What I Think of the Bilateral Talks Talk

I’ve let much of the sturm and drang over the announcement of a bilateral meeting with the North Koreans pass while I tried to acquire a sense of what this really means, and whether it necessarily suggests that Obama’s not-bad North Korea policy is going to revert to something weaker, something ironically like the policy George W. Bush ultimately adopted, and which failed so completely to achieve American interests.

Conservatives have gotten into the habit of opposing bilateral talks with North Korea and insisting that talks be in a multilateral forum, as nearly as I can figure, because (a) North Korea wants them for prestige and other reasons, (b) it furthers North Korea’s divide-and-extort strategy, and (c) because we get stuck paying most of the extortion. The big test of a multilateral forum was the six-party talks that George W. Bush insisted on while he was being denounced as a unilateralist by just about everyone, including the South Korean government which was thereby suggesting that it should be cut out of the discussion.

It’s really not the talks themselves we fear; it’s what they might lead to that we fear. I believe the fear is healthy, but I don’t think it’s necessarily justified … yet.

Let’s unpack the conservative argument on bilateral talks, point by point. Point (a) looks rather moot when Kim Jong Il can snap his fingers, summon Bill Clinton, and (despite Clinton’s denials) engage in substantive discussions just weeks after a nuke test. Frankly, Bush himself was willing to subvert the process by sending Chris Hill to talk to the North Koreans on the sidelines of the 6PT, or by meeting them in Berlin, or via the so-called “New York channel.” The sheer abundance of bilateral talks during the Bush Administration suggests that what Obama is doing now is hardly a departure from past practice. Obama’s people are insisting that these talks are only about returning to multilateral talks, and so far, nothing I see contradicts that message.

Point (b) is about keeping a united front with the South Koreans and Japanese, and about preventing China and Russia from double-dealing us. But did it work out that way in practice? Certainly the South Koreans, the Russians, and the Chinese continued talking to the North Koreans, supplying aid, undermining sanctions, propping up the regime, and generally giving them every reason not to take the talks seriously throughout Bush’s presidency, despite his increasingly superficial insistence on a multilateral forum. Eventually, his jarring reversal on Agreed Framework II would be seen as a total surprise and betrayal by the Japanese, and it would leave the South Koreans looking at us with a blend of dismay and pity. The damage to America’s position in Japan from that reversal is probably still considerable. The key, then, is not so much who is present but what is said, and how closely we coordinate with nations that are (for the moment) allied to us. I’m not hearing either through published sources or elsewhere that the South Koreans are panicking about this. Yes, they’re probably wary, but so far, they seem to be taking the Obama Administration’s “talks-about-talks” line at face value. For the moment, I’m more worried that North Korea will find a weak link in Japan’s new Prime Minister, and as I predicted, they’re probing for one.

Point (c) is a based on the pattern of 1994, but since then, we’ve seen that China and South Korea were willing and able to keep Kim Jong Il alive and supplied with luxuries and arms without much contribution from us. The problem isn’t really avoiding the bill; the problem is keeping other nations from undermining the pressure that will be necessary to achieving disarmament.

Where this leaves me is that the shape of the table matters much less than what’s said over it, and what’s passed under it. Throughout the entire Bush presidency, we adhered to the facade of a “united front” strategy while every one of the other parties, save Japan, was double-crossing us. Frankly, a united front might be an easier thing to hold together if there were some more mutuality in the fear of betrayal by those who’ve previously betrayed us.

The focus, of course, shouldn’t be about talks at all. I don’t know of a single intelligent person in or out of government who really believes the North Koreans will ever keep an agreement to disarm without being brought to the brink of regime collapse (or, for that matter, even if they are). The focus should instead be on financial and political pressure on the regime itself, and thus, the most important thing is to keep the Chinese, Russians, South Koreans, and Japanese from undermining that pressure. We have levers against each of those countries that will allow us to do that (see my Plan B page for more on that), but what matters most to me is that I don’t see any signs that the economic pressure is being relaxed. And if the message Bosworth carries to the North Koreans is “disarm or prepare for extinction,” I don’t see how we’ve done ourselves much harm.

Below the fold, some excerpts from State Department briefings on this (thanks to a friend), and an odd vignette in the Ling-Lee saga.

September 14, 2009

QUESTION: On North Korea, at the end of last month, P.J. said from the podium that there was no formal invite to Bosworth from North Korea to engage in talks. And then, this past Friday, he stated that there’s an invite that’s being considered.

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: Can you give us more information on when this invite actually came in, the context, through what channel ““ kind of clear it up a little bit for us?

MR. KELLY: Yeah. I don’t know if I can give you an exact chronology. Well, I know I can’t give you an exact chronology standing right here. But it was fairly ““ the invitation came fairly recently. The topic of this invitation for Ambassador Bosworth to go to Pyongyang was discussed in the ““ during the recent trip of Ambassador Bosworth and Ambassador Kim to the region. They discussed this with their counterparts in the Six-Party Talks. But no decision has been made as to whether or not we will accept this invitation for him to go to visit Pyongyang.

QUESTION: Well, it’s been a ““ it’s not that recently. It’s been, like, several weeks or a month, hasn’t it, since the invitation came in? And didn’t you initially decide not to send Bosworth because they wanted to talk about just direct talks between the United States and North Korea, and not within the Six-Party context?

MR. KELLY: Well —

QUESTION: So has it been amended? Has the invitation been amended, or the topic? Was it —

MR. KELLY: I’m not aware that it’s been amended. I mean, I think it was a fairly simple, informal invitation that they’re willing to talk to Ambassador Bosworth.

QUESTION: But it wasn’t about going back to the Six-Party Talks; am I correct?

MR. KELLY: No.

QUESTION: It was about a bilateral dialogue?

MR. KELLY: Right.

QUESTION: Which is why you didn’t send Bosworth when ““ why you didn’t accept the invitation?

MR. KELLY: Yeah. I mean, what we’ve said all along is that we will not have any substantive bilateral talks with North Korea that’s outside of the Six-Party context, that our goal is to get North Korea to return to the Six-Party context, Six-Party Talks. And Ambassador Bosworth went out ““ Ambassador Bosworth and Ambassador Kim went out to the region, met with their counterparts to talk about the various avenues that we have to get North Korea to return to those talks. And one of the things they talked about was this invitation.

QUESTION: You said informal invitation.

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: Yes. And from whom? I mean —

MR. KELLY: I mean, yeah, I don’t have the ““ I don’t have the answer to that, I’m afraid. And I don’t know if I’ll be able to get you the answer to that.

Yes. Also on North Korea? Any ““ yes.

QUESTION: Secretary Clinton yesterday had lunch with Laura Ling and her family.

MR. KELLY: Uh-huh.

QUESTION: And what was the purpose of this luncheon? Was it first time that Secretary Clinton met with this reporter after they were released from Pyongyang?

MR. KELLY: No, she met with them very soon after they returned. She met with them in her office. And she did have lunch with them, but it was very much a private, personal lunch.

QUESTION: Well, but what was the purpose of the lunch? I mean —

MR. KELLY: Private and personal.

QUESTION: So it was a social lunch?

MR. KELLY: Well ““ (laughter). It was a private and personal lunch.

QUESTION: Well, but if you have two people that were hostage or that were detained in North Korea, and they’re coming in and having —

MR. KELLY: Yeah. It wasn’t a debrief, if that’s what you’re —

QUESTION: What’s that?

MR. KELLY: It wasn’t a debrief, if that’s what you’re implying. She did have a formal sitdown with them right after they returned.

QUESTION: Well, I mean, but what was the purpose of the lunch?

MR. KELLY: She was invited to lunch and she accepted the invitation.

QUESTION: So they invited her to lunch?

MR. KELLY: Well, I ““ again, it was private and personal.

QUESTION: One more question?

MR. KELLY: Yes.

September 15, 2009

QUESTION: Any update on either Ambassador Bosworth or any other U.S. representative meeting with the North Koreans?

MR. KELLY: As I said yesterday, Ambassador Bosworth came back from the region after having consulted with our Six-Party partners. He’s had a chance to debrief the Secretary. But we haven’t made any ““

QUESTION: Not all of the Six-Party partners.

MR. KELLY: Yeah. With our four-party ““ with our four partners. And —

QUESTION: I’m sorry. I don’t think he saw the Russian, did he?

QUESTION: He didn’t see the Russians, but he saw the —

MR. KELLY: No, but Ambassador Kim saw the Russian. Yeah.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. KELLY: And so ““ but no decisions have been made about where to go with ““ in terms of the invitation from the North Koreans for —

QUESTION: What are you guys waiting for? Now that a consensus has been built among your other partners, that you guys are ready for temporary brief bilateral talks as a way to get them back to the Six-Party table, talk about nukes, what are you waiting for? You’ve got the invitation from Bosworth. Why not just accept it ““ (inaudible) Bosworth?

MR. KELLY: Well, Ambassador Bosworth had a chance to go out there, as did Ambassador Kim, and consult with our partners. And there will be a deliberation, an interagency deliberation, on the next steps. And we’ll see where we go from there.

QUESTION: So you ““ so an interagency deliberation on the next steps? I thought you’ve already come to the conclusion that you’re going to ““ you said the other day that you’re going to talk to North Korea. So then why do you need an interagency discussion to discuss the fact that you’re already agreeing to talk to talk to them?

MR. KELLY: Well, we need to ““ Ambassador Bosworth has come back. We need to collect all the information that he’s gotten from these talks, and Ambassador Kim got from talking to his counterpart, and then we’ll make our decisions.

QUESTION: But I’m confused, because you’ve said that you’re willing to talk to the North Koreans. I mean, how much latitude does this special envoy for North Korea have, if you have to go through an ““ if you’ve already decided that you’re going to talk to him, and now you’re going to have to go through an interagency deliberation?

MR. KELLY: We always have to go through interagency deliberation.

QUESTION: Well, I know that there are certain times that you have interagency deliberations, but how come he doesn’t have any latitude to accept an invitation when you’ve already said that you’re willing to talk to North Korea?

MR. KELLY: Well, we’re willing to talk to North Korea only insofar as it advances our goal of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And we believe the best way to do that is by a multilateral process and the best forum for that is the Six-Party Talks.

QUESTION: Yes, we know that.

MR. KELLY: Yeah.

QUESTION: But you’ve already said that you’re willing to talk to them to get them to go back. So what else do you need to discuss?

MR. KELLY: We need to have an interagency deliberation.

QUESTION: On what?

MR. KELLY: On this. On what Ambassador Bosworth and Ambassador Kim came back with.

QUESTION: I thought ““ I mean, it sounded like when you said yesterday or the day before that you’re willing to North Korea, that you already did that.

MR. KELLY: No, we have not done that yet. We will do that.

QUESTION: Ian?

MR. KELLY: Yes, go ahead. I’ll get back to you.

QUESTION: Tomorrow, Hatoyama’s cabinet will be sworn in. And last week, they officially announced that they were going to reexamine the 2006 bilateral agreement. Will the U.S. be willing to renegotiate this agreement?

MR. KELLY: I’m sorry, which cabinet is being sworn in?

QUESTION: Hatoyama’s cabinet in Japan.

MR. KELLY: Uh-huh. Well, of course, we’ll look forward to working with the government once it’s formed. We have a very vigorous and important bilateral relationship with Japan. And we look forward to working with it, once it’s sworn in. I know that the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell plans to go out there ““ plans to go out there. I think he’ll be out there by September 17, by Thursday. So he looks forward, of course, to continued close consultations with our Japanese allies.

QUESTION: Yeah, but U.S. have officials said that they didn’t want to renegotiate this agreement. Is this going to be a problem? Will this affect bilateral relationships?

MR. KELLY: Well, we ““ again, we look forward to continuing this important bilateral relationship, and we look forward to talking to the new government and getting their points of view.

Yeah, in the back.

QUESTION: What is the objective of the trip that Assistant Secretary Campbell is taking?

MR. KELLY: It’s ““ it’ll be his first trip since July. And of course, it’ll be his first opportunity to meet with the new government, so it’s basically consultations with the new government.

QUESTION: Is he going anywhere else?

MR. KELLY: I think that’s all he’s going to. I think he’s only going to Japan.