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MUST READ: ‘Finding America’s Role in a Collapsed North Korean State’

[Update:  Is this an invitation to Munich?  China promises to ”cooperate” with the West, but admits that it might move into North Korea to “restore order,” and for strictly humanitarian reasons, of course.  We all know what humanitarians rule the People’s Republic of China.]

Not a moment too soon, as the Red hordes mass to reclaim the Outer Koguryo Autonomous Zone, there is a much-needed advancement of the discussion of the future former North Korea.  It comes from U.S. Army Captain Jonathon Stafford in the latest Military Review (here, link opens in pdf).  Stafford offers us a military officer’s analysis of how the United States and South Korea ought to be preparing for the reconstruction of North Korea after Kim Jong Il goes to meet Ceausescu at the ash-heap, but aren’t. 

(You will note that CPT Stafford cites Richardson’s opinions and my own; that’s because he’s a reader and a friend.)

Reconstruction and post-collapse conflict avoidance is something that’s been given far too little thought, considering the stakes.  If a garrison in North Korea’s far north revolts tomorrow, would China move in to restore order?  Would they leave when the regime arrives to “restore order?”  Or if South Korean and American troops move in after the central government collapses?  Depending on how stabilization and reconstruction are planned and executed, North Korea could become either the Outer Koguryo Autonomous Zone or the scene of the first front of World War III, with Sinuiju playing the role of Danzig.

Here, in a nutshell, is what Stafford says the Pentagon and the Ministry of National Defense ought to be doing:

  • Recognizing that North Korea’s current trajectory isn’t sustainable;
  • Recognizing that China has designs on North Korea or its resources;
  • Planning for an occupation of North Korea using South Korean — not American — forces;
  • Coordinating logistical and financial support from the United States, Japan, and other allies;
  • Using information operations and the recruitment of refugees to gather human intelligence and influence the local population;
  • Planning, in meticulous detail, how we will feed, shelter, and otherwise provide for 23 million citizens in a failed state.

Above all, Stafford stresses the need for us to have clear plans to avoid chaos and mass migrations that would justify a Chinese occupation.  Essential to this is careful planning, training, and pre-positioning equipment, materials, and people that will be needed for the post-collapse humanitarian crisis.  It will also require some effective diplomacy, public and otherwise (and if that depresses you, it should).

A cynic might suggest another course:  why not let China wade into the North Korean morass?  Politically, it will allow Lee Myung Bak to refocus Korea’s inexhaustible reservoir of nationalist enmity against China.  North Korea would cost a fortune to rebuild and is one big arms room waiting to be looted.  Its regime has spent the last five decades teaching its people to be xenophobes and kill foreign occupiers.  I don’t doubt that China has some degree of ambition in North Korea.  The more interesting question is whether China’s military, political, and economic system could handle the strain of occupying North Korea if the North Koreans don’t welcome them in. 

lankov said,

January 8, 2008 @ 11:57 pm

I am sorry to say, but I increasingly think like this. But when Chinese ask my opinion (as they sometimes do), being an honest cynic, I tell them: “Do not get there, you’ll find yourself in trouble very soon”. The reconstruction will be a mess, and a lot of people will get hurt even under the best possible scenarios, so everybody who will be in charge of post-Kim Korea is likely to be discredited. So I sometimes think that it will be good (not for Chinese) if Chinese “volunteer” to do dirty work. And if it will be Americans who get involved, they should keep low profile, since Korean nationalism can easily make them the primary target of politically useful scapegoating. No ,matter how many billions they will spend.

But it’s good people start thinking about it, finally. Perhaps, two things are vital for preparations: creating non-Kim elite from among defectors, and educating North Koreans about the outside world and modern society (radio broadcasts, video materails etc.)

lankov said,

January 8, 2008 @ 11:57 pm

I am sorry to say, but I increasingly think like this. But when Chinese ask my opinion (as they sometimes do), being an honest cynic, I tell them: “Do not get there, you’ll find yourself in trouble very soon”. The reconstruction will be a mess, and a lot of people will get hurt even under the best possible scenarios, so everybody who will be in charge of post-Kim Korea is likely to be discredited. So I sometimes think that it will be good (not for Chinese) if Chinese “volunteer” to do dirty work. And if it will be Americans who get involved, they should keep low profile, since Korean nationalism can easily make them the primary target of politically useful scapegoating. No ,matter how many billions they will spend.

But it’s good people start thinking about it, finally. Perhaps, two things are vital for preparations: creating non-Kim elite from among defectors, and educating North Koreans about the outside world and modern society (radio broadcasts, video materails etc.)

lankov said,

January 8, 2008 @ 11:58 pm

I am sorry to say, but I increasingly think like this. But when Chinese ask my opinion (as they sometimes do), being an honest cynic, I tell them: “Do not get there, you’ll find yourself in trouble very soon”. The reconstruction will be a mess, and a lot of people will get hurt even under the best possible scenarios, so everybody who will be in charge of post-Kim Korea is likely to be discredited. So I sometimes think that it will be good (not for Chinese) if Chinese “volunteer” to do dirty work. And if it will be Americans who get involved, they should keep low profile, since Korean nationalism can easily make them the primary target of politically useful scapegoating. No matter how many billions they will spend.

But it’s good people start thinking about it, finally. Perhaps, two things are vital for preparations: creating non-Kim elite from among defectors, and educating North Koreans about the outside world and modern society (radio broadcasts, video materails etc.)

Jack said,

January 9, 2008 @ 2:21 am

Great post Joshua. There is not much else to say.

Joshua said,

January 9, 2008 @ 7:32 am

Andrei, I see you’re having trouble with the comments. I’m sorry about that. Sometimes it takes a while for comments to appear because of the spam filter. Thank you for your observations — wise and informed, as always.

Tukhachevsky said,

January 9, 2008 @ 2:36 pm

Excellent posting Joshua. Another name for the Outer Koguryo Autonomous Zone could be the “Greater Bohai (Balhae) Autonomous Economic Development Zone” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balhae)?

Dark humor aside, what worries me is the thought that when NK ultimately collapses (or implodes) we will have concerned citizens around the world chanting “if only the world had known sooner about the camps we would have done something” and/or blame the US for not sending enough aid fast enough.

Bearing in mind the decades of NK’s xenophobic propaganda, I doubt the Peace Corps will send volunteers to NK because they would be “softer” targets than USFK personnel. I know you get this question a lot about NK human rights organizations and charities, but what charities and organizations do you recommend for those who want to help “prepare” for the end game?

Joshua said,

January 9, 2008 @ 2:48 pm

I wish there were someone I could recommend. I think the ICRC will end up being the only charity with the resources to have much impact. In all likelihood, it’s going to be militaries that do the literal heavy lifting, since the country’s roads, ports, and railroads are too decayed to handle the traffic.

usinkorea said,

January 10, 2008 @ 1:10 pm

A question for Dr. Lankov (and anybody else who is uptodate on China’s thinking and familiar with the North)….

How likely is armed violence against Chinese occupation forces

and how likely would it be against South Korean forces?

My guess, with the little information I have on China today, and what I know about North Korean history, leads me to believe Chinese forces would find continous trouble with insurgency freedom fighters even if they moved into North Korea unopposed by the US, UN, SK, and whoever.

Little things—- like having read once that students at Pyongyang University couldn’t read the works of Lenin or Marx without special permission from the government —— tend to make me believe China will end up not as unwelcome as the evil Americans — but violently unwelcome nonetheless.

I would think only South Koreans have a chance of working with North Koreans with minimal violence once the regime is fully collapsed.

That is why this article makes perfect sense but might not be a great blueprint for handling other trouble spots in the future.

Nobody has been so successful at demonizing the outside world as a whole as North Korea.

Tukhachevsky said,

January 10, 2008 @ 1:54 pm

“Nobody has been so successful at demonizing the outside world as a whole as North Korea.”

usinkorea: Sad, but true.

I apologize that I keep asking questions, but one thing that has been in the back of my mind for some time is: What will be the costs (emotional and financial) of “de-programming” North Korean citizens to: (1) help them let go of their “DPRK vs. the world” mindset, (2) let go of their visceral anti-Americanism, (3) help them adjust to life in the 21st century, and (4) accepting that their government routinely lied to them for more than 60 years? I have read articles that focus on the lives of North Koreans adjusting to life in South Korea, but how do you help an entire country? I think the world will have to keep an open wallet and an open heart for many years to see this through. I am not a specialist in human psychology, but I think it will be a challenge for the world like no other.

Tukhachevsky said,

January 10, 2008 @ 2:50 pm

“Nobody has been so successful at demonizing the outside world as a whole as North Korea.”

usinkorea: Sad, but true.

I apologize that I keep asking questions, but one thing that has been in the back of my mind for some time is: What will be the costs (emotional and financial) of “educating” North Korean citizens to: (1) help them let go of their “DPRK vs. the world” mindset, (2) let go of their visceral anti-Americanism, (3) help them adjust to life in the 21st century, and (4) accepting that their government routinely lied to them for more than 60 years? I have read articles that focus on the lives of North Koreans adjusting to life in South Korea, but how do you help an entire country to adjust? I think the world will have to keep an open wallet and an open heart for many years to see this through. I am not a specialist in human psychology, but I think it will be a challenge for the world like no other.

usinkorea said,

January 11, 2008 @ 10:37 am

We have at least three hopes - small but at least hopes.

1. That the ingrained habit of the idea of total obediance to the state will cause North Koreans post-collapse to be more manageable than we might imagine. (This seems to have been what happened in Japan after WWII).

2. That North Koreans become so antagonistic to their government that they rally around outsiders (like South Koreans) who come in to help overthrow it.

3. That the complete brainwashing of the juche religion coupled with the total failure of such a despotic state will leave such a mammoth hunger for salvation that when collapse comes, North Koreans will seek outside knowledge and faiths and ideologies to fill the void the lies have left.

Koreans have historically shown such a hunger for Christianity — like in the Hermit Kingdom period that has parallels to today - and like today with the underground church in NK and among refugees in China and refugees who make it to South Korea.

……and that is certainly an avenue into conditioning for the collapse that the US government could and should be working on right now…

My guess is we’ll have to wait a couple of generations before North Korea becomes managable, however.

The only way I can realistically picture a “successful” handling of the North after collapse is by relying on the South for that couple of generations.

Gillian said,

January 11, 2008 @ 6:18 pm

This has recently been released from the CSIS: Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor.” China’s plans in case of an emergency in North Korea. Well worth a read…. a downloadable PDF file option is available.
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4255/type,1/

Synopsis:
This report is based on discussions with Chinese specialists on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) during a CSIS-USIP delegation visit to Beijing, Changchun, and Yanji, June 25-30, 2007. Topics discussed included trends in North Korea’s economy and prospects for reform; current trends in Sino-DPRK economic relations; China’s policy toward North Korea in the wake of the nuclear test; Chinese debates on North Korea; Chinese assessments of North Korea’s political stability; and potential Chinese responses to instability.

This Working Paper was commissioned by the Korea Working Group (KWG) at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The KWG brings together the leading North Korea watchers from the government and think tank communities to discuss pressing policy issues in the political, security, social, and economic fields.

The Chair of the KWG is Ambassador Richard Solomon, President of the U.S. Institute of Peace. The Director is John S. Park, a Northeast Asia specialist in the Institute’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention.

Gillian said,

January 11, 2008 @ 6:37 pm

The CSIS recently released this report: Keeping and eye on an unruly neighbor,” dealing with China’s plans should a crisis arise in N. Korea. Well worth a read…..
http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4255/type,1/

Synopsis:
This report is based on discussions with Chinese specialists on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) during a CSIS-USIP delegation visit to Beijing, Changchun, and Yanji, June 25-30, 2007. Topics discussed included trends in North Korea’s economy and prospects for reform; current trends in Sino-DPRK economic relations; China’s policy toward North Korea in the wake of the nuclear test; Chinese debates on North Korea; Chinese assessments of North Korea’s political stability; and potential Chinese responses to instability.

This Working Paper was commissioned by the Korea Working Group (KWG) at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The KWG brings together the leading North Korea watchers from the government and think tank communities to discuss pressing policy issues in the political, security, social, and economic fields.

The Chair of the KWG is Ambassador Richard Solomon, President of the U.S. Institute of Peace. The Director is John S. Park, a Northeast Asia specialist in the Institute’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention.

Joshua said,

January 11, 2008 @ 11:42 pm

Gillian, this looks very interesting. Thank you.

OneFreeKorea » What Should the Senate Ask Kathleen Stephens? said,

April 3, 2008 @ 11:38 am

[…] Let me open the bidding by asking what Ms. Stephens, as Ambassador, would do to address outrages like this. I’d like to know how high a priority Ms. Stephens would make of dusting off OPLAN 5029 in light of the unfolding untergang in Pyongyang (pst - I know someone who would make a fine military attache). And I’d like to know what role she had in the State Department’s blocking of the North Korean Human Rights Act, most vividly illustrated by the disgraceful behavior of our Consul in Shenyang. […]

More Reports of Chinese Troop Increases on North Korean Border said,

November 21, 2008 @ 9:10 am

[…] US forces moving into North Korea would only legitimize any Chinese action into North Korea plus cause a host of other issues such as causing the North Korean population to question the legitimacy of the South Korean government.  North Koreans have been brought up since the day they were born on anti-US propaganda saying the South Koreans are just puppets of the Americans and any US occupation force into North Korea would only confirm this in the minds of North Koreans.  It will be imperative after any regime collapse to establish the legitimacy of the South Korean government with the people of North Korea and any US intervention force will greatly compromise this. […]

KCJ said,

November 26, 2008 @ 11:03 pm

Jamestown Foundation’s China experts have a very detailed, insightful report on PRC/PLA contingency plans and options for the succession of leadership in the DPRK. Their report includes possible factions within an ascendant military around the traditional divide between those who see Beijing as either friend or foe. This paragraph really got my attention:

“More specifically, the source of KPA’s political power is institutionalized along two parallel lines. The first line is the regular command structure of the KPA. This consists of field armies and garrison troops. Most senior officers are loyal followers of Kim but relations are less personal in comparison with the second line of commanders who manage Kim’s security units. They actually form the inner circle of the military clique serving as the “big brother in the back” in the KPA. Kim is highly dependent on their loyalty to execute his succession plan since they also maintain close contact with his sons. These units are a subsystem within the KPA, responsible only to Kim, although theoretically their superiors are those in the formal structure of command. The biggest uncertainty is whether there is any powerful figure in the current DPRK leadership who can prevent the strife between these two camps of top brass. If there is not one, then civil war might be a real possibility.”

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=korea&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5229&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=bb09abec1f

I knew there were risks of disunity and regionalism in the wake of a DPRK collapse; I did not know that the military itself is divided on relations with the PRC in either scenario (unforced collapse or struggle for power upon KJI’s expiration).

This makes the role of the ROK even more dicey…

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