The Death of an Alliance, Part 30

Now, we reach the fundamentals. What, then, is the enduring purpose of this alliance? Let me throw down every reasonable alternative, and we’ll pick them apart one at a time.

What are the interests of South Korea and the United States?

1. It’s in the interests of the United States for the region to be peaceful and for trade to flow freely . . .
2. . . . with the notable exception of weapons of mass murder, dope, and counterfeit currency.
3. It’s also in the interests of the United States to check the spread of Chinese influence, although a Chinese invasion of South Korea seems rather unlikely (particularly given China’s growing political and economic influence in the South).
4. Ultimately, it’s in the interests of the United States to protect democracy in South Korea and Japan.
5. It’s also in the interests of the United States to assist the rise of a democratic opposition in China and North Korea, because the success of such a movement could contribute greatly to the aforementioned goals.

South Korea’s perception of its own interests is harder to understand.

1. Paradoxically, South Korea appears to seek good relations only with those regional powers that represent a military threat to it–China and North Korea–out of an apparent belief that this will protect its security.
2. At the same time, South Korea still wants the insurance of reasonably good relations with the United States, because it realizes that “independent defense” will be expensive, and that South Korean voters are not ready for a significant lowering of the nation’s defenses.
3. Above all, South Korea wants free trade with everyone and low taxes at home, and its policies subordinate security concerns to economic ones.
4. On a less rational level, South Korea’s current leaders have found the exploitation of anti-American and anti-Japanese sentiment to be politically expedient. It may well be that in South Korea’s current political climate, rational reasons trail behind emotional ones.

Now, reread those two short paragraphs, and ask yourself whether the presence of U.S. ground forces–or U.S. forces overall–contributes to each goal. In other words, why have the alliance? For the United States, only Objective 1 is substantially advanced by the current forces structure, and the current form of USFK, the diplomatic leverage its presence gives to South Korea, actually inhibits the achievements of Objectives 3 and 5. For South Korea, the presence of USFK in its current form advances Objectives 2, 3, and 4, and inhibits its achievement of Objective 1. Let’s examine the reasons for USFK’s existence in more detail:

1. To protect South Korea from a North Korean invasion. The problem with this theory is that South Korea’s military and economy are–or should be–capable of defending the country from this highly unlikely event without the help of U.S. ground forces, and probably with no U.S. help at all. Does anyone really believe a North Korean invasion is likely anymore, particularly given North Korea’s stunning progress toward achieving its goals in the South politically? Does anyone believe that the North Korean economic and political system could endure more than two weeks of forward-deployed fighting? Does anyone think that the North Korean military could conquer the South in less than that? Of course, the North Korean military could do great damage to the South, but in this day of precision weapons, it couldn’t win using its standard battle doctrine of armored, mechanized assault. That’s particularly true given the decrepit condition of North Korea’s air force. Even its armor is mostly of 1960’s vintage and consists of lower-quality Chinese copies of older Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers.

2. The Tripwire Theory. This boils down to using American soldiers as human shields, meaning any North Korean attack on South Korea would also kill Americans, theoretically assuring a U.S. commitment to defeating the North. The theory is more political than military, and rests on several flawed or outdated assumptions. There’s no question that U.S. forces lend South Korea a high deterent value, but in today’s political climate, not as many observers have considered that large U.S. facilities could be an attractive target for a direct North Korean attack on U.S. forces. This actually deters the United States from a limited or preemptive strike as much as it deters North Korea, a fact that has not been missed by South Korea. Nor is U.S. deterrence of a North Korean attack aided by keeping 32,000 American necks in the North Korean guillotine. U.S. air and naval power are the real deterrent value of Pacific Command today. Worse, the presence of so many U.S. ground forces in Korea virtually assures high U.S. casualties during the first days of a war, which would impose a terrific political cost on U.S. assistance to South Korea. Thus, the United States would actually be a better position to support South Korea’s defense if most of its forces were out of North Korean range, such as in Guam, Hawaii, Japan, or Ft. Lewis. The obvious disadvantage (for Korea) of the USFK moving to safer quarters is that it gives the United States the option of non-participation, say, in the event China is attacking Taiwan at the moment. But that’s what countries do–they assess their own interests and act accordingly.

3. To sustain the vibrancy of the South Korean economy by keeping its defense budget low, with U.S. taxpayers picking up the tab. See Part 29. South Korea’s advanced, prosperous economy is far beyond the point of fragile dependency on the United States. This is contrary to the political, military, and economic interests of the United States, and Korean anti-Americanism has exhausted the U.S. good will that once made this a factor of any significance.

4. To allow the United States to project power in the region in the event of a “contingency.” It’s the only real U.S. interest that I can articulate for maintaining a robust USFK. So what are the reasonably likely “contingencies?” We’ve discussed a North Korean attack. A more likely event would be a civil war in North Korea, which would involve a partial regime collapse, large refugee flows, and the possibility of loose nukes. Another possibility is some kind of aggressive action by China, most likely against Taiwan. A third and growing possibility is a partial regime collapse or civil war inside China itself, where rural uprising are growing rapidly in frequency, size, and ferocity. Unfortunately, South Korea seems determined to deny the United States the strategic flexibility to use its own Korean-based forces to advance its own interests:

Evans Revere, U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs told a seminar co-sponsored by the Chosun Ilbo the dreaded “strategic flexibility” his government envisages for the U.S. Forces in Korea would also mean that American troops stationed elsewhere in the region can hurry to Korea in an emergency; and Victor Cha, the White House National Security Council Asia director, said pretty much the same things to back up his contention that strategic flexibility “is not a one-way street.

These American explanations are profoundly at odds with what our own government has told us strategic flexibility is all about. President Roh Moo-hyun said in March, “What is certain is that our people will not be embroiled in conflicts in Northeast Asia against our will. This is a firm principle on which the country cannot yield.” That remark was interpreted as a clear objection to turning the USFK into a regional expeditionary force, and Chong Wa Dae even dubbed it the “Roh Moo-hyun doctrine.”

The government has thus far highlighted only its objections to deploying the USFK in conflicts in Northeast Asia, but kept mum on the trade-off that American soldiers from elsewhere could be shipped to the Korean Peninsula if they are needed. That has given rise to a perception that strategic flexibility means nothing but sacrifices for Korea to secure U.S. interests. There is a need to find out if we were deliberately misled, if it was a result of ignorance, or whether there was something else involved that we don’t know about.

I’m not suggesting that Korea should set itself up to be dragged into World War III. Korea will assess its own interests and act accordingly, just as the United States should. In fact, South Korea’s former National Security Advisor and current Unification Minister Lee Jeong-Seok did just that, and as a result, South Korea’s President essentially declared South Korea a neutral state without so much as consulting its long-time protector. Korea is free to make that decision, but doesn’t that dramatic strategic shift suggest that the United States should also reassess its own interests? I like the way Rep. Jim Leach, a very moderate Republican, put it recently:

U.S. House Representative and Chairman of the East Asia Pacific Subcommittee Jim Leach said it would be unwise for Korea to thoughtlessly toss aside its alliance with the United States at the beginning of the 21st century after it played such a decisive role in its political and economic security in the 20th. While it might bring short-term political benefits to put some distance between Seoul and Washington in the name of independence, in the long-term the policy was questionable, he said. Leach said a healthy alliance did not diminish but strengthen the sovereignty of both partners.

Of course, Rep. Leach is American, not Korean. It may be that the interests of Korea and the United States, as the elected and appointed leaders of both countries currently assess them, have diverged to the point of incompatability. Wallpapering of this kind can’t conceal the stress cracks for long:

Korea”as an ally, fully understands the rationale for the transformation of the U.S. global military strategy, and respects the necessity for strategic flexibility of the USFK,” the two top diplomats said in a joint statement in Washington. In return, “the U.S. respects Korea’s position that they will not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.

Can anyone imagine a likely regional conflict that wouldn’t be against the will of the Korean people, as anti-American, pro-North Korean regime, and pro-Chinese regime as they’ve become recently? If the erstwhile allies can’t articulate a common vision for a military alliance, why not dispense with all the airfare and bile, and simply wind it down on the best possible terms?