Three Blind Men and an Elephant, Part I
I don’t mean “blind” in a perjorative way; I use the term to signify the studied opacity and manipulation that are so evident from visitor accounts to the country. This post, more than anything else, is about the difficulty of measuring economic and political trends in the North, and how the biases of the writer and those he speaks with can quickly lead from three small and different datasets to three wildly different conclusions. The course of North Korean society, in other words, depends on the aspect of North Korea you’ve been permitted to view. On careful examination, the differing impressions are partly explained by the different areas viewed by each of the writers.
The three reporters are all men for whom I have much respect, professionally speaking: James Brooke of the New York Times, Donald Macintyre of Time Asia, and Andrei Lankov, the Russian expert who writes for the Asia Times. All have been in North Korea recently, and no two of them came back with the same impression. Consider these impressions alongside those of Don Kirk, which I blogged here and here.
James Brooke, The New York Times
Writing for The New York Times, Brooke returns from just across the DMZ with glowing accounts of robust development, booming trade, and the construction of a new customs post. Brooke’s focus is mainly, but not exclusively, from the perspective of South Koreans trying to develop Kaesong, along with a variety of tourism schemes. North and South are cooperating on the opening of a new tourist and commercial corridor through the DMZ. Brooke, hardly one to be carried away with false enthusiasm for engagement, reports that cross-border traffic does appear to be on the rise, a strong contrast to reports of the traffic between Kaesong and Pyongyang, as we will see later.
Presumably, the vehicles on this new corridor will drive between armed North Korean pickets and remain almost completely isolated from ordinary North Koreans, as previously, but the South Koreans will remain as hermetically sealed from the real North Korea as ever. A little further down, we reach the heart of what’s spurring South Korea to new levels of urgency:
Behind some of this new push is fear in South Korea that North Korea could become an economic colony of China, North Korea’s largest trading partner. While South Korea is paying for rebuilding parts of North Korea’s railroads, a Chinese rail consortium has won access to the North’s entire rail network.
Brooke could well have added one more item to that list–North Korea’s purchase of all rights to use the Rajin harbor in the Northeast. The deal–a 50-year lease–promises to give China’s underdeveloped northeast its only direct access to a seaport. China also bought a concession to the railroad connecting Rajin with the Chinese border. I’ve heard other reports about growing Chinese military influence over the North, but those reports are harder to verify.
Some people, including people I respect very much, are very alarmed about this. I’m also concerned about Chinese intentions in the North, but I don’t share their sense of urgency. First, North Korea has a history of abrogating or unilaterally modifying the terms of its foreign contracts. Second, North Korea inevitably restricts investor access to such facilities so much that the facilities wither for lack of improvements and repairs. Third, I see no compelling reason why a post-Kim Jong Il government should recognize the terms of an odious agreement in which the North Korean people were essentially unrepresented, any more than South Korea should honor the terms agreed by Yi Wan Yong.
South Korean companies are also pushing forward with another potential source of profit–the slumming industry.
The corner of North Korea north of this port of entry is already well on the way to becoming a South Korean tourist playground. The giant Hyundai conglomerate’s inter-Korean business division, Hyundai Asan Corporation, is building golf courses, hotels, restaurants and a family reunion center, which will be able to accommodate half a million tourists a year. “North Korea is new to capitalism, but by working together we will improve their economy,” Byun Ha Jung, a Hyundai senior manager, said in this stretch of the 767-square-mile Mount Kumgang special tourism zone, a long sliver of beach and mountains, which starts just north of the demilitarized zone.
There would be nothing wrong with any of this if the North Korean people were going to see any of the profits, but they won’t. Meanwhile, in Kaesong, Brooke report solid progress:
One year after the first section of the Kaesong industrial park opened, 4,100 North Koreans now work for 15 South Korean companies. This fall, 25 more South Korean companies are building factories in the park, and 700 more are on a waiting list. Electricity comes from South Korea. Direct dial telephone service is being installed to link Kaesong with South Korea. Daily shuttle buses cross the demilitarized zone, carrying South Koreans between Seoul and Kaesong. Hyundai says the growth is continuing. By 2020, it hopes, Kaesong will have 600,000 North Koreans working for 2,000 South Korean companies, producing $16 billion worth of goods a year. President Roh Moo Hyun said 3,000 South Koreans now work in North Korea.
Better yet, Hyundai hopes, Kaesong will be a tourist spot. That, of course, would mean busloads of South Korean tourists in red visors, tall hiking socks, and LL Bean fishing vests walking all around in full view of the locals. So just how likely is that?
“Look at the line of trucks from the North,” said Gov. Sohn Hak Kyu of Kyonggi, the western province between Seoul and the demilitarized zone. Through a cleft in the fortified hills, South Korean trucks were delivering loads of construction sand. Heading north were busloads of engineers and foremen to run South Korean-owned factories in the Kaesong Industrial Park, seven miles north of the demilitarized zone. With cross-border traffic growing fast, workers are hurrying to complete by December a customs and immigration center on the South Korean side. Mr. Sohn is a conservative with presidential ambitions. His support for this piercing of the demilitarized zone is an indication that Seoul’s northern policy has bipartisan backing.
Well, I haven’t heard that Sohn is a contender, but I don’t dispute that plenty of mercenaries within the GNP would pursue engagement with the North without any burdensome conditions.