Category: NK Economics

North Korean Harvest Output Declines Again

Reports of short harvests have been perennial in North Korea since 1993, but the worst of the famine probably ended in 2000. Some credit the end of the famine to international food aid, but North Korea’s own restrictions on international food aid have kept most of it out since late 2005. That year, I predicted — wrongly — that the result would be another famine. Although the regime’s severe cutback on food aid certainly must have caused hardship for many...

Will North Korea’s Failure to Control Markets Mean the End of the Regime?

Reuters has a long round-up on the failure of the Great Confiscation, with this being the bottom line: “The collapse of the market system brought about by the currency revaluation produced rare civil uprisings. But the violence appears to have been sporadic and should fade as long as the North allows market activity to return.” Marcus Noland, catching up on the latest reports for the BBC, wonders if the failure of the Great Confiscation has damaged Kim Jong-Eun’s succession prospects....

Great Confiscation Updates and Aftermath; Demonstration Reported in Dancheon

It’s still premature to say that the North Korean regime has retreated in its attack on the system of markets, known as jangmadang, on which the majority of the people had come to depend since the collapse of the state distribution system in the 1990’s. The best available information — and the qualifiers to the aforementioned phrase should be obvious — suggests that the regime has decided against pressing the attack in certain specific places for now. For the time...

Marcus Noland on NPR: This Could Be “the Beginning of the End”

Speaking on the failure of North Korea’s attempt to reconsolidate state control over the economy, Noland concludes with this: The underlying political stability of that regime, I think, is starting to be called into question. Noland emphasizes how difficult it is to confirm reports of civil unrest in North Korea, but I think there’s sufficient evidence for us to conclude that North Koreans are questioning and challenging their government more openly than ever.

We Demand a Sacrifice! North Korea Purges Economic Official

[Update: Kushibo notes that North Korea has started lifting market restrictions. Rice prices and exchange rates have begun to stabilize. The confiscation is done, but does this mean the regime is backing down? That would mean that change is irreversible, and that the regime has just surrendered much of its control over the economy. And just to thank Kushibo for re-posting his comment after I stupidly deleted it, I’ll recommend you read his post on the sacking of Pak Nam-Ki....

Great Confiscation Updates: Hard Times in North Pyongan

Why did North Korea believe that it could reestablish a socialist economy despite international sanctions? According to Open News, the men in the palace were expecting a substantial infusion of sanctions-busting cash from the Chinese: North Korea expected to receive a financial aid of more than a hundred million yuans from china once the currency reform was in place, so that it provides better supply of goods. And, this is why North Korea had informed China of how and when...

The Great Confiscation Backfires, Badly

How can we tell that North Korea is in a state of self-inflicted economic chaos? When the regime can’t even conceal it from the barbarians. AFP, quoting an unidentified Western diplomat via Yonhap, reports that “[a]t the Koryo Hotel where many foreigners stay, the [North Korean won exchange] rate swung from 51 won to 120 in the space of a few hours on January 22.” Another report says that currently, prices in North Korea are “anyone’s guess” and that in...

Great Confiscation Updates: Current Trends Cannot Continue

The wire services continue to report that conditions just keep getting worse for North Koreans, but the latest dispatch from Good Friends adds extensive detail to the hyperinflation story, and how it’s affecting the ability of people to get food: This is the sort of reporting that Good Friends typically does well. We’re used to seeing North Korea’s corn-eaters going hungry, but I always watch for signs that the elite, the military, and other rice-eaters are sharing in the misery:...

Great Confiscation Update

From the Daily NK: A defector, who spoke with his family in North Hamkyung Province on Tuesday, reported the news to the Daily NK, “I called my family to send some money to them as I had heard they were in trouble, and they told me that the current situation is unspeakably terrible. They live only by bartering with others. He explained further, “For now, state-designated prices are still not public, so people think that selling goods for cash now...

North Korea Rejects Capitalism, Experiments with Luddism

Even for North Korea, this idea sounds too strange to be true: Therefore, Japanese cars are no where to be seen in North Korea. According to the source, Japanese cars are now supposed to be destroyed. Except, cars over 20 thousand tons, graters, and other weighty mechines will not be destroyed. These machines, however, willl only be operated at nights. [Open Radio] No doubt, this would do wonders for that “great and powerful socialist economy” the North Koreans are on...

Good Friends: North Korea Will Close Large Markets in Chongjin, Hamhung

Just minutes after reading of the sprawling Sunam Market in Chongjin, which she called North Korea’s largest market, my ADD got the best of me, I set aside the book, and clicked on Good Friends’s site, where I saw this: Soonam Market in Chungjin to be Closed in March North Korean authorities are to close down Soonam market in Chungjin, North Hamgyong Province in March following the shutdown of Pyongsung market in South Pyongan Province last June. The cabinet decided...

North Korea Descending Into Economic Chaos

I’ve long believed that functionally, there were two North Korean economies — a mostly capitalist (and to the U.N., illicit) “palace” economy that funds Kim Jong Il’s regime, and an increasingly capitalist (and to Kim Jong Il, illicit) “peoples’ economy” that rose from the ashes of the failed Public Distribution System. Some say that international food aid ended the Great Famine, a famine that may have killed millions of North Koreans. There is some truth in this, but international food...

Great Confiscation Updates: Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard on the Risk of Hyperinflation (Updated)

[Update:   Blaine Harden has a must-read story in the Washington Post:  “[T]he government’s action appears to have backfired, with potentially disastrous consequences in a country that is chronically short of food.  The black-market value of “new” won has reportedly plummeted against Chinese currency, spooking private traders who have pulled their goods out of markets. Outside economists say suspicion about the value of the won has made residents wary, increasing economic stagnation and worsening food shortages.”] In my in-box today...

North Korea’s Foreign Investment Strategy Explained

Reading of North Korea’s new plans for yet another trade zone, just as the Kaesong experiment collapses, must make some observers wonder what Kim Jong Il could be thinking: who could possibly expect to attract significant foreign investment with such uneven policies toward investment? My response: they don’t want to attract significant foreign investment. That would require some significant opening of their economy and the lowering of the state’s vigilance against the subversive power of ChocoPies. North Korea’s foreign investment...

North Korea’s New Currency Collapses

The Seoul-based Open Radio for North Korea (ORNK), citing unidentified sources along the Sino-North Korean border, said that merchants were exchanging one yuan for 1,000 new North Korean won as of late last month, plummeting from the 50 won traded for every yuan on Dec. 3, right after Pyongyang introduced the new currency. [Yonhap] If my math is right, that’s 1,000 percent in less than a month. Under the move, the communist country knocked two zeros off its currency without...

Great Confiscation Updates: Regime Turns Attention to Foreign Currency

The North Korean People’s Safety Agency has declared a “complete prohibition of foreign currency usage. The decree was issued on December 26th and went into effect on Monday 28th. A source inside North Hamkyung Province reported, “A People’s Safety Agency declaration on banning the use of U.S. dollars, Yuan and the Euro was publicized on the 26th. The declaration was posted in public places and in every workplace starting this morning. The title of the declaration is, “On punishing severely...

Great Confiscation Updates

The Washington Post’s Blaine Harden writes today that popular discontent over the Great Confiscation isn’t going away: It was an unexplained decision — the kind of command that for more than six decades has been obeyed without question in North Korea. But this time, in a highly unusual challenge to Kim’s near-absolute authority, the markets and the people who depend on them pushed back.  Grass-roots anger and a reported riot in an eastern coastal city pressured the government to amend...

Treasury Issues Alert on Another North Korean Bank

Just days after Stephen Bosworth’s mostly unproductive visit to Pyongyang (it was, despite much spin to the contrary) the Treasury Department has issued a financial advisory against one of North Korea’s largest banks, Kumgang Bank, for “[i]nvolvement in [i]llicit [f]inancial [a]ctivities,” based on “publicly available information.” You can read Treasury’s advisory in full here, but you’ll find it terse and otherwise lacking in detail about Kumgang’s transgressions. The advisory updates this broader advisory against North Korean financial institutions, issued following...