No wonder Kim Jong-un didn’t demand an immediate U.S. withdrawal from South Korea. But then, does it serve our interests to be trapped in a loveless alliance that limits our options for deterring or disarming North Korea, until President Im shows us the door? Maybe Moon Chung-in has, however unintentionally, done us a favor by stimulating a better conversation about restructuring or downsizing U.S. Forces Korea on our own terms.

(Update: Recent press reports suggest that Mr. Moon may be pushing against an open door with President Trump. Just a day after Mr. Moon’s article was published, NBC News reported that the President and his Chief of Staff, John Kelly, had a “heated exchange” just before the Olympics in February, when Kelly “strongly – and successfully – dissuaded Trump from ordering the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula.”

That wasn’t the end of the discussion, as it turns out. The day after Foreign Affairs published Moon Chung-in’s article, the New York Times, citing “several people briefed on the deliberations,” reported that Trump had asked the Pentagon to “prepare options for drawing down American troops in South Korea.” Maybe Trump was just being impulsive; maybe he was calling Uncle Moon’s bluff.

Reduced troop levels are not intended to be a bargaining chip in Mr. Trump’s talks with Mr. Kim about his weapons program, these officials said. But they acknowledged that a peace treaty between the two Koreas could diminish the need for the 28,500 soldiers currently stationed on the peninsula.

Mr. Trump has been determined to withdraw troops from South Korea, arguing that the United States is not adequately compensated for the cost of maintaining them, that the troops are mainly protecting Japan and that decades of American military presence had not prevented the North from becoming a nuclear threat.

His latest push coincides with tense negotiations with South Korea over how to share the cost of the military force. Under an agreement that expires at the end of 2018, South Korea pays about half the cost of the upkeep of the soldiers – more than $800 million a year. The Trump administration is demanding that it pay for virtually the entire cost of the military presence.

Of course, presidents ask for plans and options about a range of contingencies, and the media often sensationalize what’s merely sound planning for them. According to the Times, Trump’s request met with curiously mixed reactions “at the Pentagon and other agencies.” Some were “rattled” about what would be a major change in U.S. national security policy for Korea that might also legitimately worry Japan. There are also legitimate questions about making such a request right before a summit with Kim Jong-un, who is sure to demand it in the negotiations now. But the reaction wasn’t entirely critical.

Officials declined to say whether Mr. Trump was seeking options for a full or partial reduction of troops, though a full withdrawal was unlikely. They emphasized that rethinking the size and configuration of the American force was overdue, regardless of the sudden flowering of diplomacy with North Korea.

On Friday, John Bolton called that report “utter nonsense.” I don’t think it’s an idea we should reject out of hand. Later this week, I’ll make the case that South Korea’s greater vulnerability is psychological, not military. Maybe a South Korea without U.S. forces — provided our withdrawal gives South Korea sufficient time to reappraise its situation and rearm itself — would become stronger politically, more self-confident of its nationhood, and thus psychologically more capable of protecting itself, much as Israel does without U.S. forces on its soil, despite being surrounded by large, hostile neighbors.

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Update: Wow, that was fast:

Two progressive civic groups on Sunday called for a review of the character of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in line with the two Koreas’ efforts for reconciliation and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and Minbyun-Lawyers for a Democratic Society issued the call, with Seoul and Washington set to hold a third round of negotiations this week on sharing the cost for the upkeep of 28,500 American troops in the South.

“As (the two Koreas) are in the process of implementing the Panmunjom Declaration and establishing a peace regime, the character and size of the USFK, and the scope of its activities should be reviewed,” the two groups said in a joint statement.

The declaration was issued after South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held the historic summit at the truce village of Panmunjom on April 27. The two leaders agreed to reduce military tensions, improve bilateral cooperation and seek a formal end to the Korean War and a peace treaty.

After the landmark declaration, some experts have raised the possibility that cross-border peace efforts could test the relevance of the USFK, whose central role is to deter North Korean aggression and provocations.

Both the PSPD and Minbyun are far-left groups whose memberships are well represented in Moon Jae-in’s government. It seems unlikely to me that either would be taking such a position without Moon’s tacit encouragement. The PSPD has a long history of instigating anti-American protests, and Minbyun has effectively become Pyongyang’s resident law firm in South Korea, where they’ve recently taken to abusing the legal process to intimidate refugees. Both President Moon and former President Roh Moo-hyun were Minbyun members.

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1. Not really his relative at all, and not really crazy, either, but his long-time mentor, confidant, and lodestar.

2. I emphasize that it’s “normal” in Korea for both left-wing and right-wing parties to censor each other to some degree. Please feel free to browse this rich Corinthian archive of all my posts criticizing both left-wing and right-wing administrations for censorship. The difference is that we expect Korea’s right to be authoritarian, so liberal journalists tend to be on guard against it. That’s part of why the censorship of the left is the greater danger — first, because the foreign press and diplomats largely overlook it; second, because the left’s methods are more subtle; third, because Korea’s left is extremely adept at mobilizing large, peaceful street protests and instigating small, violent ones; fourth, because the left has a strong ethno-nationalist wind at its back; and finally, because all of this seems to be headed toward cooption by a system that’s ruthlessly totalitarian.

3. Only the President of the United States gets to do that.

4. Serious question: why was it wrong for Park Geun-hye to have an unofficial advisor but perfectly fine for Moon Jae-in to have one? Is it just because Choi Soon-sil was weirder than Moon Chung-in? Or is Moon Chung-in somehow “official,” yet not official?