MUST READ: ‘Finding America’s Role in a Collapsed North Korean State’

[Update:   Is this an invitation to Munich?  China promises to  “cooperate” with the West, but admits that it might move into North Korea to “restore order,” and for strictly humanitarian reasons, of course.  We all know what humanitarians rule the People’s Republic of China.]

Not a moment too soon, as the Red hordes mass to  reclaim the Outer  Koguryo Autonomous  Zone, there is a much-needed advancement of the discussion of the future former North Korea.  It comes  from  U.S. Army Captain Jonathon Stafford in the latest Military Review (here, link opens in pdf).  Stafford offers us a military officer’s  analysis of how the United States and South Korea  ought to  be  preparing for  the reconstruction of  North  Korea after  Kim Jong Il goes to meet Ceausescu at the ash-heap, but aren’t. 

(You will note that CPT  Stafford cites Richardson‘s opinions and my own; that’s because he’s a reader and a friend.)

Reconstruction and post-collapse conflict avoidance is something that’s been given far too little thought, considering the stakes.   If a garrison in North Korea’s far north revolts tomorrow, would China move in to restore order?  Would they leave when the regime arrives to “restore order?”  Or if South Korean and American troops move in after the central government collapses?  Depending on how stabilization and reconstruction are planned and executed, North Korea could become either the Outer Koguryo Autonomous Zone or the scene of the first front of  World War III, with Sinuiju playing the role of Danzig.

Here, in a nutshell, is what Stafford says the Pentagon and the Ministry of National Defense ought to be doing:

  • Recognizing that North Korea’s current trajectory isn’t sustainable;
  • Recognizing that China has designs  on North Korea or  its resources;
  • Planning for  an occupation of North Korea using South Korean — not American — forces;
  • Coordinating logistical and financial support from the United States, Japan, and other allies;
  • Using information operations and the recruitment of refugees to gather human intelligence and influence the local population;
  • Planning, in meticulous detail, how we will feed, shelter, and otherwise provide for 23 million citizens in a failed state.

Above all, Stafford stresses the need for us to have clear plans to avoid chaos and mass migrations that would justify a Chinese occupation.  Essential to this is careful planning, training,  and pre-positioning equipment, materials, and people that will be needed for the post-collapse humanitarian crisis.  It will also require some effective diplomacy, public and otherwise (and if that depresses  you, it should).

A cynic might suggest another course:  why not let China wade into the North Korean morass?  Politically, it will allow Lee Myung Bak to refocus Korea’s inexhaustible reservoir of nationalist enmity against China.  North Korea would cost a fortune to rebuild and  is  one big arms room waiting to be looted.  Its regime has spent the last five decades teaching its people to be xenophobes and kill foreign occupiers.   I don’t doubt that China has  some degree of ambition in North Korea.   The more interesting question is whether China’s military, political, and economic system could handle the strain of occupying North Korea if the North Koreans  don’t welcome them in.